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SUMMARY
This thesis entails the study o f both why and how decentralisation o f government 
authority takes place. Decentralisation in Canada is explored by investigating a federal 
proposal for the devolution o f active labour market policies from federal to provincial 
governments, and by closely examining the positions taken by both levels o f  government 
during the development o f two federal-provincial labour market agreements in the mid- 
1990s. The two bilateral agreements chosen for this examination are, the Canada-Nova 
Scotia Agreement on a Framework for Strategic Partnerships, and the Canada-Alberta 
Labour M arket Development Agreement.
The central focus o f this research is to examine the extent to which federal and 
provincial governments’ positions on the devolution o f policy are influenced by 
‘political’ and ‘public’ interests. The first argument holds that political imperatives 
influence governmental priorities, attitudes, and motivations as decisions about 
devolution are made. The second argument maintains that governmental positions on 
devolution are founded on the motivation to promote the best outcomes for the public at 
large.
This study employs a research focus that is qualitative in nature, and it draws from 
interpretive and constructivist approaches to inquiry. Interviews were conducted with 
civil servants who represent federal and provincial interests in the provinces o f Alberta 
and Nova Scotia. A comparative analysis o f the evidence found that both political and 
public interests influenced federal and provincial positions on devolution. This research 
illustrates that while political and public interests might be separated analytically, in real 
cases o f policy-making they overlap. Nonetheless, the evidence tips the scales towards a 
political interest explanation much more clearly and convincingly than a public interest 
interpretation.
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Chapter 1
Decentralisation and Devolution in Canada
Introduction
This thesis attempts to contribute to the development o f theory related to the concept o f 
decentralisation. The rationale for the focus o f this thesis is grounded in existing 
theoretical challenges and contemporary political circumstances concerning 
decentralisation. First, decentralisation is an ambiguous concept. Thomas (1994) notes 
the absence o f agreement regarding a universal definition o f decentralisation, and Noel 
(1999) suggests that the concept is vulnerable to multiple interpretations. Second, a broad 
range o f opinions exists as to the relative merits o f decentralisation. Decentralisation may 
be perceived as a strategy to avoid or offload responsibility (Lazar et al., 1992) and as a 
means to enhance autonomy o f peripheral governments (Courchene, 1996).
Further, it is argued that it might lead to the realisation o f greater sensitivity to 
locality and democracy (Benz, 1987); while others are concerned that it may impede 
democracy (Gibbins, 1997a; Keating, 1999). In addition, decentralisation is touted as a 
means to increase economic efficiency and experimentation, which is valued because it 
can lead to innovation (Richards, 1996) and to better-targeted policies (Schwanen, 1996).
These divergent positions may hold important implications for the adoption or 
avoidance o f decentralisation. It is certainly feasible that governments’ particular 
circumstances and opinions about potential problems and merits o f decentralisation, have 
been affected by history, and could result in a range o f positions on the promotion or
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avoidance o f decentralisation. In other words, views on relative costs and benefits o f 
decentralisation may be dependent upon governments’ historical experiences, and unique 
characteristics and circumstances. Through case study examinations o f decentralisation, 
this thesis will illustrate these arguments and will test related theoretical concepts.
This chapter will establish the subject o f the thesis and the central research 
questions to be investigated. The rationale o f the study will be presented and the 
arguments examined in the study will be outlined. In addition, the case study will be 
introduced, and the substance and purpose o f each chapter will be reviewed.
Focus o f the study
Governments are responsible for making decisions about whether or not to encourage 
decentralisation. The central focus o f this research is to examine the influences on such 
decisions, and entails the study o f both why and how decentralisation o f government 
authority takes place. These influences affect the structure and result o f decentralisation. 
For example, some forms o f decentralisation are advocated by the centre in order to 
monitor the activities o f peripheral governments (Lindquist, 1994). Decentralisation and 
devolution will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
This thesis explores decentralisation in Canada by investigating the devolution o f 
labour market policy from federal to provincial governments in the mid- 1990s. In this 
thesis, decentralisation is understood as the transfer o f responsibility and authority from 
central or national governments to peripheral or sub-national governments. Several types 
o f decentralisation exist, including administrative decentralisation. With reference to the 
case study examined in the thesis, devolution is perceived as a type o f  administrative
2
decentralisation, whereby federal government authority and responsibilityv including. 
decision-making, programme design, implementation powers, and finances are devolved 
to provincial governments (Rondinelli, 1999). As illustrated by the case study, 
devolution is the means by which decentralisation is realised and executed.
Research questions
This thesis examines the influences on decisions made about the devolution o f labour 
market policies by federal and provincial governments in Canada in the mid- 1990s. The 
main question that concerns the thesis is: What influences federal and provincial 
governments’ decisions about devolution? More specifically, to what extent are federal 
and provincial governments’ positions on the devolution o f  policy influenced by political 
interests and to what extent are they influenced by public interests? Are decisions about 
devolution primarily driven by political imperatives that maintain or increase federal and 
provincial governments’ power, official status, jurisdiction, and authority, or are these 
decisions based on promoting perceptions o f what is best for citizens and the public at 
large?
From this main focus o f inquiry follow other corresponding research questions to 
be examined in this thesis:
1. How do federal and provincial positions on devolution compare with 
each other?
2. Are federal and provincial positions on devolution driven by similar 
motivations and priorities, or are their respective positions influenced 
by circumstances unique to federal and provincial governments?
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3 . Under what conditions will provincial governments either encourage o r .
avoid devolution?
4. Given the opportunity to receive greater powers and responsibility
associated with devolution, how do different provincial governments 
respond, and what influences these responses?
It is expected that divergent federal and provincial points o f view will allow for a 
wide range o f possible influences on positions concerning devolution. Further, given 
different experiences o f federalism, it is unlikely that all provincial governments will 
react in a similar way to proposals for devolved responsibility. Chapter 4 will address 
issues related to the methodology o f the research at length.
Case study: Labour market development agreements
This research examines a case study o f devolution to answer these questions and to 
address some o f the theoretical assumptions and positions asserted in the literature. The 
case study for the research involves a federal proposal to devolve federal responsibility 
for active labour market policies to provincial governments in the country o f Canada.
The purpose o f choosing to study the devolution o f labour market policy is 
supported by the fact that this policy sector is relatively centralised in Canada, as the 
federal government maintains exclusive legislative control of employment policy under 
the Employment Insurance Act (1996). In contrast to this, and as will be discussed later 
in this thesis, Canada is representative o f a relatively decentralised federation. Moreover, 
provinces that desire greater autonomy in this policy area challenge the notion that labour 
market training policy falls under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Therefore, it is suggested
4
that the choice to study labour market policy will proyide theopportunity to observe . . 
various dynamics pertaining to devolution in the federal state o f Canada.
The time frame o f the research is placed in the early to late 1990s, a period 
marked by particular challenges to status quo federalism. During this time period, the 
federal government faced formidable provincial pressures that brought into question the 
centralised federal authority to represent the interests o f all Canadians. In 1996, 
following many years o f provincial discontent, the federal government o f Canada offered 
to transfer federal jurisdiction over labour market training to provinces and territories.1
The bilateral labour market agreements, which were negotiated with most 
provinces by 2000, differ markedly with respect to the extent o f responsibility devolved 
to provincial authorities. Not all provinces accepted the proposal for devolution, and 
therefore, this labour market policy example is particularly valuable as a test o f the 
research questions. With the key questions as outlined above in mind, the study 
investigates the initiative to devolve the noted labour market policies by closely 
examining two federal-provincial labour market agreements. The two federal-provincial 
agreements chosen for this examination are, the Canada-Nova Scotia and Canada-Alberta 
Labour Market Development Agreements.
Nova Scotia and Alberta represent contrasting provincial experiences within 
Canada. Nova Scotia has a smaller population, a much higher rate o f unemployment, and 
is significantly less financially independent from federal income transfers, as compared to 
the province o f Alberta. Alberta is one o f the wealthiest provinces, and it has one o f the
]For the sake o f both simplicity and convenience the words ‘provinces’ 
and ‘provincial’ will include ‘territories’ and ‘territorial’.
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lowest unemployment rates in Canada. Given these provinces’ unique conditions and 
experiences within Canadian federalism, it is speculated that a comparison may offer 
insights regarding potentially divergent positions on devolution and the particular 
influences and circumstances that lead to these positions. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will 
examine the influences o f decisions made about the case study o f devolution by the 
federal, Alberta, and Nova Scotia governments, respectively.
Main thesis: Political interest and public interest arguments
The main thesis o f this research is that the devolution o f governmental power and 
authority, as illustrated by this policy case study in Canada, is driven primarily by 
political interests, and that other pressures- for instance those o f public interest- are 
secondary.
As a result o f the preceding rationale and research questions, two arguments will 
be examined in this thesis, and as such will provide the framework for the study. Primary 
and secondary data will be used to explore two distinguishable, yet not necessarily 
mutually exclusive arguments. This thesis examines federal and provincial influences on 
decisions made about devolving labour market policy from the perspectives o f both 
‘political interest’ and ‘public interest’ arguments.
The first main argument is that when considering the potential devolution o f 
policy, federal and provincial governments’ positions are influenced primarily by political 
imperatives. These political imperatives affect the priorities, attitudes, and general 
positions o f governments’ as they make decisions about devolution. In short, 
governmental behaviour is primarily motivated by self-preservation. The political
6
interest argument is based on the assumption that all governments are_primarily 
concerned with retaining power and seeking greater political scope (Cairns, 1988).
The second main argument is that federal and provincial governments’ positions 
on devolution are based on the rationale to advance the public interest. Decisions about 
devolution are founded on the desire to promote the best outcomes for citizens. In the 
weighing o f competing interests, including political interests, governments are primarily 
influenced by what is best for the public at large.
As will be discussed at length in the m ethod’s chapter (Chapter 4), it is 
acknowledged that social science cannot prove anything beyond doubt. This thesis 
rigorously tests the supposition that political interests influence federal and provincial 
governments’ positions on devolution by giving full weight to other explanations. 
Evidence that contradicts the main thesis will be examined to determine whether or not 
political interest considerations offer the most convincing explanation for federal and 
provincial governments’ decisions.
While this thesis argues that political interests supersede public interests as 
governments make decisions about devolution, it is recognised that distinguishing 
between these two hypotheses is somewhat artificial, and that significant overlap exists 
between them. Political interest and public interest arguments are distinct, yet they may 
be used to justify each other. For example, governments might advocate for devolution, 
and corresponding autonomy and responsibility to design policies that are perceived as 
extending the public interest. Although governments may be influenced by both political 
interests and public interests, one may take precedence over the other. Thus, this thesis
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will examine primary and secondary evidence in an effort to reveal which Influence is 
m ost salient.
Thesis overview
Prior to concluding this chapter, an overview o f this thesis will be presented. As will be 
argued throughout this thesis, it is necessary to understand federal and provincial 
governm ents’ preferences regarding devolution in light o f historical and contemporary 
circumstances. Therefore, most chapters will discuss the relevance o f particular historical 
events and circumstances with respect to this study’s main thesis. The earlier chapters 
will examine pertinent theoretical concepts and background information that will set the 
context for the latter chapters that deal more specifically with the case study.
The first section o f Chapter 2 will examine the theoretical concepts related to the 
political interest and public interest arguments. An understanding o f federalism in the 
Canadian context will be reviewed in the latter sections o f the chapter. This examination 
will include a brief historical account o f the factors leading up to federation, and the 
circumstances that continue to affect the debate about the contemporary federal system in 
Canada.
This is viewed as essential material to address because the extent o f 
decentralisation and devolution are largely determined by the principles o f federalism. 
Furthermore, several challenges to status quo federalism have served as instigators o f 
reforms taking place during the time period o f this study. Although these pressures will 
be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 5, a general knowledge o f Canadian federalism
provides important descriptive and contextual information needed when examining the 
circumstances related to the case study.
While Chapter 2 examines relevant theory and context for Canadian federalism, 
Chapter 3 will offer a theoretical explication o f decentralisation by examining definitions 
and various interpretations o f the concept. The chapter will distinguish among terms such 
as decentralisation, devolution, centralisation, and deconcentration. Attention is paid to 
this area because it will allow a more thorough analysis o f the case study o f devolution 
explored in the three case study chapters. How decentralisation might be measured is a 
subject discussed in Chapter 3, and this will lead to an assessment o f the extent to which 
Canada is a decentralised federal state. Also examined, is the extent o f decentralisation in 
Canada in comparison with other federal systems.
Further, Chapter 3 will examine the debate about the relative merits of 
decentralisation and devolution. This discussion is offered to gain insight about why 
federal and provincial governments might encourage or avoid devolution. The final 
section o f the chapter will review the case study o f devolution explored in this thesis. For 
example, the range o f choices available to provinces and some o f the federal conditions o f 
the proposal will be reviewed. The theory discussed earlier in the chapter will inform this 
review. Also, this overview will set the context for Chapter 5, which is the case study 
chapter that examines the political and public interest influences o f the federal proposal to 
devolve labour market policies to provinces.
Chapter 4 will address the methodological considerations o f the thesis. This study 
utilises a research focus that is qualitative in nature, and it draws from interpretive and 
constructivist approaches to inquiry. Interviews were conducted with twenty-four
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respondents. Three elected officials were interviewed early in the study to provide 
background knowledge pertaining to the case study and to the motivations o f 
governments in relation to devolution. The remaining twenty-one respondents are either 
federal or provincial civil servants representing federal and provincial jurisdictions o f 
Alberta and Nova Scotia.
All respondents are knowledgeable about the federal proposal for devolution and 
the ensuing negotiations; and, most respondents were directly involved in negotiating the 
labour market agreements for their respective provinces. The interviews focused on 
federal and provincial perspectives about the rationale and content o f the federal proposal 
to devolve labour market policies, and federal and provincial perceptions about priorities, 
and positions on devolution. The primary data consists o f three data sets: (a) Federal civil 
servants (b) Alberta provincial civil servants, and (c) Nova Scotia provincial civil 
servants.
Chapter 4 reviews issues related to methodology including the case study 
approach, field research, and sampling and recruitment strategies. This chapter describes 
the instrument used and procedures followed to collect data. The rationale and process o f 
collecting both primary and secondary data will be discussed, as will issues related to 
informed consent and other ethical considerations. This chapter will discuss the 
limitations and challenges o f the research.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the case study from the perspectives o f the Canadian 
federal government, and the two provincial governments o f Alberta and Nova Scotia, 
respectively. Each o f the three case study chapters employs both primary and secondary 
data sources. In Chapter 5, the rationale and specifics o f the federal proposal are
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examined, with special attention paid, to,the pressures faced by the federal government 
during this time period. As mentioned already, federalism faced particular challenges to 
status quo arrangements between the two levels o f government. The primary purpose o f 
Chapter 5 is to examine the rationale o f the federal offer as interpreted by federal and 
provincial civil servants involved in the process. It will be interesting to compare federal 
and provincial descriptions, as all three data sets represent very different constituents with 
divergent histories that have contributed to differing experiences o f federalism.
Chapters 6 and 7 will examine the positions o f Alberta and Nova Scotia 
concerning the decision to devolve federal labour market policies. These two case study 
chapters evaluate the potential influences o f the provincial positions on devolution, and 
the type o f agreement preferred by Nova Scotia and Alberta, respectively. Attention is 
paid to provincial characteristics, historical experiences, attitudes, and priorities that 
might lead to the decisions made about devolution.
In Chapter 8, a comparative analysis o f the evidence will be provided to answer 
the questions posed by this study. This chapter will compare and contrast each 
government’s position on devolution, and will evaluate the extent to which these 
positions were influenced by political interests and public interests.
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter, and it will review the investigation 
undertaken by this research and it will summarise the central findings o f this thesis. The 
relevance o f the main findings for divergent interpretations o f ‘provincial rights’ will be 
discussed. In addition, this concluding chapter will offer a brief comparative o f Canadian 
devolution and devolution as it has recently unfolded in the United Kingdom.
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Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the rationale o f the study, the central research questions to be 
investigated, and the main thesis that drives this research. The main thesis o f this 
research is that the devolution o f governmental power and authority, as illustrated by the 
Canadian case study, is driven primarily by political interests, and that public interest 
influences are subordinate. The case study under consideration in this thesis involves the 
federal government proposal made in 1996 to devolve labour market policies to 
provinces. This chapter highlighted the issues that will be examined by this research. 
Also, this chapter presented an overview o f this thesis and the primary purpose o f each 
chapter.
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Chapter 2
Federalism in Canada: Implications for Decentralisation and Devolution
Introduction
As reviewed in the introductory chapter, this thesis examines the political and public 
interest influences on federal and provincial governments’ decisions concerning the 
federal proposal to devolve labour market policy to provinces in 1996. A main purpose 
o f this chapter is to discuss in greater detail the theory underlying the political and public 
interest arguments explored in this thesis.
The second central purpose o f this chapter is to explore the significance o f 
federalism for this thesis. To appreciate Canadian governments’ perspectives concerning 
decentralisation and devolution, an understanding o f federalism in the Canadian context is 
necessary. The early beginnings and development o f Canadian federalism will be 
addressed and the tension between federal and provincial perspectives concerning these 
developments will be highlighted. As will be argued in Chapter 5, challenges to status 
quo federalism provide, in part, the rationale for the proposal o f devolution examined in 
this thesis. Therefore, knowledge o f Canadian federalism will provide important 
descriptive and contextual information needed when examining these challenges.
First, this chapter will elaborate on the theoretical foundations o f the political and 
public interest arguments. Next, the chapter will provide an overview o f the features 
common to most federal systems, and it will make reference to Canadian federalism 
specifically. A brief comparison will be made between federal and unitary states in order
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to further distinguish the general features o f federalism. The latter part o f the chapter will 
discuss some o f the distinctive features o f Canadian federalism. Included in this 
discussion are the challenges to federalism that are relevant to this thesis. The main 
points made in this chapter will be summarised in the chapter conclusion.
Political and public interest theory
Broadly, this research examines whether governments’ positions reflect primarily 
political or public interests. This inquiry is pursued with the acknowledgement that 
probably most government decisions are, at least to some degree, based on realising both 
political and public interests. As discussed in Chapter 1, it is recognised that an 
unambiguous separation o f the two potential influences is somewhat artificial, and in 
reality impossible to achieve.
This research does not attempt to prove beyond doubt, the superiority o f one 
argument over the other. Rather, these different hypotheses offer a framework from 
which to examine the influences o f federal and provincial governments’ decisions 
regarding devolution. The case studies investigated concern the federal proposal for 
labour market devolution, and provincial responses from Alberta and Nova Scotia.
Political interest
The federal government’s decision to make the proposal for devolution and the ensuing 
provincial responses, are examined by the first hypothesis that is called, throughout the 
thesis, the ‘political interest argument’. The political interest argument is informed by a 
number o f theories in the political science and public administrative literature. The
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founding principles o f the political interest.argument can be outlined in three related, ye t 
distinct points.
To begin, this argument asserts that governments seek power and are self- 
interested. Secondly, different levels o f government vie for power, and this can be 
observed in intergovernmental relations in general, and by the competition between 
national and provincial interests. Thirdly, this competition is largely influenced by 
regional diversity, and differential economic and power distribution across provinces in 
the federal state. Theoretical concepts related to these three principles will now be 
discussed.
Governments are self-interested and seek to justify their existence to the electorate 
(Cairns, 1988; Jackson and Jackson, 2001). Moreover, government decisions are based 
on the motivation to gain or maintain official political status. To this end, governments 
assert positions that extend their reach and increase their power.
Public choice theory is relevant to the political interest argument. The roots o f 
public choice theory are grounded in classical liberal economics. Thereby, the theory 
holds that the maximisation o f self-interest largely determines all political behaviour, 
including how citizens vote, and the decisions made by politicians and civil servants 
(Kemaghan and Siegel, 1991; Jackson and Jackson, 2001; Dyck, 2000). According to 
public choice theory, governmental positions are mainly influenced by interests that 
benefit politicians and civil servants as opposed to being influenced by any general sense 
o f serving the public good (Jackson and Jackson, 2001). For example, Kernaghan and 
Siegel (1991: 121) assert that public choice theorists contend that the motivation to
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acquire or retain power ‘leads politicians who want to be elected to espouse policies that 
will please voters’.
Following this theoretical stance, the political interest argument in this thesis 
assumes that decisions made by governments are informed by rational analyses that seek 
to maximise political gains and minimise political losses. However, as noted by Jackson 
and Jackson (2001), public choice theory focuses more on:
the process o f policy-making inside government than with the 
wider relationship between government and its socioeconomic 
environment or broader questions o f the distribution o f power, 
ideas and institutions.
(Jackson and Jackson, 2001: 510, italics used in original text)
Public choice theory is criticised for being too narrow in focus, and thus, it does 
not provide a comprehensive enough explanation for political behaviour. It is necessary 
for the political interest argument in this thesis to draw from additional theoretical 
concepts, to incorporate explanations for relations between orders o f governments, and 
the influence o f broader socioeconomic factors.
Similar to public choice theory, state-centred theory supports the assertion that 
governments are self-interested, and it encompasses an understanding about political 
behaviour and the promotion o f the public good (Dyck, 2000). However, state-centred 
theory broadens the political interest argument by incorporating the dynamic o f federal- 
provincial competition.
To begin, state-centred theory sees civil servants and politicians as acting 
autonomously from public preferences. Dyck (2000) argues that instead o f being guided
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by public demands, or broad public consensus o f the public interest, governmental 
authorities make decisions that are driven by their independent interpretation o f what is 
best for society.
Further, state-centred theory is relevant to the political interest argument to the 
extent that federal and provincial politicians and civil servants are perceived as competing 
with each other to extend their own interests. Dyck (2000) holds that state-centred theory 
conceptualises the dynamics o f nation-building as pitted against the drive towards 
province-building, and the other way round. For example, Dyck (2000) states:
Federal authorities argue for federal jurisdiction, revenue, 
conditions, standards, and controls, while provincial authorities 
fight for maximum provincial revenue, flexibility, and freedom.
(Dyck, 2000: 422-423)
According to Simeon (1972: 185), relations between the two levels o f  government 
are affected by the fact that ‘federal and provincial governments compete to gain credit, 
status and importance, and to avoid discredit and blam e’. As devolution has implications 
for shifts in governmental authority and power, conceptualisations o f competition 
between levels o f government are pertinent for this thesis. According to Black and Cairns 
(1971), since the inception o f the Canadian Confederation in 1867, province-building and 
nation-building have evolved along side each other. Cairns (1988) holds that ever since 
Confederation, both federal and provincial levels o f successive governments have focused 
their greatest attention on remaining in power and extending their political reach.
In Canada, there exists a federal-provincial governmental friction exemplified by 
the fact that provincial governments claim to represent communities within the bounds o f
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their governance, and. the federal governm entclaim s to represent all Canadians (Cairns, - _ 
1988). Therefore, conflict abounds, and as noted by Cairns (1988):
In the dialectical process o f federal-provincial controversies, the 
claims o f provincial governments encounter the rival claims o f the 
central government with its constitutional authority to speak for all 
Canadians...The political incentives for the federal government to 
couch its claims in the language o f individual citizen rights and 
obligations engender a direct conflict with provincial claims on 
behalf o f territorially-based communities, the reconciliation o f 
which is worked out in the federal process.
(Cairns, 1988: 113)
In relation to this, provincial and federal governments are influenced and inhibited 
by political history. Here, Cairns (1988) offers the example o f how no provincial leader 
in Quebec would ever publicly doubt the Quebec government’s responsibility to advocate 
French Canadians’ rights. The supposition that governments are affected and constrained 
by political history has relevance for this thesis. In the provincial case study chapters it 
will be argued that historical experiences have contributed to Alberta and Nova Scotia’s 
responses to devolution.
With regards to province-building, Black and Cairns (1971: 95) point to the 
influence o f business, political, and administrative provincial political elite’s in providing 
‘incentives and supports for the expansion o f provincial power against that o f the federal 
government’. In the federal-provincial struggle, provinces seek to protect jurisdictional 
capacity and to expand their reach to ensure that long-term self interests are safeguarded 
(Hueglin, 1990; Dunn, 2001; Brooks, 2000).
Further, over the last three decades, and, in part as a result o f the growing 
sentiment o f Quebec independence, there has been a shift to greater ‘power seeking’
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among both levels o f government (Cairns, 1988: 113). As will be addressed in greater _ 
detail in Chapter 5, the provincial position has strengthened through the ‘deliberate 
improvement o f their own bureaucratic power and capacity’ and the provinces have 
become less tolerant o f the centralised power o f the federal government (Caims, 1988: 
114).
For Hueglin (1990), province-building tends to focus on furthering provincial 
political objectives as opposed to enhancing public interests. Hueglin (1990: 31) 
describes province-building as ‘a self-aggrandizing dynamic o f governments to promote 
their agendas, not those o f the provincial populations they represent’.
Additionally, the contest between province-building and nation-building is 
conceptualised in the notion o f competitive federalism. As Robinson and Simeon (1999) 
state, competitive federalism is typified by:
interregional and intergovernmental conflict, strong pressures for 
decentralization, and expansion by both levels o f government into 
new policy fields in a form of “competitive expansionism”...and 
increasing efforts by both levels o f government to mobilize their 
populations around competing images o f federalism and how it 
should work.
(Robinson and Simeon, 1999: 251-252)
In Canada, provincial resistance o f federal authority, and federal-provincial 
competition in general, is well documented (Cairns, 1988; Duquette, 1995; Simeon, 
2001). Moreover, there is divergence among federal and provincial interpretations o f the 
constitution with respect to which government can justly claim jurisdiction over various 
issues. Throughout the 20th century, areas o f jurisdictional division between levels o f 
government have been disputed including, for example, labour market policy (Haddow,
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1995; Bakvis, 1996; Noel, 1999; Lazar, 2002) and health policy (Cohn, 1996; Maioni, 
1999, Lindquist, 1999).
Furthermore, the theoretical concept o f regionalism is related to the political 
interest argument, as it, in part, provides an explanation for intergovernmental 
divisiveness. Regionalism infers an understanding o f territorially distinct communities 
that are differentiated from other communities predicated on ethnicity, economics, 
religion or language. Further, the inhabitants o f regions are aware o f being a part o f that 
territory and distinct from other communities (Oiling and Westmacott, 1988). Since it 
tends to accentuate dissimilarities among regions, regionalism is sometimes considered to 
impede nation-building (Jackson and Jackson, 2001). As mentioned earlier, regional 
tensions have grown in Canada since the 1960s, resulting in increasing discord among 
provinces, and among provinces and the federal government (Kernaghan and Siegel, 
1991).
Conflict arises when the federal government institutes policies and programmes 
that are perceived from a regional vantage point as disadvantageous for provinces within 
that region. Hence, sometimes, the priorities o f nation-building serve to disadvantage 
regional interests in Canada. For example, Brodie, (1990) and Bickerton (1990) hold that 
federal attempts to establish a healthy national economy have privileged business in 
central Canada, and have therefore constrained economic interests in outlying regions. 
Regionalism and province-building go hand in hand, as the former can result in the latter, 
to counter national interest pressures that are perceived as limiting regional interests.
In this thesis, the province o f Alberta represents regional interests stemming from 
western Canada, and Nova Scotia is representative o f the Atlantic Canadian region.
20
Regional interests have clashed with the national interest from time to time in Canadian 
history. Historical and contemporary examples that exemplify intergovernmental tension 
and federal-provincial discord over the distribution o f power across jurisdictions will be 
reviewed in this thesis.
Historical examples that will be addressed include, Alberta’s opposition to federal 
authority over natural resources in the early 20th century, and the federally driven 
National Energy Programme in the 1980s. Historical examples from an Atlantic Canada 
perspective include Nova Scotia’s disappointment with federal stewardship over the 
National Policy in the early 20th century, and regional development programmes initiated 
in the 1960s. These historical examinations will complement the contemporary analysis 
o f the federal proposal for devolving labour market policies to the provincial level, and 
the ensuing responses from these two provinces.
Public interest
The second hypothesis asserts that federal and provincial governments’ positions on the 
devolution proposal are mainly influenced by concerns that are subsumed in this thesis, 
under the term ‘public interest argument’.
Notably, the public interest is an elusive and oftentimes abstract concept, and 
there is a great deal o f debate over how it should be defined (Kernaghan and Langford, 
1990; Hodgetts, 1981; Hartle, 1979; Meyer, 1975; Held, 1970; Downs, 1967; Schubert, 
1962). Hodgetts, (1981) claims that the idea o f the public interest is:
slippery, mercurial and possessed o f the qualities o f the chameleon; 
it is akin to the Holy Grail, in that its relevance for political life
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may reside in the pursuit and anticipation rather than in the actual 
grasping or attainment o f the reality it is supposed to represent.
' (Hodgetts, 1981:218)
In response to the debate over whether the concept can be operationally defined or 
whether it defies a singular or common definition, some hold that it is preferable to view 
the public interest as having multiple meanings that correspond to multiple interests 
(Kernaghan and Langford, 1990; Schubert, 1962; Sorauf, 1962). In fact, Schubert (1962) 
challenges attempts to empirically investigate the influence o f public interest as it relates 
to explanations o f governmental decision-making. According to Schubert (1962), the 
diversity and elusiveness o f the meaning o f the public interest serves to thwart its viability 
as an explanation for governmental behaviour.
Kernaghan and Langford (1990) maintain that the viability o f the public interest as 
a concept to inform or account for governmental decisions is refuted by public choice 
theorists. As discussed earlier, and as Kernaghan and Langford (1990: 37) state, ‘all 
political actors...act in a rational, self-interested m anner’. Kernaghan and Langford 
(1990: 37) further note that contrary to those who support public choice theory, other 
political theorists see the public interest as a ‘viable’ and ‘valuable’ concept, and they 
‘believe that the concept has important effects on the operation o f political systems and 
the content o f public policies’. For example, Cassinelli (1962: 46) holds that all political 
actions are subject to the scrutiny o f the public interest- what is ‘good for the “public,” 
rather than good for only part o f the public’.
Furthermore, Pennock (1962: 182, 178) proposes that the public interest ‘is a spur 
to conscience and to deliberation’ and he suggests that the concept sheds ‘much o f its 
vagueness’ once it is understood within a particular context. Meyer (1975: 2, 133) asserts
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that the concept o f the public .interest is  necessary ‘to understand the workings o f  public .. 
authority’ and to understand the extent to which ‘the existing authority structure’ is 
‘satisfactory and workable’.
In response to the multitude o f definitions o f the public interest, Hartle (1979) 
delineates the various meanings into three groups. These groupings will be briefly 
reviewed with the intention o f arriving at a refined understanding o f the public interest 
from which to steer the analysis o f the public interest argument in this thesis.
H artle’s (1979: 213) first group o f definitions views the public interest as 
‘resulting from the aggregation, weighting and balancing o f a number o f special 
interests’. For example, government actions are said to be in the public interest if  they 
give ‘equal weight to the welfare o f every member o f society’ (Noll, 1971: 15).
Kernaghan and Siegel (1991) note that viewing the public interest as a process o f 
balancing divergent interests to reach an eventual compromise o f interests, is a beneficial 
approach because it offers a level o f specificity to guide political action. Yet, they caution 
that those groups or collectives who represent various interests are endowed with 
differential levels o f power and resources to assert their positions. Kernaghan and Siegel 
(1991) state:
the interests o f some segments o f the population may not be 
represented because these segments are underprivileged, 
uneducated, uninformed, inarticulate, unorganized, underfunded, or 
simply uninterested.
(Kernaghan and Siegel, 1991: 330)
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The second group o f definitions addresses t h e ‘public interest in terms o f the 
common or universal interests which all (or at least almost all) members o f 
society/nation/political unit share’ (Hartle, 1979: 214). Barry (1962: 199) agrees that the 
public interest should be concerned with those interests that all citizens share, and in 
defence o f universal interests he suggests that even ‘enemies’ have interests in common.
Noting Rousseau’s definition, Held (1970: 106) asserts that ‘if  any given action or 
policy truly is in the public interest, it is, in his view, in the common interests o f all 
individuals o f the community’. Held (1970: 107) further notes that although, for 
Rousseau, a public interest is one that reflects ‘common individual interests’, he 
recognises that common interests do not ‘form the totality o f all interests’. Therefore, 
while ‘valid’ individual interests exist, the ‘valid’ common interest outweighs the former 
(Held, 1970: 107).
Third, the public interest is defined from an idealist perspective. These definitions 
‘judge alternative actions or policies in relation to some absolute standard o f values -  in 
some cases independently o f the preferences o f individual citizens’ (Hartle, 1979: 215). 
For example, according to Cassinelli (1962: 45, 51) ‘the public interest is a standard o f 
goodness by which political acts can be judged’ and ‘when we interpret the public 
interest, we bind ourselves to a conception o f the “good life’” .
Further, Kernaghan and Langford’s (1990: 39) ‘dominant value approach’ to 
decision making in the public interest, states that values such as ‘equality’ and ‘human 
dignity’ are used to discern whether government actions are deemed to be in the public 
interest. Taking a humanistic perspective, Dvorin and Simmons (1972) suggest the public
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interest merit o f governmental strategies is determined by the extent to which they realise 
human well-being and dignity.
In summary, thus far, the political interest argument assumes that when making 
decisions about the case study o f devolution, federal and provincial governments are self- 
interested and are motivated to attain or maintain power and authority. It is presupposed 
that levels o f governments compete for power. And, further, intergovernmental dynamics 
are affected by regional diversity and differential distribution o f economic resources.
According to the public interest argument, governments are motivated primarily 
to meet the public interest, by, for example, expanding or maintaining the welfare o f 
citizens. Therefore, in regards to the subject o f this thesis, decisions about the devolution 
o f labour market policy are influenced by governments’ primary motivation to meet 
public interest. The process o f encouraging the public interest can be seen as an attempt: 
(a) to balance divergent special public interests (b) to meet the common interests o f 
societal members, and (c) judged according to some type o f standard.
Historic overview o f federalism in Canada
According to Gagnon (1995), the Canadian federal system is unique because it has been 
influenced by both American and European federalist traditions. In the case o f the 
former, federalism reflects a tradition steeped in ‘the one-nation concept’, and in the 
corresponding hierarchical relations between national and sub-national units (Gagnon, 
1995: 24). Gagnon (1995: 24) contrasts this with federal traditions in Europe ‘which 
encourage the expression o f many different political streams in the body politic’. These
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two federalist traditions will become evident given a brief historical review o f Canada’ s 
early years.
A brief examination o f the historical development o f Canadian federalism will 
highlight the beginnings o f federal-provincial discord. This historical overview will 
underline the calls for provincial rights and decentralisation from French Canadians in the 
very early years o f Confederation. Based largely on the desire to safeguard French 
culture and language, the provincial rights movement challenged federal supremacy over 
provinces.
At the heart o f the debate are the divergent perspectives regarding the separation 
o f powers between the two levels o f government. As will be examined in the case study 
chapters, similar tension and divergence among perceptions o f federalism are reflected in 
federal and provincial positions on the proposal for the devolution o f labour market 
policy in the latter 20th century.
Confederation was achieved in 1867 by uniting the provinces o f Ontario, Quebec, 
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. However, prior to Confederation, the founding 
nations o f aboriginal peoples, and the two European nations o f France and England 
established early colonial political entities. Almost three decades before Confederation, 
the 1840 Act o f Union unified the colonies o f Upper and Lower Canada, which were 
inhabited primarily by English and French speaking people, respectively. Although 
united, these colonies remained politically and culturally separated.
Politically, the two colonies enjoyed an equal division o f seats in the legislature 
but consensus was frequently thwarted by the cultural divisiveness between French and
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English interests (Archer et al,, 1999). Inherent in this single legislature, was the rule o f 
‘double majority’, where in order to pass a law, the bill had to gain the approval o f the 
majority in both sections o f the legislature. This system was plagued by ‘sectional 
deadlock’, a problem that served to promote the idea o f creating two levels o f government 
(Archer, 1999: 136). Confederation founders, such as John A. Macdonald and George- 
Etienne Cartier acknowledged that:
if  English Canadians and French Canadians were to continue to 
share a single state, the English majority could control the general 
or common government so long as the French were a majority in a 
province with exclusive jurisdiction over those matters essential to 
their distinct culture.
(Russell, 1993: 18)
In addition, with the desire to expand Canada’s boundaries still further, union was 
sought with other colonies such as Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. As the planning 
process for union unfolded, there was much debate over whether Canada should adopt the 
more contemporary federalism as experimented with in the U.S. or whether it should 
follow in the unitary footsteps o f Britain. It is important to recognise the founders’ 
motivations and expectations o f union. It should be noted that the founders may have 
purposely embedded within the 1867 constitution, a lack o f specificity and clarity about 
the division o f jurisdictional power.
In fact, according to Duchacek (1970: 273), the Tack o f verbal precision in all 
federal constitutions’, may be intentional as ‘some founders simply wish to conceal a 
unitary hope in a federal wrapping’. In the case o f Canada, one o f the founding fathers 
and its first Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald, believed that as time progressed, 
citizens’ identity would be facilitated more through federal than provincial means, and
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thus ‘provincial identities would wither away’ (Vernon, 1988: 12). For M acdonald the ~ 
provinces were a means to an end. As Archer et al. (1999) note:
Macdonald saw the new constitution as an instrument for building 
a great nation on the northern half o f the continent, extending from 
coast to coast and expressing itself primarily through its national 
government. The provinces were a necessary concession to 
existing local sentiment, but to Macdonald their powers were 
relatively unimportant in the larger scheme o f things. Ottawa had 
been given all o f the powers important to building a vibrant 
modern state, especially the economic powers and the residual 
power.
(Archer et al., 1999: 140-141)
Though they have merited little significance in recent years, the centralising 
powers o f reservation and disallowance ratified in the 1867 Constitution Act gave the 
federal government the right to postpone, or even prohibit, enactments o f provincial 
legislation (Archer et al., 1999). Armed with the powers o f reservation and disallowance, 
Macdonald justified the subordination o f the provinces by likening the relationship 
between British Parliament and Canada with that o f the relationship between Canada’s 
central and provincial governments. In this interpretation, sovereignty is lodged in the 
British Parliament and the Canadian central government.
Quebec supporters o f decentralisation such as Antoine-Aime Dorion and Jean- 
Baptiste-Eric Dorian were only too aware o f the unitary overtones in the proposed plan, 
and how Confederation would surely ratify a subordinate provincial position in Canada 
(Vipond, 1991). Following Confederation, those who supported decentralisation sought 
to overcome the theoretical problems popularly associated with the division o f 
sovereignty. In part, the American Civil War led many to distrust and fear federalism; 
thus, many centralists like Macdonald adhered to the Blackstonian theory o f  sovereignty,
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which argued that the  ^separation o f sovereignty should not be attempted because such . . 
action could lead only to chaos (Vipond, 1991).
Blackstonian theory held that as time passed, sovereignty shifted from the 
‘monarch to the collective body o f Parliament but by definition it could not be split 
between different legislatures’ (Archer et al., 1999: 142). But the supporters o f 
decentralisation endeavoured to defend their position that it was possible for the 
provinces to share in sovereignty (Vipond, 1991; Archer et al., 1999). The provincial 
rights advocates argued that sovereignty was rooted in British Parliament, and by its 
authority as expressed in the constitution, it appointed ‘secondary sovereignty’ to both 
Canadian central and provincial governments (Archer et al., 1999: 146).
The provincial rights movement gained significant momentum and influence after 
Confederation and eventually the assumption o f divided authority, fundamental to 
federalism took hold. Be that as it may, within the 1867 Constitution Act, lie the seeds 
that corroborate both interpretations that support centralisation and those that advocate for 
decentralisation. The central-peripheral tension built into the inception o f Canadian 
federalism is important to keep in mind, as it reflects the long-standing divisiveness over 
identity and power dynamics inherent in federal-provincial governmental relations.
These dynamics are examined in the case study chapters.
Characteristics o f federalisms
Heywood (2000) identifies four common characteristics o f most federalisms, each o f 
which will be illustrated in reference to federalism in Canada. To begin, in most federal 
systems, national and sub-national governments have certain powers which neither level
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o f government can usurp from the other. A second commonality among federal systems, 
is the presence o f a constitution that defines the powers and responsibilities o f  both levels 
o f government, and which neither level o f government may amend unilaterally.
In addition, the third characteristic is the existence o f a Supreme Court set with 
the powers to interpret the constitution and arbitrate differences o f opinion regarding the 
constitution. Finally, most federal systems are structured to accommodate representation 
o f sub-national governments in decision-making at the national level. The characteristic 
division o f powers in federal states, and the significance o f a federal constitution will now 
be discussed with reference to the Canadian model.
The Canadian federal system is comprised o f three northern territories and ten 
provinces. Canada became a federation with the establishment o f the 1867 constitution, 
which in its allocation o f legislative powers tended to favour the central government 
(Duchacek, 1970; Watts, 1999; White et al., 1998). This can be seen in the powers 
granted to the centre over the economic functioning o f the nation, such as taxation, and 
powers concerning national security issues such as military defence (Duchacek, 1970). 
While in general, federalism, and federal constitutions embody a recognition o f  two 
distinct jurisdictions and related separation o f power, the supremacy o f central 
governments, is valid when considering that ‘the purpose o f the adopted federal structure 
is to either create one nation out o f many or to preserve a nation by a timely recognition 
o f its inner diversity’ (Duchacek, 1970: 233).
The 1867 constitution allocated exclusive federal, exclusive provincial, and 
concurrent federal-provincial legislative powers. In Canada, the majority o f legislative 
powers are assigned to federal and provincial governments, exclusively. This exclusivity
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o f powers enables governments to act autonomously, and it fosters, in principle, c le a r . _ 
lines o f  governmental accountability; nonetheless, despite efforts to discern separate 
spheres, jurisdictional overlap is commonplace (Watts, 1999).
In response to problems associated with overlap, constitutions in many other 
federal states, including Australia, the U.S. and Germany, tend to assign concurrent 
federal-state legislative jurisdiction (Watts, 1999). However, in Canada, concurrent 
federal-provincial legislative jurisdiction is limited only to a few areas including 
immigration, agriculture, natural resources, and old age pensions and benefits.
In Canada, jurisdiction over areas not identified in the constitution, otherwise 
known as residual powers, were allocated to the federal government. In most 
federalisms, residual powers are assigned to the periphery, and therefore Canada stands in 
contrast. Duchacek (1970: 242) notes that the rationale for favouring the federal 
government was associated with the belief that a contributor to the ‘political confusion 
and civil w ar’ in the U.S. was linked to the residual powers endowed in the states. 
However, Watts (1999) contends that the residual power is less important in those 
federations like Canada, where the constitution tends to exhaust the areas assigned to 
either or both provincial and federal jurisdictions.
In most federations, the federal government is assigned areas concerning defence, 
economic and monetary matters, international affairs, key powers o f taxation, and 
transportation. Provincial governments are usually assigned legislative powers over 
social issues, such as health, social welfare, education, and labour (Watts, 1999). 
However, in most federalism systems, including Canada, both federal and provincial 
governments have been active in the areas concerning social and economic policy.
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In the case o f economic policy, provincial governments have asserted their 
involvement in order to address provincial economic interests. For example, provinces 
establish offices in foreign countries to promote trade and other business related 
opportunities (Watts, 1999). And despite the leading role assigned to provincial 
governments over many social policy areas, the federal government is involved in 
standard setting and providing financial support in many social policy areas such as 
health and education.
The third feature common to most federal systems is the presence o f a Supreme 
Court. In Canada, the Supreme Court interprets, amends, and arbitrates disagreements 
concerning the constitution. As an overseer o f the constitution, the Supreme Court plays 
a key role in policy-making, and it attempts to resolve intergovernmental disputes (Watts,
1999). While constitutional considerations are many, a few observations only will be 
addressed here. To begin, as Watts (1999) points out, amending constitutions is a highly 
complex process. Amending formulas need to balance both the rigidity and flexibility o f 
constitutions. Regarding this issue, Watts (1999) explains:
Some element o f rigidity is required to safeguard the protections 
built in for regional and minority interests in the constitutional 
structure o f the federation, since a sense o f regional or minority 
insecurity generally tends to undermine federal cohesion. At the 
same time it is important that as conditions change the federation is 
sufficiently flexible to adapt. Too rigid a constitutional structure 
may seriously weaken the ability o f the federation to respond to 
and accommodate changing internal economic, social and political 
pressures and external international conditions.
(Watts, 1999: 102)
In a review o f constitutional amendments among federal states, Watts (1999) 
notes the constitutional rigidity o f most federations. As comprehensive constitutional 
amendment has proven to be difficult, most federations have sought non-constitutional
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means to realise greater ilexibilily in the. operation o f  federalism (Watts, 1999). On this _ 
issue, Canada falls into the status quo. For reasons that will be dealt with in greater detail 
in Chapter 5, Canada has struggled unsuccessfully to make comprehensive amendments 
to the constitution over the last thirty years. Constitutional debate has not led to 
agreement among provinces and the federal government concerning in particular, the 
position o f the province o f Quebec in the federation.
It will be argued in Chapter 5, that in part, the failure to resolve intergovernmental 
disagreements has led to trends o f non-constitutional intergovernmental arrangements and 
corresponding greater federal collaborative approaches in relations with provinces. The 
policy under consideration in this thesis offers one such example o f greater federal- 
provincial collaborative efforts in the mid- 1990s. The federal proposal to devolve labour 
market policy to provinces followed decades o f constitutional disputes and 
intergovernmental discontent, which, in part, sparked a unity crisis concerning Quebec.
One further issue concerning the constitution and the role o f the Supreme Court 
should be considered. Although the federal government consults with provinces when 
choosing Supreme Court membership, the federal government alone has the power to 
designate judicial representatives to the Supreme Court. It is sometimes suggested that 
these arrangements expand the power o f the federal government, notwithstanding the 
assumption that the Supreme Court is unbiased (Remillard, 1980; Rocher and Rouillard, 
1996). Rocher and Rouillard (1996) comment:
Despite its pretensions to rationality, impartiality and objectivity, 
judicial interpretation is a properly political phenomenon, for it is a 
function not o f a universal and timeless legal logic, but rather is a 
function o f the values, beliefs, and preferences o f the judges 
themselves. The exclusive right o f the federal government to name
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judges allows it ta  select those who are ideologically close or, at .. .. - -
the very least, sympathetic to its views. This, o f course, leads to a
bias in favour o f the federal government.
(Rocher and Rouillard, 1996: 111)
The Constitution Act o f 1982 met with criticism among those who worry about 
federal dominance over the Supreme Court (Vandycke, 1995; Rocher and Rouillard, 
1996). The Act gives the federal government more far-reaching powers with a greater 
ability to intervene in areas supposedly reserved under exclusive provincial jurisdiction, 
including issues related to education and language. Laforest (1992) and Vandycke (1995)
suggest that the Constitution Act o f 1982 advances federal dominance and thus
entrenches further the centralisation o f power in the federation.
The province o f Quebec as represented by the Parti Quebecois government 
vehemently opposed the 1982 Constitution Act largely on the grounds that the Act 
expands the powers and influence o f  the Supreme Court, which in turn strengthens the 
reach o f  the federal government. The 1982 Act champions symmetrical federalism and 
upholds the equality among all provinces instead o f recognising a special status for 
Quebec. As Vandycke (1995: 135) notes, ‘Canada’s cultural dualism has been 
progressively eroded by egalitarian provincialism’. It is held that these amendments 
hinder Q uebec’s ability to assert its desire for a distinct status within Canada, and it 
encroaches upon its capacity to oversee policy issues germane to its cultural makeup, 
such as those related to language (Laforest, 1992; Vandycke, 1995).
Lastly, in order to cultivate co-operative and relevant relations between central 
and peripheral governments, most federal systems establish the opportunity for the 
periphery to have some measure o f input into policy-making at the centre (Heywood,
2000). However, the types o f governmental institutions that facilitate this process differ
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among federations, Federations have adopted governmental institutions that e ith e r. . 
separate or fuse executive and legislative powers. In either case, representatives are 
appointed by and accountable to the electorate.
Canada is sometimes referred to as executive federalism meaning that as a result 
o f its parliamentary system, which fuses executive and legislative power, the executives 
o f both levels o f government form a relationship that largely determines the federal 
makeup (Hueglin, 1990; Heywood, 2000). This is contrasted with the presidential system 
followed in the U.S. where, because o f the separation o f executive and legislative powers 
‘government power is diffused both territorially and functionally, meaning that there are 
multiple points o f contact between the two levels o f government’ (Heywood, 2000: 240).
Comparing the relative benefits and challenges concerning federal governmental 
effectiveness and how representative both types o f systems are, Watts (1999: 85) notes 
that while the ‘presidential-congressional’ type tends to deter the ‘excessive dom inance’ 
o f federal and state governments, it is hindered by ‘deadlocks and impasses’; a set o f 
problems that are exacerbated when different political parties preside over the respective 
jurisdictions. In comparison, in the parliamentary type found in Canada, the federal 
government tends to be more ‘cohesive and decisive’, yet this type is over reliant on both 
strict party discipline, and the exercise o f executive federalism (Watts, 1999: 85).
With regards to representing regional interests at the federal level, the presidential 
type found in the U.S. primarily depends on the president and vice-president in reaching 
balance amongst regional interests. The parliamentary type by contrast, it is argued, has 
far more capacity for the inclusion o f regional interests at the federal level (Watts, 1999). 
This is particularly important to this study, as both Nova Scotia and Alberta desire
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representation at the national level yet their interests are different. The case study 
specifically illustrates these desires and the divergent interests that are expressed by both 
provinces.
Unitary and federal systems: Canadian federalism
In comparison with the separated spheres o f power as found in federal systems, one 
central governmental body reigns supreme in unitary systems. This centralised 
dominance is exemplified in its authority to revise any devolved powers o f peripheral 
governments (Jackson and Jackson, 2001). As will be addressed later, though this central 
body o f  government is supposed to ‘reign suprem e’ this might be an overgeneralisation. 
For example, the unitary system in the U.K. has devolved substantially.
Legislative authority, or sovereignty, is lodged at the centre in unitary systems, 
and both at the centre and periphery in federal systems. As such, Archer et al. (1999) 
suggest that federal systems aim to promote both diversity and unity, whereas unitary 
systems are more concerned with the latter.
According to Duchacek (1970), what differentiates a unitary system from a federal 
one is the lack o f constitutional protection for peripheral governments. Provincial or 
peripheral administrations in a unitary state do not enjoy guarantees o f permanent 
autonomous status. On the other hand, peripheral governments’ ‘existence and 
autonom y’ are safeguarded in federal systems (Duchacek, 1970: 234). In a unitary 
system, the central government ‘has the right to create, extend, circumscribe, or altogether 
eliminate local self-rule’ (Duchacek, 1970: 234). This does not preclude the existence o f
36
some measure o f territorial autonomous status, yet it does render this autonomous status 
as ‘impermanent’ and ‘destructible’ (Duchacek, 1970: 234).
However, Duchacek (1970) qualifies his comment by noting that unitary systems 
rarely eradicate or significantly reduce peripheral autonomy, because to do so could have 
serious political costs. Such actions could be perceived as a lack o f respect for ‘territorial 
pluralism ’ and regional autonomy (Duchacek, 1970: 235). In addition, limiting autonomy 
might carry other costs such as reducing the efficiency o f government administration. 
Also, Duchacek (1970) observes that many unitary systems do guarantee levels o f 
autonomy for the periphery.
In fact, most systems, including unitary ones, embody some measure o f 
decentralisation (Lindquist, 1994; Bakvis, 1981). Bakvis (1981) maintains that:
It would be most unusual to find a system which can be called a 
purely unitary state. Most polities are decentralized in some form, 
even if  it is only at the administrative level, as in France. Federal 
arrangements are unique, however, in that they do give institutional 
expression and a degree o f autonomy to territorially-based 
interests. These territorially-based interests need not be unusually 
strong, although institutions do tend to render the territorial 
cleavage more politically salient than might otherwise be the case.
Societies like Germany which have a federal arrangement may be 
quite homogeneous in terms o f culture, economic interests, and 
other matters. On the other hand, societies having a unitary system 
may be highly pluralistic and fragmented: Belgium is an example.
Thus, it should be kept in mind that both federal and non-federal 
systems can be either homogeneous or pluralistic in their societal 
make-up.
(Bakvis, 1981: 9)
Thus, it is difficult in practice to draw sharp distinctions between unitary and 
federal systems (Bakvis, 1981; Duchacek, 1970). For example, M exico’s federalism 
mimics unitary qualities with its ‘near one party’ system and the U.K.’s unitary system
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has recently developed a pattern o f asymmetrical devolution to administrations in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales (Jackson and Jackson, 2001: 199). It is apparent 
then that both unitary and federal systems can be located near either extreme o f the 
centralisation-decentralisation continuum (Jackson and Jackson, 2001). In other words, 
‘decentralization does not require federalism at all’ (Vernon, 1988: 5).
Distinctive features o f Canadian federalism
Heywood (2000) notes that classical federations are rare and he identifies Canada along 
with the U.S., Switzerland, Belgium, and Australia as nations belonging to this category. 
Classical federalism is defined as the territorial distribution o f power within a nation, 
where sovereignty is shared between two bodies o f government. As power is shared, 
neither level has complete dominion over the other.
However, while Canada is considered a ‘classic’ federal system, the decision­
making process aimed at national concerns is highly centralised. The tendency towards 
exclusive federal or exclusive provincial jurisdiction in Canada contributes to the 
centralisation o f national issues. Therefore, in the spectrum o f ‘classic’ federal states, 
Canada is primarily an example o f unilateral federalism, as collaboration and consultation 
between federal and provincial levels are minimised (Biggs, 1996; Maxwell, 1997).
As will be addressed in Chapter 5, the view that Canada’s approach to federalism 
is a relatively unilateral one, contributed to a notable shift towards a more collaborative 
federalism in the mid- 1990s. According to Vernon (1988), the debate in Canada about 
the strengths and weaknesses o f federalism has shifted over the decades from arguments 
that extol the virtues o f centralisation to arguments that support the opposite.
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Criticisms o f federalism made in the 1930s focused on the federal governm ent’s .. 
apparent incapacity to offer effective support in response to problems caused by the Great 
Depression. Arguments about the best strategy for rapid recovery favoured a centralised, 
federal approach and decisive actions by ‘big government’. In marked contrast, debates 
about the desirability or legitimacy o f the federal government since the 1970s have tended 
to discredit or question the advantages o f centralisation.
Canada, as exemplified by its territorial divisions, is regarded by Roskin et al. 
(1997: 252) as a ‘federation with strong centrifugal tendencies’. One framework used to 
describe Canadian federalism is a continuum with opposite polls that represent two very 
different conceptions about the goals or purposes o f federalism. At one end o f the 
continuum ‘centripetal federalism’ supports the preference o f a strong federal government 
that gains its strength from restricting the power o f provincial governments. At the other 
end o f  the continuum ‘centrifugal federalism’ favours just the opposite: increasing 
provincial powers that result from a weakening o f federal government authority 
(Kernaghan and Siegel, 1991). Discussing this continuum Stevenson (1982) states:
The concepts and continuum are possible because federalism itself 
is a compromise between unity and diversity, symbolized by two 
levels o f government which ostensibly represent these two aspects 
o f the federal polity. Federalism has been admired by some 
because it promotes unity and by others because it protects 
diversity; conceivably it does both. However, in practice most 
adherents o f federalism, and most citizens o f federal states, are 
more deeply committed to one o f these goals than to the other, so 
the two goals correspond with two concepts o f federalism, 
depending on which is emphasized.
(Stevenson, 1982: 41)
As discussed earlier, models o f federal systems often try to ensure both a 
substantial level o f local autonomy and an adequate measure o f federal power. All
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federalisms accord peripheral constituents a measure o f power that cannot be readily 
usurped by the centre. (Roskin et al., 1997). However, the concepts o f centripetal and 
centrifugal federalism are important and useful because they incorporate an idea o f 
process and development. They suggest that, over time, one level o f government seeks to 
draw power from the other.
This challenges static definitions o f federalism that refer to divided sovereignty 
with delineated powers. Inherent in federalism is a continuing paradox or tension 
between two competing ends. Thus, federalism in the Canadian context can be viewed as 
a mechanism, which balances decentralisation and centralisation, as it challenges regional 
disparities and pan-Canadian societal inequity, while at the same time sanctioning ‘full 
expression o f diversity’ (Gagnon, 1995: 30).
However, federalism’s tolerance for diversity is strongly contested by those 
centrifugal interests stemming from the province o f Quebec, in particular (Rocher and 
Rouillard, 1996; Noel, 1999). Pressures from Quebec and other provinces for increased 
decentralisation are discussed in Chapter 5. It is argued in this thesis that these pressures 
influenced the federal government’s decision to propose devolution o f labour market 
policy to provinces.
Conclusion
This chapter reviewed theory related to the main arguments examined in this thesis. The 
political interest argument holds that governments are influenced by the drive to seek and 
maintain power when they make decisions about the devolution o f policy. Thus, 
governments are motivated primarily by self-preservation as they seek out electoral
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support, and compete with each other to sustain and extend their political reach. In the 
political interest argument, competition among governments is influenced by regional 
diversity, and unequal power and economic distribution across the Canadian federal state.
Contrary to the political interest argument, the public interest argument asserts 
that governments make decisions on devolution based on the best interests o f citizens. 
Three main categories o f public interest were reviewed. Noted was that the public 
interest is interpreted as an attempt to balance divergent special public interests, and to 
meet the universal interests o f citizens’, and lastly, public interest is judged according to 
some type o f standard.
Further, the chapter gave an overview o f the early development o f the Canadian 
federal system. The central features o f Canadian federalism were discussed, and 
controversial issues about divided sovereignty were highlighted. The continuum o f 
centrifugal and centripetal conceptions o f the Canadian federal state pointed to 
developmental processes that challenge static perceptions o f federal states.
The political interest argument, which, in part, contends that governments attempt 
to gain power at the expense o f the other, has relevance to the long-standing federal- 
provincial divisiveness evident in Canadian federalism, as discussed in this chapter. The 
clashing o f  national interests with sub-national interests is rooted in Canada’s pre- 
Confederation history. Also, public interests are relevant in the development o f the 
Canadian federal state. For instance, Quebec’s attempts to protect French language and 
heritage can be seen as an attempt to contribute to the public interest o f French speaking 
Canadians.
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The discourse on federalism addressed in this chapter provides information that 
will be helpful when examining definitions and theoretical concepts pertaining to 
decentralisation and devolution. In Chapter 3, the debate concerning centralisation and 
decentralisation will be explored further, and the case study o f the devolution o f labour 
market policies will be discussed.
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Chapter 3
Understanding Decentralisation and Devolution in the Canadian Federal
State
Introduction
This chapter will begin by defining terms relevant to the thesis, including centralisation, 
decentralisation, devolution, and deconcentration. As mentioned earlier, the concept o f 
decentralisation is subject to multiple interpretations (Thomas, 1994) and therefore it is 
important to make some observations about the challenges in achieving consensus on 
definitions related to concepts pertinent to this thesis. Next, the extent o f decentralisation 
in Canada will be examined and comparisons with other federal states will be made.
Knowledge about decentralisation and devolution in the Canadian context will be 
instructive when examining the case study investigated in this thesis. One o f the primary 
purposes o f this chapter is to better comprehend why federal and provincial governments 
might encourage or avoid decentralisation and devolution. Therefore, the debate over 
centralisation and decentralisation will be presented. Divergent views about 
decentralisation might be reflected in federal and provincial governments’ positions on 
the proposal for labour market policy devolution.
In the latter part o f the chapter the case study will be described. Details about the 
official federal proposal to devolve labour market policies to provinces will be helpful 
when examining the influences o f the federal initiative and provincial government 
responses from Alberta and Nova Scotia.
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Definitions pertaining to devolution in Canada
According to Heywood (2000), centralisation and decentralisation refer to the division o f 
political power between national and sub-national governments. Centralisation involves 
the concentration o f power at the national governmental level, while decentralisation 
refers to political power shifting towards peripheral or sub-national governments. Some 
o f the concepts discussed in the previous chapter have relevance for how these divisions 
are structured. For example, the degree o f centralisation or decentralisation is dictated by 
the constitution and the resulting official divisions o f roles and responsibilities (Heywood, 
2000).
Notwithstanding these defining characteristics, it is acknowledged that 
differentiating centralisation from decentralisation is a complex task. For example, 
reform can engender both the centralisation and the decentralisation o f different 
authorities at the same time, and thus, it could be asked if one level o f government 
‘centralizes the financing o f a program, but decentralizes responsibility for administering 
the program, is that decentralization or centralization?’ (Lindquist, 1994: 421).
In contrast, devolution ‘at least in its legislative form, establishes the greatest 
possible measure o f decentralisation within a unitary system o f government’ (Heywood, 
2000: 239). Devolution represents the transfer o f central or national powers to peripheral 
or sub-national bodies and the resulting ‘devolved bodies thus constitute an intermediate 
level o f  government between central and local government’ (Heywood, 2000: 238).
Devolution, compared to federalism, lacks sovereignty as its newly founded 
powers ‘are conferred by, the centre’ (Heywood, 2000: 239). Administrative devolution
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represents the weakest type o f devolution as it lacks the authority to create policy and 
thus, devolved bodies are restricted to the implementation o f policies alone. In 
comparison to this, legislative devolution denotes both greater fiscal and policy-making 
independence. Devolution occurs in response to centrifugal pressures that exist within 
the state. It is interesting to note that ‘devolution may fuel centrifugal pressures by 
strengthening regional, ethnic and national identities, leading to federalism or even state 
breakdown’ (Heywood, 2000: 239).
Defining the degrees o f decentralisation is a complex process, and as suggested 
above, is only possible if  different types o f  decentralisation are taken into account. For 
instance, Watts (1999) differentiates between jurisdictional decentralisation and 
decentralisation o f federal decision-making. Where the latter deals with the extent to 
which peripheral governments have the opportunity to participate in making decisions at 
the national level, jurisdictional decentralisation involves both scope o f jurisdiction and 
degree o f  autonomy. Watts (1999) notes:
....decentralization o f jurisdiction, has itself two aspects to be 
distinguished: the scope o f  jurisdiction  exercised by each level o f 
government, and the degree o f  autonomy or freedom from control by other 
levels o f government with which a particular government performs the 
tasks assigned to it.
(Watts, 1999: 71-72, italics used in original text)
While noting the difficulty inherent in assessing and measuring scope o f 
jurisdiction and degree o f autonomy among federations, Watts (1999) suggests that such 
an endeavour necessitates the consideration o f several indicators, three o f which will be 
discussed herein: legislative, administrative and financial decentralisation.
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Legislative decentralisation
Legislative decentralisation is an indicator o f the scope o f decentralisation. Legislative 
decentralisation has to do with the constitutional allocation o f national and sub-national 
powers. Among federations the extent o f power allocated by constitutions may not be 
uniform. Thus, it is important to take into consideration the extent to which constitutional 
divisions o f power are actually exercised by the different levels o f government (Watts, 
1999).
The degree o f autonomy granted to each level o f government is influenced by 
whether the constitution allocates exclusive federal or provincial powers, concurrent 
federal-provincial powers, or shared federal-provincial powers. Exclusive powers 
indicate that either the federal or provincial government has sole legislative authority over 
a subject matter. In Canada, examples o f exclusive legislative authority include federal 
jurisdiction over unemployment insurance and provincial jurisdiction over education.
Concurrent powers indicate that both federal and provincial governments have 
legislative authority over a subject matter. Matters o f concurrent legislative authority are 
limited in the Canadian federal system, and include immigration, pensions, and 
agriculture. Finally, shared powers imply that different aspects o f a matter are allocated 
exclusively to the federal and provincial governments. For example, in Canada, the 
federal government has exclusive legislative authority over banking, where provincial 
governments have sole authority over credit unions and savings.
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Administrative decentralisation
Administrative decentralisation is another indicator o f the scope o f decentralisation. This 
type o f  decentralisation is either constitutionally assigned, or established by 
intergovernmental arrangements. Basically, administrative decentralisation occurs when 
one level o f government relies upon another for the administration o f policies for which it 
has legislative responsibility. Also significant is the degree to which the government with 
constitutional jurisdiction steers or controls the administrating government’s 
implementation activities.
Watts (1999) suggests that the degree o f provincial autonomy is influenced by 
whether delegation o f authority is constitutionally based or the result o f  an 
intergovernmental agreement. For example, when administrative decentralisation results 
from shifting federal constitutional authority to provinces, by means o f an 
intergovernmental agreement, the biases o f the federal government can strongly influence 
the extent o f provincial autonomy. This issue has relevance for the case study explored in 
this thesis. As will be discussed later in this thesis, the federal government attempted to 
extend its own political interests while limiting provincial autonomy through asserting 
particular stipulations in the official proposal for devolution.
Financial decentralisation
Financial decentralisation can be examined by comparing federal government revenues as 
a percentage o f expenditures incurred at all governmental levels (Watts, 1999). Both the 
scope o f financial centralisation or decentralisation and degree o f financial autonomy can 
be assessed by comparing revenues raised by individual governments and by controlling
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for transfers o f revenue between governments. The extent o f financial decentralisation - 
increases as the proportion o f federal revenue and expenditure decreases, compared to the 
revenue and expenditures o f provincial and municipal governments. With reference to 
programme administration and service delivery, the scope o f financial decentralisation 
(but not the degree o f financial autonomy) can be assessed by comparing federal 
government expenditures after transfers as a percentage o f expenditures o f all levels o f 
government.
The scope o f decentralisation and degree o f autonomy are affected also by the use 
o f spending power. This occurs when one government exercises control through the 
spending power to have influence in an area outside its jurisdiction. (Watts, 1999; Rocher 
and Rouillard, 1996).
The extent o f decentralisation in Canada
Taking into consideration the different types o f decentralisation as just discussed, Watts 
(1999) analyses the extent o f decentralisation in Canada. In a comparative analysis 
involving twelve federalisms Watts (1999) finds that while Canada is not the most 
decentralised, it is one o f the more decentralised federations in the study2.
For example, when examining relative legislative power, Canada is less 
decentralised in culture and policy related to language than is Switzerland and Belgium 
and less decentralised than the U.S., Switzerland, Germany, and Austria with respect to 
the residual power. W atts’ (1999) analysis finds that Canada is less decentralised in the
2W atts’ (1999) comparator federations are: Canada, United States, Switzerland, Australia, 
Germany, Austria, India, Malaysia, Belgium, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Pakistan.
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area o f unemployment insurance than the U.S., Switzerland, Australia, and Germany. 
With regard to this matter, Canada’s position in comparison to other federal systems is 
significant, as the case study explored in this thesis is the federal proposal to devolve Part 
II o f the 1996 Employment Insurance Act. As set out in the introduction, details 
pertaining to the case study will we examined later in this chapter.
Different from many other federations, provincial autonomy is emphasised in 
Canada. Provincial autonomy is significant because legislative jurisdiction in Canada is 
largely exclusive; whereas, in several other federations, such as Australia and Germany, 
legislative authority tends to be shared or concurrent. As federal government control 
tends to predominate in shared and concurrent jurisdictional arrangements, provincial 
jurisdictional autonomy appears to be greater in Canada (Watts, 1999).
In Canada, this tendency towards exclusivity is demonstrated by the fact that the 
federal government enjoys exclusive jurisdiction o f unemployment insurance, where 
among the twelve federations studied, five constituents only (four federal: Austria, 
Belgium, Spain, Malaysia and one state: India) can claim the same arrangement. With 
respect to post-secondary education in Canada, provinces hold exclusive jurisdiction and 
in four other federations only (three federal: Austria, Malaysia, Spain and one state: 
Belgium) does exclusive jurisdiction exist among the federations in the study3.
In Canada, administrative responsibility primarily mirrors legislative 
responsibility. Other federations, such as Germany and Switzerland are centralised in 
terms o f legislative jurisdiction but have relatively decentralised administrative
3For two o f the study federations, namely Pakistan and Czechoslovakia, the examples o f 
unemployment insurance and post-secondary education are neither registered nor 
evaluated in W atts’ (1999) study.
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arrangements (Watts, 1999). In contrast to Canada, the peripheral or cantonal public 
service bodies in these administratively decentralised federations are much larger than 
those found at the federal government level. As an indicator o f the scope o f 
decentralisation concerning legislative and administrative responsibilities, in 1993, 
compared to the federations in the study, Canada’s federal expenditure as a percentage o f 
all government expenditure was less, save Switzerland, at 40.6 per cent and 36.7 per cent 
respectively.
In terms o f provincial autonomy, Canada is once again among the most 
decentralised federations when federal and all other government revenues (before 
transfers) are compared with each other. W atts’ (1999) study indicates that in 1993, 
Canadian federal revenues before transfers set at 47.7 per cent represented the lowest 
federal revenues except for Swiss federal revenues that amounted to 44.7 per cent in the 
same year. W atts’ (1999) study finds Canada’s federal revenues (before transfers) as a 
percentage o f total government revenues (47.7 per cent) are significantly lower than 
Germany (64.5), the U.S. (65.8), and Australia (69.1).
Importantly, in Canada, this trend towards financial decentralisation, which does 
provide for some measure o f provincial autonomy, is pitted against the federal use o f the 
spending power to influence areas outside o f federal jurisdiction. Governments gain 
control and influence over areas outside their jurisdictions through making conditional 
financial contributions. The use o f the federal spending power represents ‘a serious 
centralizing counterweight to the otherwise relative autonomy o f the provinces’ (Watts, 
1999: 77).
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In general, W atts’ (1999) study supports the supposition that Canada is a 
relatively decentralised federation. Noting the difficulty inherent in demarcating degrees 
o f decentralisation, Watts (1999) states:
Canada, in terms o f the scope o f responsibilities and autonomy exercised 
by the provinces would appear on balance to be one o f the more 
decentralized federations, although not indisputably the most 
decentralized...There are some specific respects in which the constituent 
units in various other federations have had more extensive responsibilities 
or more autonomy or have exercised greater influence on federal policy 
making than the Canadian provinces. But overall, the Canadian provinces 
in terms o f jurisdiction and fiscal autonomy across a wide range o f policy 
areas o f  major importance to their residents have been more powerful than 
the constituents in most other federations.
(Watts, 1999: 79)
Drawing attention specifically to the fiscal autonomy o f the provinces, others also 
evaluate Canada as a decentralised federation. For example Bird and Tassonyi (2001) 
note:
Canada is one o f the most decentralized countries in the world. Canadian 
provinces are responsible for most major social expenditures and have a 
virtually free hand in levying taxes. They face essentially no constitutional 
restraints on tax rates, bases, or collection systems and no requirement to 
harmonize either with each other or with the federal government. All 
provinces receive essentially unconditional transfers from the federal 
government, and, in some provinces, such transfers are more important 
sources o f revenue than their own taxes. Moreover, if  provinces wish to 
borrow, they may borrow as and from whom they wish, with no central 
review or control.
(Bird and Tassonyi, 2001: 85-86)
Notwithstanding W atts’ (1999) and Bird and Tassonyi’s (2001) analyses, 
however, the degree to which Canada is a decentralised federation is debatable. While 
some contend that Canada is quite decentralised (Leslie, 1993; Maxwell, 1996; Watts, 
1999), others draw attention to the unilateral and centralised tendencies o f the federation 
(Richards, 1998; Rocher and Rouillard, 1996; Noel, 1999).
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Studies that conclude that Canada is a relatively decentralised state based on the 
predominance o f jurisdictional exclusiveness o f federal and provincial governments are 
criticised for ignoring the political influence o f the federal use o f the spending power, and 
thus, ‘it is necessary to go beyond simple constitutional prescriptions to address the real 
dynamics o f federal-provincial relations’ (Rocher and Rouillard, 1996: 107).
As mentioned earlier, it is important to recognise the distinctions between 
constitutional arrangements and the practice o f politics. The case study examined in this 
thesis allows for the exploration o f this distinction. It will be argued in the case study 
chapters that federal and provincial governments’ decisions about devolution o f  labour 
market policy are influenced by factors beyond the provisions outlined in the 
constitutions.
Furthermore, there appears to be a lack o f consensus in determining which tools or 
methods to employ when measuring and comparing relative decentralisation across 
federations. Rocher and Rouillard (1996) are critical o f the view that decentralisation is 
greater when the percentage o f conditional transfers is lower than the percentage o f all 
other revenues, arguing that a higher proportion o f unconditional revenue does not 
guarantee greater decentralisation. They offer the example that a province may accrue 
additional revenue by means o f borrowing but that the subsequent increase in 
unconditional revenue compared to conditional revenue does not lead to greater 
decentralisation (Rocher and Rouillard, 1996: 107). Further on this point, it is suggested 
although it may choose to decrease the amount o f conditional funds, the federal 
government may continue to hold provinces accountable for adhering to nationally 
imposed standards (Brooks, 2000; Richards, 1998). Thus, the extent o f decentralisation 
in Canada is debatable.
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The challenge o f determining the extent o f decentralisation in the Canadian 
federation is limited further by definitional problems related to distinguishing different 
types o f decentralisation, and ensuing characteristics o f federal-provincial arrangements.
It has been suggested that an examination o f the concept o f deconcentration can advance 
a more comprehensive understanding o f the issues at hand (Kernaghan and Siegel, 1991; 
Barrette, 1992; Rocher and Rouillard, 1996; Lindquist, 1994).
The term 4deconcentration’ is useful in this discussion because it draws attention 
to the limitations imposed on the autonomy o f the level o f government that receives 
devolved or 4deconcentrated’ powers. When policy is deconcentrated it is assumed that 
strategic powers are lacking and that the central government, while shifting some measure 
o f authority to peripheral governments, retains legislative control and the means to 
closely monitor and sometimes dictate how the delegated powers are implemented.
Highlighting the importance o f distinguishing political or legislative 
decentralisation from administrative decentralisation, Rocher and Rouillard, (1996: 102) 
contrast strategic power (control over directions and goals) with operational power 
(control over decisions about how to achieve the former). It is argued that it may be 
imprudent to conceive operational power as an indication o f decentralisation. More 
specifically, even though an expansion o f public expenditures may go hand in hand with 
operational power, assessment cannot ignore the issue o f strategic power that imposes 
limits upon provinces by way o f federally determined conditions (Rocher and Rouillard, 
1996). The failure to make this distinction may result in confusion and ambiguity in 
assessments that attempt to define and measure decentralisation.
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According to Barrette (1992), deconcentration involves the delegation o f 
particular powers and responsibilities which:
allows a deconcentrated unit to take some more or less limited decisions, 
within a framework defined by the central authority, which nevertheless 
preserves the totality o f powers and the general responsibility o f the 
mandate.
(Barrette, 1992: 83)
Lindquist, (1994) agrees that deconcentration may not result in greater authority 
being passed down to peripheral units, and in fact notes that deconcentration may actually 
serve to inform the centre about the actions taking place in the periphery.
From the perspective o f the structural organisation o f public administration, 
Kernaghan and Siegel (1991: 50) hold that decentralisation and deconcentration can be 
differentiated by highlighting the degree o f ‘real decision-making authority’ housed in the 
body o f  the peripheral organisation. Moreover, the distinct benefits o f decentralisation 
and deconcentration as approaches to organisation, illustrate the complex challenges to 
balance the sometimes disparate objectives o f enhancing local sensitivity, and 
maintaining equity and standards across a country as large and diverse as Canada 
(Kernaghan and Siegel, 1991).
It is suggested by Kernaghan and Siegel (1991), that with decentralisation, local 
conditions and regional co-ordination can be given greater attention as the authority 
contained in the peripheral governing body is significant. The extent o f authority in 
decentralisation is greater when measured against the much lesser extent o f  such authority 
in cases o f deconcentration, where central bodies retain authorities that result in uniform 
dispersion o f standards across geographic regions. The benefit o f deconcentration is
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found in the maintenance o f uniformity, and is preferred when assuring the existence o f 
standardisation is desired (Kernaghan and Siegel, 1991). Thus, it would seem that 
standardisation comes at a cost to local autonomy.
In sum, though controversy exists over the extent o f decentralisation in Canada, it 
appears that Canada is representative o f a relatively decentralised federal state. Further, 
definitions o f concepts related to decentralisation will inform the analyses that take place 
in the case study chapters. As will be discussed, perceptions about the extent o f 
devolution contained in the federal proposal differed among federal and provincial 
governments. Also, these divergent perceptions help to shed light on the political interest 
and public interest influences o f federal and provincial governments’ decisions and 
positions on devolution.
The decentralisation-centralisation debate
The debate over decentralisation is informed in part by context. According to Lindquist 
(1994), examining the debate about decentralisation free o f contextual bias can render the 
argument to one o f relative merits and limitations o f organisational structures. Arriving at 
the best organisational structure involves deliberation about particular divisions o f 
responsibility among governmental levels in order to maximise policy and programme 
outcomes.
However, Lindquist (1994: 424) notes that, there is more to the debate over 
decentralisation than ‘finding the right balance o f  authorities and organizational capacities 
within jurisdictions’. Moreover, fiscal issues that suggest the need for revised 
intergovernmental arrangements, along with provincial demands for expanded powers
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akin to greater autonomy, result in pressures for decentralisation. According to Lindquist 
(1994) these latter pressures:
create a different set o f incentives, constraints, and dynamics on what 
might otherwise be touted as a rational discussion o f organizational design. 
Governments have considerable incentive, at the very least, to defend their 
jurisdiction in order to demonstrate they represent their constituents, and to 
expand their tu rf and claim new jurisdiction in order to show that they are 
proactive and responsive.
(Lindquist, 1994: 424)
Prior to examining the case study o f devolution, this section o f the chapter will 
review the debate over decentralisation. In general, the debate over decentralisation has 
relevance for federal-provincial dynamics as it will broaden the notions o f nation-building 
and province-building. Moreover, this examination will shed light on some o f  the reasons 
why provinces might either encourage or avoid devolution o f federal authority. As will 
be seen, province-building needs to take into account the differential wealth o f  provinces. 
Provinces do not have similar views on decentralisation. Different provincial experiences 
within the Canadian federal state result in a range o f views about the relative value o f 
decentralisation and devolution.
The debate over decentralisation is substantial. In the first part o f this section the 
historical significance o f centralisation will be reviewed. This material will inform the 
second part o f this section that will examine two broad categories o f the decentralisation- 
centralisation debate:
(a) Responsibility for national concerns, and implications for standards and 
equity:
Divergent perspectives about which level o f government is most justified to 
represent national concerns will be addressed. Arguments have been lodged from
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centralists and decentralists in reference to national standards and equity. Some o f 
these arguments will be reviewed, including the debate about how decentralisation 
affects national standards and equity. Arguments for and against decentralisation 
in the form o f inter-provincial arrangements to oversee national concerns will also 
be presented.
(b) Decentralisation and effects on policy:
Arguments that favour decentralisation based on its beneficial effects on policy 
will be discussed. Arguments that support decentralisation point to the benefits o f 
flexibility in the practice o f federalism; asymmetry is prized because it encourages 
provincial policy experimentation and innovation. Further, it is argued that 
decentralised policies can be more effective and more sensitive to local needs and 
issues than centralised policies. Also, this section will review arguments for 
decentralisation that are based on perceptions that decentralisation has the 
potential to realise efficiency gains. One argument made is that efficiency is 
impeded by the overlap and duplication found in provincial and federal policies. 
These arguments will be dealt with in the latter half o f this section.
Historical significance o f centralisation
According to Lindquist (1994) when examining decentralisation, it is important to 
recognise the perceived merits o f centralisation:
...to take advantage o f economies o f scale, to create a critical mass o f 
expertise, to equalize disparities across component units, and to provide 
another level o f accountability and control.
(Lindquist, 1994: 423)
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Generally it is held that central governments are best situated to represent interests 
which concern the whole country, in contrast to ‘its various parts’, which may be 
composed o f ‘sectional, ethnic or regional groups’ (Heywood, 2000: 238). Moreover, 
centralisation can rectify inequalities across peripheral units, as those regions with high 
social need are often limited in the extent to which they can raise funds in response to 
social problems (Heywood, 2000). With regard to this, it is critical not to lose sight o f the 
reasons for centralisation o f social policy during the first half o f the twentieth century.
It is well understood that centralisation allowed for the establishment o f pan- 
Canadian social policies and programmes (Kent, 1996; Banting, 1997; Cameron, D.R. 
1994; Lindquist, 1994; Maioni, 1999). It is a popular assumption that social policy is 
very closely tied to the federal role in Canada. Largely, the Great Depression altered the 
provisions set out in the 1867 Constitution, when the country faced overflowing 
municipal welfare rolls and soaring unemployment. In response, the federal government 
began to play a key role in national social policy.
In 1941, federal and provincial governments agreed on tax arrangements that 
permitted the federal government to ‘occupy tax fields and collect taxes for the provinces’ 
(Muszynski, 1995: 292). These arrangements established the onset o f federal control over 
spending, which in turn laid the foundation for the post-war era o f social policy 
development and Canada, along with several other industrialised nations, entered into the 
Keynesian period o f macro-economic welfare state development.
Through federal conditional grants and cost sharing programmes, both federal and 
provincial levels o f government established a series o f social policies and programmes 
between 1945 and 1962 (Muszynski, 1995). In the 1960s, for instance, the federal
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government introduced the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan. Other policies and 
programmes introduced in the 1960s included the national health insurance system, and 
federally funded post-secondary education. Also established was the Canadian 
Assistance Plan, where the federal government paid 50 percent o f provincial costs related 
to social assistance.
Muszynski (1995) notes that while Quebec traditionally opposed a strong federal 
involvement, the other provinces, while not wholly satisfied with extensions o f federal 
influence, have not been displeased to receive the benefits o f federal monies. In some o f 
the arguments that follow in the next part o f this section, the merits o f centralisation are 
disputed, and decentralisation is often posed as the most favourable alternative.
Responsibility for national concerns: Implications for standards and equity
A central argument against decentralisation is the worry that decentralisation will 
undermine national standards that relate to the issue o f pan-Canadian equity (Collins, 
1996; Gibbins, 1997b; Maioni, 1999). Some commentators such as Gibbins (1996) and 
Deber (1996) hold that Canadian citizens support national social programmes and some 
measure o f national standards, which ensure that similar service levels are available for 
all Canadians, regardless o f provincial residence. Given the popularity o f social 
programmes, such as Medicare4, it is suggested that options to decentralise social policy 
should be scrutinised to account for how national standards will be affected (Gibbins, 
1996).
4In a comparison with ten countries, Blendon et al. (1990) found that Canadian citizens 
had the highest levels o f satisfaction with their health care system.
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Gibbins (1997b) argues that a highly probable outcome of increased 
decentralisation is a decrease in public support for national efforts, such as maintaining 
national standards. This is a salient issue to consider because the degree o f wealth varies 
widely across the provinces o f Canada. Efforts to redistribute attempt to balance this 
variance through an equalisation scheme, which, through a centralised federal 
mechanism, provincial revenues are transferred from richer to poorer provinces.
In 1957, the fiscal equalisation scheme was initiated in Canada and in 1982 it was 
entrenched in the constitution. In the form o f unconditional cash transfers, the scheme 
provides fiscal support for poorer provinces to ensure the availability o f similar levels o f 
public services and similar levels o f corresponding taxation across the country. The 
equalisation programme is an instrument that attempts to achieve and maintain provincial 
equity. However, among the richer provinces, mainly, Alberta, British Columbia and 
Ontario, equalisation schemes have been challenged, as these provinces have asserted 
their desire for the authority and funding o f social policy initiatives to be decentralised to 
the provincial level (Armitage, 1996). With greater decentralisation, public support may 
reflect provincial rather than national priorities.
Gibbins (1997b) contends that because social policy asymmetry among provinces 
is the goal o f decentralisation, steps to assure symmetry o f outcomes contradict with the 
rationality o f  decentralisation. Gibbins (1997b) notes:
Decentralization makes sense if one recognizes that provinces are and 
should be significantly different with respect to social programmes and 
economic management...Formal constitutional symmetry might be 
maintained in a more decentralized federation, but symmetry o f result is 
incompatible with the logic o f decentralization. At some level, therefore, 
the logic o f decentralization works against the logic o f equalization: the
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former celebrates the interprovincial variation for which the latter tries to
correct.
(Gibbins, 1997b: 9)
Thus, decentralisation might threaten pan-Canadian equity. Predictably, 
opposition to decentralisation has come from those provinces most reliant on the 
equalisation programme, and according to Gibbins (1997b) taxpayers in richer provinces 
have become reluctant to pay for pan-Canadian provincial equity. W ealthier provinces’ 
support for equalisation policy is decreasing because they ‘see increasingly less direct 
benefit to them for the contributions they m ake’ (Bickerton, 1996: 21). This issue will be 
revisited in the case study chapters, as Alberta and Nova Scotia have been selected as 
representative o f wealthier and poorer provinces, respectively.
There is an interesting counter argument to the position that decentralisation leads 
to the weakening o f national standards, and to less equity between provinces. In defence 
o f decentralisation, advocates charge that national standards do not necessarily offer 
greater protection o f social programmes (Courchene, 1996). For example, in 1996, the 
U.S. federal government imposed national regulations over states that effectively imposed 
harsher welfare policies on citizens (Boychuck, 1996; Noel, 1999).
In this case, national standards place limits on the maximum level o f financial aid 
that can be received and those states not maintaining these standards are subject to 
penalties, which include partial federal withdrawal o f fiscal resources. Thus, when the 
federal government is overseeing standards, policies that lead to greater equity can be 
discouraged. Accordingly, centralisation does not always encourage social policies that 
aim to increase equity.
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However, if  it is assumed that national standards are necessary in order to 
maintain some equity, the overriding issue remains: what are the appropriate roles for 
each level o f government in realising this end? Since the early to mid- 1990s, the 
argument for greater decentralisation has highlighted the importance o f provinces playing 
a larger role in determining and monitoring national standards (Courchene, 1996; 
Richards, 1998).
Contrary to fears related to a lesser federal presence in overseeing standards, some 
maintain that a reduced role for the federal government will not lead to a weakening o f 
‘Canadian values’ and disintegration o f the country (Brooks, 1999; Noel, 1999). Critical 
to the debate is the contention that national standards do not have to be federally imposed, 
and that inter-provincial mechanisms are preferred (Schwanen, 1996; Courchene, 1997; 
Noel, 1999).
For example, Courchene (1997) argues for a greater provincial role in achieving 
positive and negative integration. Negative integration has to do with what Courchene 
calls ‘thou shalt nots’, referring to the vertical monitoring o f rules, where traditionally the 
federal government would for instance, impose stipulations against ‘extra billing’ for 
medical services. It is argued that negative integration alone is limited in its 
effectiveness. Courchene (1997: 80) argues that positive integration is crucial because it 
ensures provincial co-ordination in matters such as ‘skills transferability’ and 
‘consumption tax harmonization’. Thus, the argument here is that harmonising provincial 
programmes promotes the integration o f policies across the country. Courchene (1997) 
suggests that a balance must be fostered which allows provinces to be innovative, yet not 
so innovative that barriers to harmonisation are constructed. It is argued that the
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provinces might be best placed to establish and monitor standards pertaining to matters o f 
harmonisation (Courchene, 1997).
In addition, arguments for decentralisation are supported by the premise that 
provinces must play a pivotal role in maintaining pan-Canadian social policy, because the 
federal government’s authority in this regard has been tarnished as a result o f  its own 
significant fiscal dilemmas (Courchene, 1996). According to Lazar (1997), it is not 
coincidence that arguments for increased provincial involvement in social policy and 
standard setting gained momentum following a period o f intense federal fiscal reform.
In 1995, the federal government reduced its fiscal transfers to the provinces by $4 
billion. What resulted from this marked fiscal restraint was that the federal governm ent’s 
‘political and moral authority’ to make unilateral decisions about the ‘terms and 
conditions under which the provinces would receive these transfers’ was considerably 
decreased (Lazar, 1998a: 107). Therefore, the argument that champions greater 
provincial autonomy and involvement in national standards is influenced by provincial 
frustration over federal fiscal restraint.
Conversely, the idea that provinces should be more responsible for setting and 
monitoring national standards is strongly challenged by some commentators who doubt 
the ability and willingness o f provinces to reach consensus on pan-Canadian social policy 
(Collins, 1996; Maioni, 1996; Kennett, 1998). Using the example o f post-secondary 
education, Norrie (1994: 167) asserts that ‘provincial governments have little incentive to 
plan their social policies with the residents o f other jurisdictions in m ind’. Because 
‘educated workers are more mobile inter-provincially’ it is noted that upon completion o f
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post-secondary education, individuals may relocate to a different province in search o f 
employment opportunities (Norrie, 1994: 167).
In a similar vein, Kennett (1998: 17) examines the incentives for 
intergovernmental co-operation and he asks: ‘Why would the provinces voluntarily agree 
to restrictions on their policy-making autonomy in the area o f social policy?’ Kennett 
(1998: 17) addresses the issue o f interdependencies o f policies where decisions made in 
one jurisdiction ‘affect the policies or residents o f another’. It is noted that policies 
created in one province may make good sense to that government, yet such a policy 
decision may have less optimal results in another province.
Kennett (1998) uses the example o f social assistance provision to illustrate this 
point, noting that it is not unusual for unemployed workers to travel across the country in 
search o f  new employment. Before they are successful in finding jobs, however, the 
‘entered’ province bears a cost that the ‘exited’ province would otherwise have to take 
responsibility for. The entered province may decide to restrict or reduce benefits. Why 
would the entered province want to save the province exited that cost?
Yet, according to Kennett (1998), provinces that make social policy decisions 
based on saving costs in the short-term do so at the risk o f undermining both labour 
market flexibility and pan-Canadian unity. This example points to challenges that may be 
encountered when attempting to encourage provincial action which benefits the nation as 
a whole, when both political and economic logic gives incentives to provincial 
governments to capture short-term provincial gains.
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In contrast, Schwanen (1996), and Noel (1999), argue that inter-provincial 
arrangements to oversee national concerns such as standards and equity are preferred to 
centralised federal authority over such national issues. Schwanen (1996: 12) holds that 
while it is important for governments to acknowledge ‘a range o f reciprocal obligations’ 
(including harmonising policy and standards, and maintaining some measure o f 
redistribution) it is not necessary for these obligations to fall under the authority o f the 
federal government. Though agreeing that productive decision-making and a means o f 
enforcement are imperative, Schwanen (1996) is concerned that a predominant federal 
government role will curtail efficient economic relations between provinces. Noting that 
economic interests vary significantly across the country, Schwanen (1996) states:
To the extent that some regions perceive that common decision making 
institutions do not adequately represent their interests, they tend to view 
centralizing initiatives -  even those that could, in principle, be better 
conducted from the centre -  with suspicion. The danger is that this 
perception could lead to less effective federal economic policies. If  
current discussions on the shape o f Canada’s political institutions resulted 
in a sense that regional interests were better represented in the economic 
union, the union would work more effectively.
(Schwanen, 1996: 13)
A similar argument is put forward by Noel (1999), who asserts that it may be too 
difficult to achieve consensus at a national level given the absence o f a single political 
community. Therefore, negotiation and binding agreements between the provinces may 
provide the best hope in reaching consensus; hence, ‘decentralization, not centralization, 
may be needed to protect and improve Canadian social policies’ (Noel, 1999: 215).
The development and enforcement o f federal-provincial or inter-provincial 
agreements is considered to be highly necessary to maintain national standards and equity 
by a number o f  commentators (Schwanen, 1996; Gibbins, 1996; Maioni, 1999; Noel,
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1999). Yet, as discussed, there are differing perspectives about whether 
intergovernmental co-ordination concerning these matters should be centralised at the 
federal level or decentralised to the provinces. What does seem clear is that arguments 
both for and against decentralisation suggest that the differential wealth and regional 
diversity among provinces challenges inter-provincial and federal-provincial consensus 
on national matters regarding standards and equity.
Decentralisation and effects on policy
Decentralisation is sometimes encouraged because o f the perceived negative effects o f 
centralisation. For example, Lindquist (1994) suggests that advocates o f decentralisation 
perceive the centre as a magnet for power. As a result, power is withheld from those 
participants and formal and informal bodies situated away from the centre, and for whom 
central decisions have considerable consequences. Stakeholders who reside outside o f the 
centre are receivers and they implement decisions that are designed and based on 
objectives determined by the centre. On this matter, Lindquist (1994) notes:
In this view, the centre is incapable o f monitoring and comprehending the 
diverse reality beyond its immediate confines and, as a result, imposes 
counterproductive and demeaning rules and controls, and sometimes 
causes decision-making gridlock. The centre loses sight o f what and who 
is to be served, becoming more interested in the means than the ends, 
because the means are more familiar.
(Lindquist, 1994: 418)
Thus, decentralisation, whether it is administrative or legislative, is called for to 
overcome problems related to the centre’s inadequacy in relation to ‘determining local 
needs, encouraging innovation and responsiveness to citizens, and furthering autonomy 
and democracy’ (Lindquist, 1994: 418). The perception is that decentralisation is
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associated with ideals o f independence, autonomy and meeting the diverse interests o f 
citizens. However, Fesler (1965) suggests that it would be an error to simply assume that 
decentralisation will promote fairness, creativity, and greater effectiveness. The capacity 
inherent in either central or peripheral bodies to function given the new arrangements that 
accompany decentralisation needs to be considered (Fesler, 1965; Linquist, 1994). This 
has relevance for this thesis, as an issue critical to Nova Scotia was that the province had 
little policy and fiscal capacity to take on devolved powers.
Arguments for decentralisation include the premise that autonomy and flexibility 
can lead to better-targeted policies that are sensitive to local needs (Schwanen, 1996; 
Keating, 1999; Noel, 1999). It is sometimes held that the federal government is less 
proficient than provincial governments in discovering what the local needs are, and in 
making good decisions about the most effective and efficient ways to intervene. Local 
government is preferred largely because o f its ability ‘to react to particular substantive 
differences in the preferences o f citizens’ (Benz, 1987: 128).
Using the example o f labour market needs, it is argued ‘a labour market policy 
that is integrated and sensitive to market realities is only possible at the local level and 
must be based on concertation [sic] at the local and provincial levels’ (Noel, 1998: 262). 
One o f the benefits reaped from provincial autonomy include a closer alliance between 
government and its citizens because o f the local proximity o f government (Boychuck, 
1996). It is assumed when local governments and citizens have greater accessibility to 
each other, citizens can let their needs be known, and governments can respond 
accordingly.
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Also, Richards (1998) suggests that greater competition emerges in the public 
sector when decentralisation occurs. Furthermore, experimentation will vary from 
province to province, and this has been argued to have long-term benefits o f encouraging 
entrepreneurial behaviour in public services and policy formation. One idea is that 
innovations in some provinces will be favoured by the electorate and replicated in other 
provinces. In sum, many advocates o f decentralisation make the point that provincial 
autonomy fosters experimentation and innovation (Cameron, 1994; Boychuck, 1996; 
Schwanen, 1996; Noel, 1999).
A frequently cited Canadian example o f the benefit o f  the experimentation 
resulting from decentralisation and provincial autonomy is the development o f Medicare 
in Saskatchewan in 1947, prior to being integrated into the federal government mandate 
and dispersed across the country. On this issue, Maioni (1999) notes the influences o f 
partisan politics and Canada’s federal system, and comments:
Partisan politics are important because it was a political party on the left, 
namely the CCF-NDP (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation-New 
Democratic Party) in Saskatchewan, that inaugurated the first government- 
sponsored hospital insurance (1947) and medical insurance (1962) systems 
in North America. The success o f these innovations, combined with the 
political pressure exerted by the CCF-NDP’s federal counterpart, was 
pivotal in convincing successive Liberal governments to deploy the federal 
spending power on condition that the provinces would agree to design 
hospital (1957) and later medical (1966) insurance systems largely 
inspired by the Saskatchewan model.
(Maioni, 1999: 98)
Banting (1998) argues that although the Medicare experiment in Saskatchewan is 
a good example o f the positive results o f provincially induced policy innovation, it would 
have been very unlikely that all other provinces would have replicated the plan 
independently. Rather, it is asserted that the post-war social union represents a ‘pan-
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Canadian compromise’ o f ideals between ‘more reformist provinces’ and ‘more 
conservative provincial governments’ (Banting, 1998: 52). Furthermore, Banting (1998: 
51) argues that the pan-Canadian framework o f the post-war social union ‘contributed to 
higher levels o f equity and efficiency in the design o f the welfare state’ compared to what 
could have evolved from a more decentralised system.
Calls for greater decentralisation are often accompanied by fiscal concerns related 
to potential waste and misuse o f government funds. The influence o f decentralisation and 
centralisation on effectiveness and efficiency o f policies is illustrated by the debate on 
overlap and duplication o f policies and programmes. Concerns about overlap and 
duplication between federal and provincial governments began to grow in the early 
1990s, in response largely to debt and deficit problems encountered by both levels o f 
government (Lindquist, 1999).
This is not to say that these concerns had never existed earlier. In 1937, the 
federal government called for the Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission o f Inquiry to 
investigate a number o f matters including mounting concerns pertaining to overlap o f 
services among federal and provincial jurisdictions. Although, as noted earlier, 
constitutional division o f responsibility in Canada tends to be exclusive, overlap and 
duplication in these areas are far from rare (Government o f Canada, 1992).
Examining the consequences o f overlap, it is argued that fiscal concerns are 
particularly evident in the costs associated with administration, and the greater resources 
needed to support the co-ordination o f intergovernmental operations (Government o f 
Canada, 1992). However, there are conflicting points o f view on the potential
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consequences o f overlap for citizens. A federal government document pertaining to 
overlap states:
Some feel that overlapping causes members o f the public to have less 
control over their governments. When governments keep throwing the 
ball back into each other’s court, it becomes more difficult for the public to 
single out the level o f government that is at fault. Overlap can therefore 
reduce the level o f government responsibility. Others believe, however, 
that overlap has some positive aspects. They feel that the public interest is 
better served when there is federal-provincial overlap and that competition 
between the two levels o f government enhances the quality o f the services 
provided, as is the case in the private sector.
(Canada, 1992: 4-5)
Solutions to overlap and duplication between the two levels o f government often 
involve either administrative or legislative decentralisation. Additionally, it has been 
noted that from the provincial perspective, responding to overlap and duplication may be 
seen as federal ‘offloading’ o f responsibilities. It has been suggested that poorer 
provinces, might be particularly worried about assuming greater responsibility which 
could precipitate an increase in costs being passed down to the provincial level 
(Meekison, 1999). The fear that greater responsibility associated with the devolution o f 
labour market policy would increase provincial costs is relevant to this thesis. This 
concern was expressed by Nova Scotia and will be discussed in Chapter 7.
However, the problem of overlap and duplication has been frequently cited by 
provinces as a reason why the federal government should ‘delegate or cede powers’ 
(Lindquist, 1999: 36). Lindquist (1999: 37) reviewed several studies that attempt to 
measure the problem, and concludes that the debate on overlap and duplication is ‘sterile 
and m isleading’. According to Lindquist’s (1999) review, these studies fail to provide 
empirical evidence and seem to support instead, arguments on the sides o f either 
provincial autonomy or the importance o f a federal presence.
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Overall, Lindquist (1999) suggests that overlap and duplication should not be 
condemned based on disputes over jurisdiction and fiscal savings, but that it is important 
to understand the issues more clearly in order to manage overlap. Lindquist (1999) 
concludes that overlap and duplication are neither inherently beneficial nor harmful, but 
rather what is needed is greater clarity o f roles and responsibilities including the federal- 
provincial interdependencies germane to the complexities o f Canadian federalism.
This section o f the chapter has addressed the debate over decentralisation. This 
thesis argues that faced with the option to devolve labour market policy, federal and 
provincial governments are influenced by potential costs and benefits that might be 
incurred by them. Federal and provincial governments’ positions on devolution o f labour 
market policy might resonate with the decentralisation-centralisation debate reviewed in 
this chapter.
Case study: Devolving labour market policy in Canada
The last section o f this chapter will examine the case study investigated in this thesis. In 
the previous sections o f this chapter, concepts pertaining to decentralisation and 
devolution were examined. Further, these concepts and the decentralisation-centralisation 
debate have been explored in the context o f the Canadian federal state. This has provided 
background information for the examination o f the federal government’s official proposal 
to devolve labour market policy to provincial governments in 1996.
The Employment Insurance (El) Act (1996) set the parameters for the federal 
proposal. This Act replaced the Unemployment Insurance Act (1971) and the National 
Training Act (1982). The 1996 Employment Insurance Act is divided into two parts.
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Part I outlines the legislation for the passive income benefit and Part II addresses active 
employment policies.
The new Act reformed unemployment legislation. Reforms to Part I o f  the new El 
Act (the income benefit), introduced significant programme constraints reflecting a 
continuing trend that began in the 1970s and 1980s (Battle, 1998). Access to the income 
benefit was limited through much tighter eligibility rules, reduced benefit amounts, and 
shorter benefit periods (Battle, 1998). These reforms are part o f  a trend in federal fiscal 
restraint in the 1990s. This is significant for this thesis because provincial reaction to 
federal restraint pressured status quo federalism, and at least to some extent, influenced 
the federal proposal for devolution.
Part II o f  the El Act introduced a series o f active re-employment benefits to assist 
unemployed workers return to work. On May 30, 1996, the official federal proposal 
made to the provinces included the offer to transfer Part II activities, plus the possibility 
o f  forming new federal-provincial partnerships concerning the National Employment 
System (NES).
Faced with the opportunity for increased authority and responsibility for labour 
market programmes, provinces assessed the relative benefits and risks associated with 
different possible models. Basically, provinces could choose between the ‘full transfer’ 
and ‘co-management’ models. In the full transfer model, provincial governments make 
independent decisions (within the parameters o f El legislation) concerning the devolved 
federal programmes and corresponding funds. In contrast, in the co-management model, 
federal and provincial representatives make decisions jointly about the design and 
delivery o f  labour market programmes. In co-managed arrangements, labour market
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programmes are still delivered by the federal infrastructure, but the province has a greater 
say in programme design and implementation.
The federal government allocated approximately $1.95 billion to fund the new 
arrangement. Also, the federal government agreed to provide for administrative expenses 
for the delivery o f services to El clients in provinces where responsibility for active 
measures was transferred. The initial duration o f each agreement was for three years with 
the provision that neither government could unilaterally terminate the arrangement 
earlier. Agreements could be renewed provided that the results accepted by both parties 
were achieved.
As outlined in the proposal, the re-employment benefits are as follows:
• Targeted wage subsidies to encourage employers to hire people and provide on- 
the-job experience;
• Earning supplements to top up wages in order to encourage people to accept 
available work;
• Self-employment assistance to enable people to start businesses and create their 
own jobs;
• Job creation partnerships to create jobs based on local economic needs via 
partnerships with provinces/territories, private sector and local communities;
• Skills loans and grants to assist people in acquiring new job skills.
(Canada, Human Resources Development Canada, 1996a: 4)
As mentioned earlier, Part II o f the legislation provided the framework for the 
proposal, including much o f the content of the proposal, and federal expectations 
concerning issues such as accountability, priority o f servicing El clients, and respecting 
the Official Languages Act, among other important issues. The accountability framework 
is particularly important because it illustrates how the federal government was able to 
step back from direct involvement with labour market training, while retaining some
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measure o f control at arm ’s-length. Further details o f the federal proposal will be 
examined in Chapter 5.
However, comments can be made on how the definitions concerning 
decentralisation are relevant to the information given about the proposal thus far. For 
example, the type o f decentralisation is identified as an example o f ‘administrative 
decentralisation’. To begin, the devolved powers are established by intergovernmental 
arrangements. Legislative jurisdiction over unemployment insurance is assigned to the 
federal government, and the proposal devolves only part o f the powers associated with 
this legislation.
On the other hand, the devolved authority and responsibility goes beyond the 
simple administration o f policies for the federal government. Provinces with devolved 
arrangements are able to design and implement labour market policies according to local 
labour market issues. Thus, the federal government has minimal control over provincial 
authority to implement Part II labour market policies.
However, neither the El Act 1996, nor the federal proposal alters the exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over unemployment policy. Notwithstanding the substantial control 
and authority pertaining to El Part II activities devolved to provinces, the framework o f 
the federal proposal determines, for example, eligibility criteria. Although provincial 
governments can use El Part II funds to meet the labour market training needs of, for 
example, social assistance clients, the majority o f clients served must be eligible for El 
Part I (the passive income benefit). As will be reviewed in the case study chapters, the 
criteria for eligibility were debated at length during the federal-provincial bilateral 
negotiations in Alberta and Nova Scotia.
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There is significant asymmetry among the Labour Market Development 
Agreements (LMDAs) reached in the mid- to latter part o f the 1990s. For this reason two 
federal-provincial agreements will be examined in this thesis. Two case studies of 
divergent experiences o f Canadian federalism, generally, and different models o f federal- 
provincial agreements, specifically, are explored in Chapters 6 and 7.
The federal government, represented by the Department o f Human Resources 
Development Canada (HRDC), began to negotiate bilateral labour market agreements 
with provinces shortly after the official proposal was announced. The Canada-Alberta 
Labour M arket Development Agreement (LMDA) was signed December 6, 1996 and the 
Canada-Nova Scotia LMDA, otherwise referred to as the Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement 
on a Framework for Strategic Partnership, was signed April 24, 1997.
Conclusion
This chapter defined terms relevant to this thesis including, centralisation, 
decentralisation, devolution, and deconcentration. An examination o f the types o f 
decentralisation concluded that the case study o f devolution investigated in this thesis is 
an example o f administrative decentralisation. Also, the extent o f decentralisation in 
Canada was examined. W atts’ (1999) analysis that finds Canada to be a relatively 
decentralised federal state was reviewed. Comparisons with other federal states suggest 
that although in some respects Canada is less decentralised than other states, it is one o f 
the most decentralised states.
However, in the policy area that concerns this thesis, Canada is relatively 
centralised. As reviewed in this chapter, the federal proposal for devolution involves
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unemployment policy that falls exclusively under federal legislative jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the federal proposal to devolve Part II o f the Employment Insurance Act 
1996 is quite significant.
To understand why federal and provincial governments might either encourage or 
avoid decentralisation and devolution, the debate over centralisation and decentralisation 
was examined. This debate was presented by examining arguments that support different 
kinds o f governmental arrangements and the resulting implications for national issues 
pertaining to standards and equity. This section concluded that consensus on these issues 
is difficult to achieve; and that, regional diversity and economic disparity across 
provinces serve to challenge both centralised and decentralised arrangements to oversee 
national concerns.
Also reviewed were arguments that supported decentralisation based on policy 
benefits. Here, decentralisation is supported because it is seen as encouraging flexibility 
in federalism, through promoting provincial policy experimentation and innovation. 
Arguments that suggest that decentralised policies are more effective and sensitive to 
local concerns than centralised policies were presented. Also addressed were arguments 
in favour o f decentralisation that suggests decentralisation results in greater efficiency.
Furthermore, the chapter described the details about the official federal proposal 
to devolve labour market policy to provinces. The significance o f studying labour market 
policy stems from the fact that it exemplifies a policy area that is relatively centralised 
within a country that is representative o f a relatively decentralised federation. Further, 
though employment policy falls under exclusive legislative federal control, there is a 
notable degree o f federal-provincial disagreement about jurisdictional authority
76
concerning this policy sector. For example, Quebec and Alberta argue that labour market 
policy is largely a provincial concern because it is viewed as an extension o f the exclusive 
legislative provincial control over education. Thus, the value in choosing labour market 
policy is that it serves as an interesting case study from which to observe the impact o f 
devolution.
Knowledge about decentralisation and devolution in the Canadian context 
reviewed in this chapter will inform the case study o f devolution investigated in this 
thesis. In particular, nation-building and province-building are exemplified in the federal 
and provincial positions taken by the governments studied in this research. Moreover, 
diverse regional experiences o f Canadian federalism are reflected in the divergent 
influences o f provincial decisions about the proposal to devolve labour market policies to 
provinces.
Chapter 4 will address the methodology o f the research. Following this, the thesis 
will present three case study chapters that examine primary and secondary evidence with 
respect to the research questions and hypotheses.
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Chapter 4
Methodology
Introduction
This thesis employs a research focus that is largely qualitative and interpretive in nature, 
and it draws on interpretive and constructivist approaches to inquiry. This research 
adopts a constructivist approach to seek comprehensive, and in-depth knowledge about 
federal and provincial perceptions, positions, and the policy processes that lead to 
decisions on devolution. This chapter will begin with a review o f the main research 
questions and the thesis. Triangulation o f methods and data sources will be discussed 
early in the chapter.
Next, the strengths and limitations o f  quantitative and qualitative methods will be 
addressed, and will be followed by an examination o f positivist and phenomenological 
research paradigms. This section o f the chapter will contrast positivism with the 
interpretive and constructivist approaches. Comparisons across research orientations are 
offered as the basis for discussing the justification o f choice o f methodology. This 
chapter will then review other issues related to methodology, including the case study 
approach; the instrument used and procedures followed to collect data; sampling and 
recruitment strategies; civil servants as study subjects; limitations o f the methodology; 
and ethical considerations.
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Research questions and main thesis
As mentioned at the outset, this thesis investigates the devolution o f labour market 
policies from federal to provincial governments, in Canada, in the mid- 1990s. A central 
objective o f this research is to examine the influences on federal and provincial 
governm ents’ decisions about devolution. The thesis asks: How do federal and provincial 
governments perceive and respond to devolution, and what influences these positions?
The main thesis o f this research, it will be recalled, is that the devolution o f 
governmental power and authority, as illustrated by this policy case study in Canada, is 
driven primarily by political interests, and that pressures concerning the public interest- 
are secondary.
Triangulation o f method and data sources
In attempt to account for measurement error, specifically systematic error, this study 
employs the principle o f triangulation. Triangulation refers to (a) the utilisation o f 
different sources o f data, and (b) the utilisation o f more than one research method to 
collect data (Rubin and Babbie, 1997; Huberman and Miles, 1998; Fontana and Frey, 
1998; Janesick, 1998).
While recognising that no method will completely avoid measurement error,
Rubin and Babbie (1997) hold that when different methods garner similar results, 
confidence in these results is increased. Also, as noted by Morse (1998: 64, 66), 
employing more than one method allows the researcher to examine phenomena through
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‘different “ lenses” or perspectives’ and thereby benefit from ‘a more holistic view o f  the 
setting’.
In this study, through the utilisation o f two research methods, namely, semi­
structured qualitative interviews and analyses o f documents, data are drawn from two 
sources: (a) from knowledgeable respondents, and (b) from a variety o f relevant 
documents and related research. Researchers are in a better position to evaluate the 
credibility o f  results when they use different ‘independent measures and sources o f the 
same phenomenon’ (Huberman and Miles, 1998: 199).
As ju st noted, this thesis examines both primary and secondary evidence. 
Interviews with federal and provincial civil servants from two provinces constitute the 
primary evidence investigated in this thesis. And, the secondary evidence examined, 
includes the actual Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDAs) and other federal 
and provincial documents related to LMDAs, political speeches, and media reports. In 
addition, secondary evidence is drawn from researchers who have studied devolution and 
the LMDAs (Bakvis, 1996 and 2002; Haddow, 1995; Klassen, 2000; Lazar and Stoyko, 
2001; Rocher and Rouillard, 1996).
Contrasting approaches to inquiry
Following a review o f qualitative and quantitative methods to inquiry, the chapter will 
discuss why the current research is best suited to the former approach. A key strength o f  
qualitative research is the comprehensiveness o f perspective it gives to the researcher. A 
deep, full, and detailed understanding o f the phenomenon under study can be achieved by 
going directly to that social phenomenon, and observing it as completely as possible
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(Patton, 1990; Rubin and Babbie, 1997). Qualitative research is especially appropriate to 
the study o f those topics for which attitudes and behaviours can be best understood within 
their natural settings.
A major strength o f quantitative research is the ability to gather data on a limited 
number o f predetermined questions from many individuals, and consequently allowing 
for statistical calculation, and rigorous comparison o f findings (Patton, 1990). Thus, 
findings from quantitative research are often able to be generalised to individuals or cases 
other than those observed in the initial study.
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, tend to gather large amounts o f detailed 
data from a smaller number o f individuals and cases compared to protocol followed in 
quantitative methods (Patton, 1990). According to Tutty et al. (1996), compared to 
quantitative research, qualitative research tends to be more subjective, and less able to 
generalise results across populations. Qualitative research rarely produces unquestionable 
descriptions and findings about populations and cases, and in general, ‘the conclusions 
drawn from qualitative field research are often regarded as suggestive rather than 
definitive’ (Rubin and Babbie, 1997: 414).
As ju st mentioned, qualitative researchers seek an in-depth perspective o f the 
subject under study. And consequently, they can achieve a remarkably comprehensive 
understanding o f  the subject o f study. However, such comprehensiveness limits 
generalisation o f results (Rubin and Babbie, 1997). Yet, while generalisation o f results is 
very restricted, largely because o f limitations on objectivity, it is these characteristics o f 
qualitative research that enhance its flexibility and depth.
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Research paradigms
Alternative approaches to research are grounded in particular ‘philosophical assumptions 
and principles’ that provide ‘broad frameworks’ to guide both the focus and process o f 
research. (Neuman, 1997: 60-61). As suggested by Neuman (1997), approaches to 
research serve to:
link abstract issues in philosophy to concrete research techniques. They
proscribe what good social research involves, justify why one should do
research, relate values to research, and guide ethical behaviour.
(Neuman, 1997: 61)
According to Patton (1990), divergent positions and values concerning the 
preferred way to carry out research have concentrated on the debate over two essentially 
diverse approaches to inquiry. Where logical-positivism relies primarily on quantitative 
methods ‘to test hypothetical-deductive generalizations’, phenomenological research 
inquiries employ qualitative methods ‘to inductively and holistically understand human 
experience in context-specific settings’ (Patton, 1990: 37).
In recognition that research is embedded in values, the qualitative researcher is 
responsible for stating the ideological guides or influences that dictate the parameters o f 
the study (Janesick, 1998). To this end, it is essential for researchers to identify the 
paradigm that guides their research. Gould (1999: 69) asserts, that the paradigm 
embraced by the researcher ‘has important consequences not only for the conduct o f the 
inquiry but also for the interpretation o f findings’.
Positivist and phenomenological research paradigms can be distinguished by 
explicating the epistemological, ontological and methodological assumptions inherent in
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each paradigm. Such an examination can help to assess the suitability and fit between the 
choice o f paradigm and the purpose and intent o f the research project. Discerning and 
evaluating the marked differences among paradigms have been likened to ‘paradigm 
w ars’ (Gage, 1989: 4). Alternatively, a less confrontational metaphor can be adopted by 
viewing paradigms as ‘competing’ with one another (Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 195) and 
eventually leading into a ‘paradigm debate’ (Gould, 1999: 69).
This section o f the chapter will review the prominent differences between 
positivism and phenomenological approaches such as constructivism by drawing 
primarily from investigations by Guba and Linclon (1998) and Neuman (1997).
Guba and Lincoln (1998) examine the long-standing positivism paradigm and 
three other paradigms that they purport to be in various stages o f development. 
Particularly noteworthy is the marked difference between positivism and the other three 
paradigms, namely postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism.
Using a similar framework as that employed by Guba and Lincoln (1998), 
Neuman (1997) compares positivism with critical and interpretive approaches to social 
science. Some o f the perspectives subsumed under the interpretive approach as seen by 
Neuman (1997) include constructionism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and symbolic 
interactionism.
To begin, following Neum an’s (1997) framework, the purpose o f research is 
determined by the approach adopted. With respect to the positivist approach, the primary 
purpose o f research is to pursue and reveal ‘explanation - to discover and document
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universal laws o f human behaviour’ thereby enabling the prediction and eventual control 
o f  occurrences in the world (Neuman, 1997: 63).
Guba and Lincoln (1998) argue that the positivist assumption that researchers will 
become more proficient in predicting and controlling social phenomena is reductionist, 
and deterministic in nature. Moreover, Guba and Lincoln (1998: 211) challenge what 
they see as the positivist paradigm’s tendency to falsely elevate the importance o f the 
researcher, noting that ‘the inquirer is cast in the role o f “expert”, a situation that seems to 
award special, perhaps even unmerited, privilege to the investigator’.
As suggested by Neuman (1997), in contrast to the positivist approach, the 
purpose o f research as seen through the lens o f the interpretive approach, is to generate 
knowledge about social life through the views and beliefs o f those who are engaged in the 
world. According to the interpretive approach, meaning is constructed, and therefore the 
goal o f research is to understand the process o f how people perceive, interpret, and create 
meaning. In a similar manner, Guba and Lincoln (1998) hold that the principle aim o f 
constructivist inquiry is to understand and reconstruct:
the constructions that people (including the inquirer) initially hold, aiming
toward consensus but still open to new interpretations as information and
sophistication improve.
(Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 211)
Furthermore, Neuman (1997: 69) asserts that the interpretive researcher ‘must 
take into account the social actor’s reasons and the social context o f action’. And because 
meaning is constructed, the process o f meaning making must be observed and 
extrapolated.
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The interpretive view that reality remains unfixed and instead is constructed, and 
reliant upon context, is appropriate for the research undertaken in this thesis, because 
governments are influenced and motivated by constantly shifting influences. Civil 
servants and politicians vie among their respective groups, and with each other, to 
interpret and define these events and influences in ways that correspond to their particular 
values, interest and world views. Moreover, influential factors are complex, and 
determined by historical circumstances and events. The purpose o f this research is to 
examine various interpretations concerning why governments take particular positions 
that lead to specific decisions about devolution.
The answers to questions pertaining to the nature o f reality, known as ontological 
inquiries, are determined by the research paradigm adopted. According to Neuman 
(1997), the ontological question from the perspective o f positivist researchers is that not 
only does reality exists but also it can be known. Positivism assumes that reality is not 
haphazard; rather it is ordered and governed by sets o f rules that have always existed.
From the perspective o f this paradigm, it is the task o f the researcher to discover 
these rules, and hence employ them to explicate reality. Furthermore, reality can remain 
stable and is accumulative in nature, which implies that reality can be broken down, and 
then made whole again without altering its true state. Guba and Lincoln (1998: 204) 
describe the positivist approach to the ontological question as ‘naive realism ’ whereby 
‘knowledge o f the “way things are” is conventionally summarized in the form o f time- 
and context-free generalizations’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 204).
In contrast to the positivist approach that sees reality as existing apart from people 
or in the absence o f particular human interactions, the answer to the ontological question
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as viewed from the interpretive approach, holds that social reality is ‘intentionally 
created’ through social actions (Neuman, 1997: 69). In fact, according to Neuman 
(1997), the interpretive approach maintains that reality exists only as a function o f human 
existence and purposeful social intent. Neuman (1997) states:
for interpretive researchers, social reality is based on people’s definitions 
o f it. A person’s definition o f a situation tells him or her how to assign 
meaning in constantly shifting conditions.
(Neuman, 1997: 69)
Neuman (1997) points to the positivist assumption that the conception o f meaning 
is held constant for all people, and therefore all people share a common experience o f the 
world. Contrary to this view, the interpretive approach presupposes that while a 
commonality o f meaning and experience o f social life may occur, they may just as likely 
differ- as it is possible for many such meanings and experiences to coexist (Neuman, 
1997). With reference to this thesis, divergent governmental experiences o f federalism 
may translate into multiple interpretations o f meanings associated with devolution. And 
therefore, federal and provincial governments may have different views on the 
significance o f the federal proposal.
Guba and Lincoln (1998) describe the ontological assumptions o f constructivism 
in a similar way to Neum an’s (1997) conception o f the interpretive approach. For Guba 
and Lincoln (1998), the constructivist paradigm assumes a ‘relativist’ ontological 
position, whereby realities are:
apprehendable in the form o f multiple, intangible mental constructions, 
socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature (although 
elements are often shared among many individuals and even across 
cultures), and dependent for their form and content on the individual 
persons or groups holding the constructions.
(Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 206)
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Yet, because various actors construct realities differently, no single reality actually 
exists (Guba and Lincoln, 1998). In other words, multiple realities are dependent upon 
and relative to particular social actors who build, maintain, and project divergent 
constructions. There are no realities or constructions that are more or less true than 
others, ‘but simply more or less informed and/or sophisticated’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 
206).
In contrast to positions on ontology, epistemological considerations have to do 
with the relationship between the researcher and phenomena that can be known. 
According Guba and Lincoln (1998: 204), positivism can be described as ‘dualist’ and 
‘objectivist’. In other words, positivism holds that reality is objective, external to, and 
independent from the researcher. Therefore, following the assumptions o f positivism, a 
researcher can study a subject and have no effect on the results; and likewise, the subject 
o f study has no effect on the researcher. Threats to validity, such as ‘values and biases’ 
are reduced or eliminated by rigorously following prescribed steps in the research process 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 204). Moreover, when findings are replicable they are known 
to be ‘true’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 204).
In contrast to positivism, constructivism assumes a significantly different 
epistemological position. Guba and Lincoln (1998: 207) describe constructivism as 
‘transactional’ and ‘subjectivist’. The researcher and focus o f study are ‘interactively 
linked’ and findings are created (or constructed) as the study proceeds (Guba and Lincoln, 
1998: 207). Similarly, Schwandt (1998) holds that constructivism assumes that 
knowledge neither pre-exists- nor is independent from the researcher, rather, knowledge 
is subject to the researcher’s active processing o f constructions.
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Paradigms and choice o f  method
M ethodological issues flow from the assumptions held within each paradigm. Paradigms 
can be differentiated according to positions taken on how the researcher approaches 
knowledge. In regards to methodology, according to Guba and Lincoln (1998: 204), 
positivism is ‘experimental’ and ‘manipulative’ whereby hypotheses are ‘stated in 
propositional form ’ and empirically tested. The focus is on the control or manipulation o f 
variables to prevent confounding effects.
Contrary to positivism, constructivism’s approach to methodological 
considerations is ‘hermeneutical’ and ‘dialectical’ (Guba and Lincoln: 207).
Constructions are ‘elicited and refined only through interaction between and among 
investigator respondents’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1998: 207). Constructions are interpreted 
and contrasted through an interaction o f conflicting ideas. The primary goal is to reach a 
‘consensus construction’ that is more informed and sophisticated than prior constructions 
(Guba and Lincoln: 207).
Justification for the methodology
It is argued that the interpretive - constructivist paradigm and qualitative methods are 
appropriate for this study for many reasons:
(a) As mentioned earlier, the purpose o f this research is to elicit constructions and 
interpretations about what influences governments’ actions. In this study, it is less 
important to be able to generalise results to other countries, for instance- than it is to seek 
comprehensive, and in-depth knowledge about such influences.
(b) The information sought in the study is difficult to access because largely, the 
negotiations were govemment-to-government activities that took place behind closed 
doors. Only outcomes- that is, the final decisions o f provinces to either accept or decline 
devolution, and the type o f model/agreement eventually adopted is general knowledge 
available to the public. Yet, what is less understood are the perceptions and positions, 
and policy processes, upon which these final decisions were based. This research seeks to 
understand those issues that governments determined to be most salient, and eventually 
influenced decisions pertaining to devolution. Federal and provincial governments have 
unique experiences within Canadian federalism, and how these experiences affected 
decisions about devolution are questions central to this study.
(c) Even though the final agreements are public documents, there is a lack understanding 
about them. For example, many o f the Nova Scotia respondents commented on the lack 
o f clarity across the country about their agreement. Respondents noted that federal and 
provincial officials in other parts o f the country refer to the Nova Scotia agreement as a 
co-managed model. And, such is not the case- as the Nova Scotia agreement is the only 
one o f its kind in Canada. Other respondents commented that the uniqueness o f the 
agreement between Canada and Nova Scotia was counter to the preferences o f the federal 
government. The federal government was believed to prefer symmetry across the 
country, and ‘provinces being too different’ from each other- was a concern. All these 
examples o f mixed perceptions and views suggest that, the constructivist paradigm and 
qualitative method are more appropriate in this study, which seeks to explore and 
explicate the nuances and uniqueness o f these two agreements, than quantitative methods 
based on a positivist paradigm.
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Notwithstanding this point, a quantitative method and a more ‘positivist’ approach 
could have been followed. For instance, a quantitative survey method could have been 
employed to measure respondents’ input using a Likert-scale instrument. A survey 
questionnaire could have been constructed to measure both political and public interest 
influences o f federal and provincial governments’ decisions about devolution. However, 
even a highly comprehensive instrument could not cover (or predict) all the nuances o f 
such influences. Respondents’ answers would be limited and constrained by the 
questions asked and the scale provided. A quantitative instrument would fail to reveal the 
in-depth and detailed account about why governments made particular decisions about 
devolution.
(d) This study assumes that the priorities and influences on governments’ decisions about 
devolution are illustrated through the negotiations. It is further assumed that perceptions 
and opinions related to this process are subjective, and relative according to differing 
experiences among governments. Quantitative methods can to some extent at least 
control for and avoid subjectivity. In contrast, qualitative methods allow for subjectivity 
in the process o f inquiry. Civil servants’ interpretations about why governments have 
particular expectations and attitudes towards devolution, is perhaps best accessed through 
qualitative methods that can explore respondents’ perceptions based on personal 
knowledge, experience and expertise.
In the case o f the present study, it is judged that a constructivist qualitative 
approach is best suited to reveal the influences, and unique nature o f the types o f labour 
market agreements reached. Compared to the methods adopted, the goals o f this research 
may be much more difficult to achieve using, for example, a quantitative method such as 
a survey approach.
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Case study approach
According to Hague et al. (1992: 459), the case study encompasses a ‘detailed study o f  a 
specific example within a broader category’. This thesis seeks to shed light on how 
devolution o f  a relatively centralised policy is managed in a federal system that is 
relatively decentralised and one in which considerable provincial autonomy exists.
This study investigates the experiences and decisions o f  the federal government in 
Canada and two provincial governments in relation to a proposal for devolving authority 
from federal to provincial jurisdictions. In this examination, the experiences and 
decisions o f  one federal, and two provincial governments, are treated as individual case 
studies. As noted by Stake (1998: 86), a ‘case study is not a methodological choice, but a 
choice o f  object to be studied’. The case is envisioned as a ‘bounded system ’ (Smith, 
1978: 316) and its parts are arranged or integrated in a functional, patterned, and 
purposeful way (Stake, 1998).
Stake (1998: 88), suggests that ‘the case is o f secondary interest’ as it facilitates 
the growth o f  knowledge about a separate phenomenon. In a similar vein, Hague et al. 
(1992) and Landman (2000) note that while a study o f one country is not in itself a 
comparative approach, common trends can be detected through examining individual case 
studies o f  several countries; and thus, case studies ‘provide most o f the raw material for 
comparative politics’ (Hague et al., 1992: 37).
Stake (1998: 89) might describe the case study approach followed in this research 
as an, ‘instrumental study’ broadened to different cases, and thereby classify it as a 
‘collective case study’. An instrumental case study seeks to build knowledge and refine
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theory. In this study, three individual case studies o f governments’ experiences facilitate 
knowledge and theory building pertaining to the political and public interest influences o f 
governm ents’ positions on devolution.
Purpose and method
This study seeks to understand the influences o f federal and provincial governments’ 
priorities and decisions regarding devolution. The federal government’s proposal to 
devolve labour market policies to provincial governments offers one such opportunity to 
investigate this issue. This research studies the influences o f the devolution o f labour 
market policy by investigating the initial federal proposal, and two federal-provincial 
labour market agreements. This research examines the circumstances influencing the 
federal proposal and the federal positions asserted in the labour market negotiations. In 
addition, two federal-provincial agreements are investigated.
The two provinces chosen to examine provincial positions on devolution are 
Alberta and Nova Scotia. These provinces were selected primarily because they illustrate 
different devolution settlements. Furthermore, these provinces represent contrasting 
provincial experiences within Canada. Nova Scotia’s population is much smaller, and it 
has a much higher rate o f unemployment as compared to Alberta. In contrast to Alberta, 
Nova Scotia is significantly less fiscally independent from federal income transfers. 
Furthermore, Alberta is one o f the wealthiest provinces in the country, and it boasts one 
o f  the lowest unemployment rates in Canada.
Given these distinctive provincial conditions, and experiences within Canadian 
federalism, it is speculated that a comparison between Alberta and Nova Scotia will offer
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important insights regarding potentially divergent positions on devolution, and the 
particular influences and circumstances that lead to these positions. The federal proposal 
is examined in Chapter 5, and Alberta and Nova Scotia’s experiences o f the proposal for 
devolution, and the labour market negotiations are discussed at length in Chapters 6 and 
7, respectively.
Sampling: Introduction
A total o f 24 respondents were interviewed in this study. Three elected officials were 
interviewed early in the study to familiarize m yself with devolution in the context o f 
authority and decision-making shifting from federal to provincial jurisdictions. While 
these elected officials were very helpful in providing background knowledge pertaining to 
federal-provincial dynamics, and governmental motivations related to the concept o f 
devolution, they were not able to provide much information on how these issues are 
illustrated by the labour market development agreements.
The primary sample is comprised o f 21 federal and provincial servants. In 
contrast to the interviews with elected officials, interviews with civil servants who were 
knowledgeable about the federal proposal and the development o f the bilateral labour 
market development agreements provided extensive information about federal and 
provincial motivations and priorities as exemplified by this case study example of 
devolution. Given the rich and detailed information that was obtained through the initial 
interviews with civil servants, I decided to concentrate my efforts on pursuing further 
interviews with civil servants who had knowledge and experience pertaining to the 
development o f labour market agreements. Later in this chapter, the rationale for 
choosing to interview civil servants will be elaborated on in greater detail.
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In Alberta and Nova Scotia, federal and provincial governments engaged in 
negotiations that led to the labour market agreements. In both provinces, regional 
Departments o f Human Resources Development Canada located in Edmonton, Alberta 
and Halifax, Nova Scotia represented the federal government.
In Alberta, the Ministry o f Advanced Education and Career Development (AECD) 
was the designated governmental body to carry out the negotiations on behalf o f  the 
province. The federal-provincial negotiations commenced shortly after the federal 
government made the proposal for devolution on May 30, 1996. The negotiations 
continued for about six months. The Canada-Alberta Labour Market Development 
Agreement was signed on December 6, 1996.
In Nova Scotia, Community Services, Education, and Economic Development 
were identified as the key provincial ministries that were strongly related to labour market 
issues. Among all o f the provincial ministries, these ministries were deemed most likely 
to be impacted by the labour market negotiations, and the eventual federal-provincial 
agreement. Community Services acted as the lead ministry, and was designated with the 
responsibility to carry out the labour market negotiations. Negotiations commenced in 
Nova Scotia in January 1997, and lasted approximately three months. The Canada-Nova 
Scotia Agreement on a Framework for Strategic Partnerships was signed on April 24, 
1997.
In both Alberta and Nova Scotia, federal and provincial governments appointed 
senior civil servants to provide leadership for each o f the negotiation teams. In both 
provinces, the head person in charge for the federal government was the Regional 
Director General for Human Resources Development Canada. The provincial leaders in
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charge in Alberta and Nova Scotia were respectively, the Deputy M inister for AECD, and 
a Senior Advisor for provincial Labour Market Development. All four team leaders who 
were appointed to head the negotiations were interviewed in this study. In Alberta, the 
negotiation team was equally made up o f federal and provincial representatives. In 
pointed contrast, the Nova Scotia provincial team was much smaller, and one individual 
played a dominant role in representing the provincial interest during the negotiation 
meetings. This issue is elaborated on later.
Sampling strategies
Nonprobability sampling approaches were utilised in this study, namely purposive, quota, 
and snowball sampling strategies. Purposive samples are selected so that ‘certain types o f 
individuals or persons displaying certain attributes are included in the study’ (Berg, 2001: 
32). With purposive sampling, the researcher evaluates or judges the appropriateness of 
the sample based on knowledge about the population, and on the purpose o f the study. 
Emory (1985: 280) notes that in purposive sampling, the researcher ‘handpicks sample 
members to conform to some criterion’. For example, this study seeks to understand the 
influences o f federal and provincial governments’ priorities and decisions regarding 
devolution. Consequently, in this study, interviews were conducted with federal and 
provincial civil servants who were judged to have expertise concerning this example o f 
devolution in two Canadian provinces.
In this study, it is assumed that federal and provincial civil servants who are 
knowledgeable about (a) the federal proposal (b) the labour market negotiations (c) and 
the details and circumstances o f the ultimate agreement reached, have relevant 
experience, and information pertaining to the main questions pursued in this study. More
95
specifically, it is assumed that civil servants with these attributes have knowledge o f 
events that illustrate the influences, and priorities o f both levels o f government. More 
detailed information about the respondents will be addressed in the next section o f the 
chapter.
Purposive sampling is appropriate when the purpose is not to generalise findings 
to other populations, but instead, when researchers want to gain in-depth understanding 
about certain kinds o f cases that represent differences across particular groups (Neuman, 
1997; Rubin and Babbie, 1997). The present study does not seek to generalise its 
findings beyond the cases investigated. Also, this research does attempt to gain an in- 
depth understanding o f these cases.
In addition, to ensure that the perspectives o f both federal and provincial 
governments in two provinces were represented a quota sampling technique was 
employed. Typically, quota sampling is utilised when ‘the group or social processes 
under study has clearly defined categories o f participants’ (Rubin and Babbie, 1997: 383). 
Such is the case with the present study, as clearly, the processes that led to the LMDAs 
involved two levels o f government. To gain an understanding about the influences o f 
government positions on devolution, it was critical to seek representation from both 
federal and provincial civil servants.
As discussed in greater detail later, most o f the respondents for this study were 
identified with the help o f key informants. In total, 16 respondents were identified in this 
manner. Efforts were made to interview additional civil servants knowledgeable about 
the negotiations and the development o f the agreement. To this end, respondents who 
were interviewed were very helpful in identifying other individuals with similar expertise.
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Just under one-quarter o f the sample was accrued through the information provided by 
respondents other than the key informants. Therefore, in addition to purposive and quota 
sampling, a snowball sampling procedure was employed in the study.
Berg (2001) suggests that the snowball sampling technique is useful when trying 
to reach hard to access populations. This fits with the present study, as written 
documentation, such as minutes o f the negotiation meetings that perhaps could have 
identified who was involved in the negotiations, were not publicly available. Neither the 
key informants nor the head o f each negotiating team were willing to provide the actual 
minutes that recorded the negotiations.
Description o f the sample
Respondents are viewed as possessing expert knowledge pertaining to the central 
questions addressed in this thesis. In general, respondents’ perceptions, ideas and 
opinions are informed by their experience, and accumulative knowledge about (a) federal- 
provincial intergovernmental relations, and (b) federal and provincial labour market 
policy. Respondents are civil servants who hold positions as senior level managers, and 
they are responsible for overseeing portfolios related to labour market policy. Given their 
official positions and related knowledge and experience that accrued from thus, 
respondents were appointed by their respective governments with some measure o f 
authority concerning the federal-provincial labour market development agreement for 
either Alberta or Nova Scotia. See Table 4A.
While Table 4A describes the positions held by respondents, it should be noted 
that respondents’ responses are not identified in this manner. Rather, respondents’ direct
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quotes are identified by province, level o f government, and an individual letter (A to U), 
in brackets following each quote. For example, the notations for Nova Scotia federal 
respondents will read: (NS-FD-letter) and notations for Alberta provincial respondents 
will read: (AB-PR-letter). Confidentiality o f respondents’ responses will be discussed 
later.
All o f the federal respondents hold senior management positions in Human 
Resources Development Canada. This department was responsible for administrating the 
Prime M inster’s official proposal for devolution on behalf o f the federal government. 
Provincial respondents hold senior management positions in ministries identified as 
potentially affected by the federal proposal and any future federal-provincial labour 
market agreement. Alberta provincial respondents are civil servants in the ministries o f 
Advanced Education and Career Development and Alberta Family and Social Services.
In Nova Scotia, provincial respondents are civil servants affiliated with Community 
Services, Education, the Science and Technology Secretariat, and the Labour Market 
Development Secretariat.
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TABLE 4A
OFFICIAL POSITIONS HELD BY ALBERTA AND NOVA SCOTIA RESPONDENTS 
AND INTERVIEW DATES
Alberta Provincial Civil Servants Interview Dates
Director, Federal Provincial Relations 29 June, 2000
Advanced Education and Career Development
Deputy Minister, Advanced Education and Career Development 26 July, 2000
Senior Manager, Family and Social Services 15 June, 2000
Assistant Deputy Minister, Advanced Education and Career 12 July, 2000
Development
Alberta Federal Civil Servants
Regional Director General, Human Resources Development 12 July, 2000
Canada
Director of Consolidated Services, Human Resources 10 July, 2000
Development Canada
Senior Manager, Human Resources Development Canada 10 August, 2000
Director, Human Resources, Human Resources Development 6 July, 2000
Canada
Nova Scotia Provincial Civil Servants
Senior Advisor, Labour Market Development Secretariat 30 October, 2000
Provincial Coordinator, Labour Market Development Secretariat 23 August, 2000
Senior Manager, Career and Transition Services, Ministry of 22 August, 2000
Education
Regional Administrator, Ministry of Community Services 24 August, 2000
Senior Manager, Science and Technology Secretariat 23 August, 2000
Director, Employment Support Services, Ministry of Community 22 August, 2000
Services
Nova Scotia Federal Civil Servants
Regional Director General, Human Resources Development 20 November, 2000
Canada
Senior Manager, Human Resources Development Canada 21 August, 2000
Manager, Planning and Evaluation, Human Resources 24 August, 2000
Development Canada
Regional Manager, Information and Technology, Human 25 August, 2000
Resources Development Canada
Director of Programs, Human Resources Development Canada 21 August, 2000
Director, Human Resource Centres of Canada, Human Resources 21 August, 2000
Development Canada
Senior Manager, Labour Program, Human Resources 24 August, 2000
Development Canada
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All respondents self-identified as being knowledgeable about the federal proposal 
for devolution and the federal-provincial negotiations. All respondents offered opinions 
on federal and provincial governments’ priorities and positions taken as a result o f this 
proposal. It must be acknowledged however, that this knowledge and related expertise is 
based on different kinds o f experience and involvement with the LMDA among 
respondents. To this end, it is necessary to be more specific about the foundation or 
sources o f respondents’ knowledge and expertise.
Respondents interviewed in this study are senior level federal and provincial civil 
servants who are deemed as being knowledgeable about, or, knowledgeable about and  
involved in, the development o f the labour market agreement for their province, and the 
negotiations that led up to the signing o f  the Canada-Alberta or the Canada-Nova Scotia 
Labour M arket Agreements.
The first category: knowledgeable about the development o f  the agreement and  
the negotiations, implies that respondents hold positions o f bureaucratic authority and 
expertise that enables them to have access to information on the progress and issues 
affecting the negotiations, and the development o f the agreement. Through provincial 
and federal briefings, these respondents were informed about issues relevant to the 
negotiations and the development o f the agreement, such as options being considered. In 
some cases, respondents were asked to respond to drafts o f the agreement. Respondents 
in this category tended to be involved in the policy development activities that prepared 
for the implementation o f the Labour M arket Development Agreements.
In contrast, the second category: being knowledgeable about and involved in 
development o f  the agreement and the negotiations implies that respondents were
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assigned to represent their respective governments by directly participating in the 
discussions and decision-making processes during the official federal-provincial 
negotiations. These respondents had the opportunity to directly observe the positions 
taken by each level o f government. Moreover, their knowledge about government 
positions is gained through contact with their respective elected officials who would need 
to be briefed following federal-provincial negotiation meetings.
Throughout the negotiation period, each o f the four teams would update their 
respective ministers on the progress o f reaching consensus on issues pertaining to the 
development o f the agreement. Updating each team ’s governmental headquarters was 
crucial in planning for upcoming federal-provincial meetings as the approval or 
disapproval o f particular matters would set the parameters for future negotiations.
In Alberta, a total o f eight civil servants were interviewed. Four o f these 
respondents are provincial- and four federal. All o f the civil servants interviewed in 
Alberta are knowledgeable about and were directly involved in the official negotiations, 
and the development o f the Canada-Alberta Labour Market Agreement. In Nova Scotia, 
o f  the thirteen respondents interviewed, seven are federal civil servants, and six are 
provincial. An explanation as to why significantly more civil servants were interviewed 
in Nova Scotia as compared to Alberta is warranted.
In Nova Scotia, most individuals directly involved in the negotiations were federal 
civil servants. Therefore, interviews with provincial civil servants who had knowledge 
about, but who were not directly involved in the negotiations, were carried out in an effort 
to obtain a more comprehensive provincial view. It was necessary to gain a fuller account 
o f provincial perceptions about the influences, and positions held by federal and
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provincial governments, than could be achieved through interviewing only those who 
were more directly involved in the negotiations.
Also, and as mentioned earlier, in Nova Scotia, the type o f model eventually 
agreed upon was strikingly different compared to others across the country. In attempt to 
clarify how such a unique type o f agreement was reached, it was necessary to interview 
additional respondents with that particular knowledge. Further, in Alberta, I had ready 
access to the two lead federal and provincial officials. In fact, these individuals were 
interviewed very early in the study. However, in the case o f Nova Scotia, I had to search 
for these lead persons with the assistance o f other respondents. Both persons were no 
longer in the positions they held during the time o f the negotiations. Interviews with 
these lead Nova Scotia senior officials were conducted towards the end o f the 
interviewing phase o f the research.
In the Nova Scotia sample, all o f  the federal respondents except for one are 
knowledgeable about, and were directly involved in negotiations and the development o f 
the agreement. In comparison, only one provincial respondent in the sample was directly 
involved in the negotiations. This is the individual who was appointed as head negotiator 
for the province. While about three other provincial officials attended at least some o f the 
negotiation meetings, both provincial and federal respondents noted that the provincial 
lead person was the primary contact for the federal negotiating team members, senior 
civil servants from involved provincial ministries, and provincial elected officials. 
Provincial respondents described this person, for example, as a “one person team ” (NS- 
PR-I), and the “the provincial architect o f this agreement”(NS-PR-L). A federal 
respondent referred to this individual as the “chief negotiator” for the province (NS-FD- 
T).
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The provincial lead for the negotiations ultimately led the Labour Development 
Secretariat, a provincial division established to manage the implementation o f the labour 
market development agreement. As the designated provincial lead for the negotiations, 
this respondent was appointed quasi deputy minister status as she reported directly to the 
M inister o f Community Services. Throughout the negotiations, the lead provincial 
negotiator worked with the three deputy ministers o f the affected ministries, notably 
Community Services, Education, and Economic Development, to build consensus around 
provincial decisions regarding the agreement. In addition to consenting to be 
interviewed, this individual submitted to me a written response to some o f the questions 
posed by the study.
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, during the time o f the LMDA negotiations, 
Nova Scotia had very little experience in labour market development policy, and thus, the 
province lacked policy expertise in this area. Moreover, labour market policy was not a 
well-established policy priority in any provincial ministry. Nova Scotia’s limited 
expertise and resource capacity pertaining to this area may be related to why one person 
played such a key role in representing the provincial position. Overall, the lack o f 
expertise and policy capacity in Nova Scotia serves as a sharp contrast to Alberta’s strong 
policy and resource capacity in labour market development.
Civil servants as respondents in studies
Data analysed from interviews with federal and provincial respondents is used in this 
thesis to explicate and examine the positions and influences o f thus, as asserted by the 
federal, Alberta, and Nova Scotia governments. Information drawn from interviews with 
civil servants suggests that this group has much to say about the priorities, influences and
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positions o f  the governments they serve. Although any decision could be proclaimed or 
ultimately changed by elected officials, civil servants were very instrumental in building 
governmental positions. The civil servants interviewed in this study were given the 
authority to make judgements about the relative benefits o f devolving these labour market 
policies, with their own governmental interests in mind. They were responsible for 
developing suitable scenarios, and implementing revised policy arrangements.
Cairns (1988) supports the suggestion that civil servants play an integral, and 
more specifically, a very powerful role in carrying out the day-to-day operations o f 
governments. Although politicians are endowed with official political power, they are 
greatly outnumbered by civil servants who do their bidding, and civil servants have 
significant incentive to expand their own authority, and assert their own interests (Cairns 
1988; White, et al., 1998).
Drawing from 1997 figures, the approximate size o f the federal and provincial 
public service sectors amounted to respectively, 400,000 and 203,000 civil servants 
(Brooks, 2000: 165). The sum o f 603,000 civil servants stands in sharp comparison to the 
near 1,011 elected officials who represent their constituents across the country in federal 
and provincial legislatures (Archer et al., 1999). Furthermore, between 1941 and 1994, 
the civil service has increased by 1,198 per cent (Peters, 1999). The considerable growth 
o f the public service over the latter part o f the 20th century has created:
large and powerful complexes o f institutions and personnel with their own 
professional and personal interests and their own official purposes for the 
provincial and federal populations they govern.
(Cairns, 1988: 105)
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Civil servants interviewed tend to have a long-term view o f their programme- 
policy area. As one federal respondent in Alberta said “I have grown up in this 
programme” (AB-FD-G). They have a good understanding o f the evolution, development 
and challenges o f their programme area, and in part, their authority and strength stems 
from their expertise to which political officials are highly dependent upon (Cairns, 1988; 
White, et al., 1998; Brooks, 2000). It is in civil servants’ interests to anticipate the 
impacts and implications o f any programme-policy shifts that might result from 
devolving labour market policies from federal to provincial jurisdictions.
It is a significant challenge to discern the influences o f governmental priorities 
and positions. As mentioned earlier, the negotiations were covert and, although the final 
agreements are public knowledge, just how and why governments reached agreement is 
not obvious or widely understood. M any research studies that deal with influences on 
government, and government positions, draw upon the perceptions and opinions o f 
federal and provincial civil servants. For example, Klassen (2000) interviewed senior 
officials in the Ontario government in a study that investigated the salient factors 
involved in the decline o f two governmental initiatives that pertain to labour market 
adjustment, during the mid- 1980s to mid- 1990s. The provincial senior officials 
interviewed, observed or were involved in the rise and fall o f  initiatives in the Ministry o f 
Skills Development, and the Ontario Training and Adjustment Board.
Lindquist (1999) interviewed civil servants in a study that investigated federal and 
provincial overlap and duplication in policy and programme development. The study 
examines four policy case studies where both levels o f government are active, to draw out 
the challenges and successes related to managing federal-provincial overlap and 
duplication.
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In a manner similar to the procedure followed in this thesis, White (2002) and 
Bakvis (1996) interviewed both federal and provincial civil servants to study the 
interaction between intergovemmentalism and the respective policy sectors o f  child-care, 
and labour market development in Canada. White (2002) explores disputes concerning 
jurisdictional issues, and the constraints inherent in collaborative federal-provincial 
approaches in the development o f child-care policy. In W hite’s (2002) study, interviews 
with civil servants helped to explain the priorities o f governments’ and the influences o f 
political factors in policy development.
Closely related to the focus o f this thesis, Bakvis (1996) examined the federal 
governm ent’s 1996 official proposal for devolution o f labour market development policy. 
Bakvis (1996) interviewed federal and civil servants to analyse some o f the challenges 
faced by the federal government in following through with devolution. Also, Bakvis’ 
(1996) study examines potential provincial positions on the proposal, and the future 
impact on national labour market policy, given the possibility that markedly different 
labour market strategies could be generated across the country. In a later study, Bakvis 
(2002) interviewed federal and provincial civil servants once again, in a study that 
examines the labour market development agreements as an illustration o f flexible 
federalism in Canada. Noting a shift away from flexible federalism following the mid- 
1990s, Bakvis (2002) examines the implications o f the labour market develop agreements 
as a benchmark for the performance, effectiveness, and legitimacy o f  federalism.
Recruitment o f respondents to the study
Four key informants were consulted about specific issues related to this study. Three o f 
these key informants are senior civil servants associated with LMDAs and are included in
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the sample o f  respondents. They will be referred to as key informant/respondents. These 
three key informant/respondents provided information about the field o f study, assisted in 
the recruitment o f other respondents, and provided feedback about the research 
questionnaire. The fourth key informant, who was not associated with LMDAs, reviewed 
and provided feedback about the technical aspects o f the research questionnaire that 
guided the interviews. This person will be referred to as a key informant. This key 
inform ant’s participation in this research will be addressed later when the chapter 
discusses the instrument used to collect data.
According to Janesick (1998), interviews with key informants help to gain insight 
about the field o f study. Key informants can play an important role in introducing the 
researcher to the culture o f the field setting, including language or jargon (Fontana and 
Frey, 1998; Janesick, 1998). For example, as in the case with this study, key 
informant/respondents were very helpful in interpreting acronyms and official 
terminology. Janesick (1998) suggests, that key informants assist researchers to establish 
relationships with other respondents, and they help researchers to become familiar with 
respondents’ time frames and availability. Also, they can identify significant documents 
and records that may reveal previously unknown information.
To gain information about the LMDAs and other potential research respondents, 
two key informant/respondents were interviewed in Alberta, and one key 
informant/respondent was interviewed in Nova Scotia. They provided me with relevant 
government documents, and they recommended particular government documents, and 
other related written material such as conference proceedings. Key 
informant/respondents were very helpful in gaining knowledge about and access to the
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study population. The process o f recruiting key informant/respondents and respondents 
was different for each province, and will be discussed separately.
Alberta
In Alberta, two key informant/respondents were chosen. Both key informant/respondents 
hold senior management positions, and both were directly involved in the Canada-Alberta 
negotiations. In search o f key informant/respondents and in general civil servants who 
were knowledgeable about the study area, I initially telephoned the Alberta M inistry o f 
Human Resources and Employment (the current lead ministry for the LMDA) and asked 
to speak to a senior official with responsibility for the LMDA. I spoke to an official who 
gave me the name and phone number o f  senior official who was involved in the labour 
market negotiations.
This second official was telephoned and confirmed their direct involvement in the 
development and negotiations o f the Canada-Alberta LMDA. This provincial official was 
interested in the research and agreed to be interviewed. This key informant/respondent 
was interviewed twice. During the first interview he/she provided a detailed written list 
o f the federal and provincial civil servants who participated in the Canada-Alberta LMDA 
negotiations. From this list I telephoned the most senior federal official and requested 
his/her involvement as a key informant/respondent. This federal official who was the 
federal lead in the negotiations, agreed to participate and he/she provided names and 
contact information for federal and provincial officials involved in the negotiations.
From the lists compiled with the assistance o f the two key informant/respondents, 
ten federal and provincial civil servants were identified as having directly participated in
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the Canada-Alberta LMDA negotiations. My intention was to interview all ten civil 
servants. I directly contacted potential research respondents to inform them about the 
research, and to request their participation. Initially, potential respondents were informed 
by letter (through electronic mail) about the study and were invited to participate.
Usually it was necessary to contact individuals by telephone to ascertain their interest and 
willingness to participate. Most often, once a respondent agreed to take part in the study,
I was given their administrative assistant’s phone number, and was requested to contact 
them to arrange the interview date and time.
Out o f the ten civil servants who were identified as being directly involved in the 
Canada-Alberta negotiations, eight were interviewed for this study. I was successful in 
contacting all but one o f these respondents. Out o f the two individuals who did not 
participate, one is retired, and I received no confirmation whether or not my letter and 
phone messages had been received. The other potential respondent declined the 
invitation to participate, via an assistant. According to the assistant, the civil servant was 
burdened by a full and busy schedule, and therefore could not take part in the study. The 
two potential respondents who did not participate in the study were both provincial civil 
servants.
Nova Scotia
The Alberta federal key informant/respondent gave me the name o f two senior officials in 
Nova Scotia who were able to provide names o f persons involved in the Canada-Nova 
Scotia LMDA negotiations. I was able to contact only one o f these individuals. This 
individual agreed to be interviewed, and to assist in providing information about the 
LMDA negotiations, and to identify suitable respondents for the study. Again, my aim
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was to interview federal and provincial civil servants who were directly involved in the 
LMDA negotiations. The key informant/respondent, a senior manager for the federal 
government, identified potential respondents who participated in, and had knowledge 
about the negotiations.
Recruitment o f respondents in Nova Scotia took place in two stages. An initial 
nine interviews with respondents were arranged with the assistance o f the key 
informant/respondent. Rather than provide me with a list o f potential suitable 
respondents, that I could then use to directly contact respondents, the key 
informant/respondent preferred to contact these individuals to ascertain their willingness 
to participate. Once they agreed to participate an assistant o f the key 
informant/respondent scheduled the date and time of the interview.
Four o f these respondents are federal civil servants who were directly involved in 
the negotiations, and one respondent is a federal civil servant with knowledge about the 
negotiations, and the development o f the agreement. In contrast, none o f the four 
provincial respondents identified by the key informant have direct involvement in the 
negotiations, yet they have knowledge about the negotiations, and the development o f the 
labour market agreement.
As the Nova Scotia interviews progressed, I became aware o f others who were 
also involved in and/or knowledgeable about the negotiations, and this allowed me to 
search out and interview four additional respondents. Two o f these additional 
respondents are federal and two are provincial civil servants. As noted earlier, one 
provincial civil servant was identified as playing a major role in the Canada-Nova Scotia 
negotiations. With the help o f respondents other than the key informant/respondent, I
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was able to locate, and contact this individual who expressed a keen willingness to 
participate in the study.
The other provincial respondent recruited to the study in this manner was not 
directly involved in the actual negotiations, but the respondent’s observations and 
knowledge about events surrounding the negotiations helped to elaborate on the 
provincial position, and the influences thereof. Both federal respondents identified with 
the help o f other respondents were directly involved in the negotiations, and in fact one 
was the federal lead for the Canada-Nova Scotia negotiations, and the labour market 
development agreement.
These additional interviews substantiated the information offered by the initial 
nine respondents identified with the help o f the key informant/respondent. Further, 
detailed information about the negotiations was obtained through the interviews with the 
federal and provincial team leaders.
In sum, thirteen civil servants were interviewed in Nova Scotia. Seven were 
identified as participating directly in the negotiations. An additional six individuals with 
knowledge about the negotiations, and the development o f the labour market agreement 
were interviewed.
Prior to each interview with Alberta and Nova Scotia respondents, a number o f 
issues were addressed. To begin, I reviewed the purpose and focus o f the research, and 
provided respondents the opportunity to ask questions about the research. Also, I ensured 
that they understood that their participation was voluntary, and how their individual 
responses would be identified in the research was reviewed and agreed upon. Further, I
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ensured that respondents judged themselves as knowledgeable about the development o f 
the LMDA. The process o f informed consent and issues pertaining to confidentiality will 
be dealt with in greater detail later.
Instrument used to collect data
Key informants can play an important role in improving the research instrument 
(Janesick, 1998). In this study, interviews with key informant/respondents helped to 
refine the interview schedule. General questions pertaining to the negotiations, and 
development o f the agreement were answered by the key informant/respondents, and 
were then deleted from the original draft o f the question schedule. For example, key 
informant/respondents verified that the negotiations were bilateral, govemment-to- 
govemment activities that did not include direct participation from other stakeholders 
such as business and labour. Also, questions concerning details about which ministries 
represented provincial and federal governments in the negotiations were answered by the 
key informant/respondents, and did not require a response from all respondents.
Key informant/respondents assisted with the final preparation and editing o f the 
question schedule. For instance, I was advised to not anticipate more than one and one 
half to two hours per interview, and to clarify my time expectations with the respondents’ 
assistants or secretaries who managed their diaries.
Other technical advice was sought and received from an additional key informant 
(not included in the respondent sample), who possesses an expertise in designing research 
questionnaires. This key informant is a senior business manager for a provincial ministry, 
and has taught third and fourth year university courses in research, and programme
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evaluation. This key informant’s critique helped to safeguard against including double- 
barrelled questions, and questions that may have been biasing or leading. This 
individual’s advice was very useful in planning the logical order o f questions, and for 
improving the wording, and hence the overall clarity o f the question schedule. See 
Appendix A for a copy o f the question schedule.
The question schedule was designed to elicit respondents’ perceptions about the 
federal government proposal for devolution, and how particular provinces responded to 
this proposal. More specifically, respondents were asked questions to gain an 
understanding about the influences o f the federal proposal, and the divergent provincial 
responses evident in the two case study provinces. To this end, the questions were 
intended to draw on respondents’ expertise, and knowledge to shed light on federal and 
provincial priorities and positions concerning the devolution o f labour market policy.
The schedule comprised four main question areas: (1) Rationale and context o f the 
federal proposal for devolution (2) Process issues related to the development o f the 
LM DA (3) Federal and provincial attitudes, priorities and positions on devolution and the 
LMDA, and (4) Lessons learned. See Appendix A for the full question schedule.
Procedures followed to collect data
Research interviews were conducted to collect data. Specific details o f the interviews 
will be elaborated upon following a brief review o f the advantages, and disadvantages o f 
utilising interviews to gather data. There are several advantages o f this procedure. 
Largely, answering questions in interviews is a more natural, and easier process for 
respondents, than approaches that require responses in written form (Gochros, 1988).
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Also, written responses may be more prone to ‘self-censorship’ compared to questions 
answered orally (Gochros, 1988: 268). Furthermore, Gochros (1988) states ‘it is more 
difficult in an interview than in a mailed survey questionnaire to “erase” an answer and 
replace it with a more “appropriate” and perhaps less valid answer’ (Gochros, 1988: 268).
Interviews promote high response rates on the questions asked, because the 
presence o f the interviewer enables respondents to clarify questions that may not be well 
understood (Gochros, 1988). As opposed to responding to a question in writing, which 
can be easily avoided, respondents may even enjoy speaking to an interviewer (Gochros, 
1988; Rubin and Babbie, 1997). When I spoke to respondents on the telephone to discuss 
their interest in participating in the research, they would often comment that the 
development o f the LMDA preoccupied a great deal o f their time. For several 
respondents, the LMDA represented a significant event. For instance, a Nova Scotia 
provincial respondent referred to the agreement as “futuristic” (NS-PR-L). Another Nova 
Scotia provincial respondent remarks:
We could see that there was an opportunity to better align what we were 
doing as a province with what the federal programming had been, in terms 
o f pooling our resources to get unemployed Nova Scotians back to work.
We saw an opportunity to bring provincial economic and social objectives 
into the discussions, which had not been the case with the federal 
government operating unilaterally in the area.
(NS-PR-N)
Some comments reflected a sense o f pride in reaching federal-provincial agreement. For 
example, an Alberta federal respondent comments:
We negotiated a very fine set o f conditions under which the transfer 
occurred. Federal staff who were transferred to the province were taken 
care of, and I think that’s one o f our greatest accomplishments here as a 
team who negotiated the first LMDA; we had achieved a breakthrough
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both from a federal and provincial point o f view. I think we had a good 
agreement.
(AB-FD-E)
From civil servants’ perspectives the LMDA was momentous, because o f its 
impact on federal-provincial relations, and the extensive commitment o f time and effort 
that was invested in the bilateral negotiations.
The interview allows for flexibility that can lead to in-depth information 
(Gochros, 1988; Patton, 1990; Rubin and Babbie, 1997). In an interview, the interviewer 
can ask probing questions in attempt to shed light on complex issues. For example, when 
I asked respondents about factors that influenced governmental positions, I asked probing 
questions to follow up on their initial responses. For instance, when asked about 
influences on the federal proposal an Albertan federal respondent explains:
The proposal was to demonstrate particularly to Quebec during the time of 
the referendum that flexible federalism, co-operative federalism, could 
work and this was the flagship that they waved.
(AB-FD-F)
Following this statement I asked, “According to your experience what does flexible 
federalism m ean?” The respondent replies:
I think it’s whatever the politicians choose to make it on any given day. 
Because from the federal point o f view, they’ve also talked about powers 
going the other way too. I mean to be pure about this- they would always 
have this little holding section in statements that acknowledged that, sure 
we could be talking about stuff going to the provinces and o f course we 
could also talk about stuff coming back to the federal government. They 
would always make reference to the fact that it could happen both ways. 
But that’s not o f course how the provinces saw it!
(AB-FD-F)
When addressing provincial priorities for the LMDA an Alberta provincial
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respondent comments:
Because we were the first and taking a chance on the agreement, we 
wanted to see a clause, we called it the equality clause, so that, if- at any 
time after we concluded our agreement, another province negotiated terms 
that were more favourable, we wanted to ensure that such options were 
available to us as well. And we were negotiating that just about to the 
eleventh hour.
(AB-PR-C)
W hen I asked: “When did the province bring the equality clause to the table?” the 
respondent answers: “It was always there but the federal government just kept refusing to 
deal with it” (AB-PR-C).
O f course such questions are complex and require complex, and comprehensive 
answers. It is probable that had respondents answered questions about governmental 
influences in written form, they may have simply stated what they perceived as influential 
without any explanation as to why or how they reached such conclusions. But in the 
interview I was able to ask respondents to expand on their comments.
Furthermore, in research interviews, the researcher is assured that the respondent 
is answering questions as opposed to someone else such as an assistant or colleague 
(Gochros, 1988). And therefore, the researcher can better account for the identity and 
description o f the population sampled. In addition, the presence o f the interviewer allows 
for access to serendipitous data (Gochros, 1988; Rubin and Babbie, 1997). For instance, 
early on in the interviewing stage o f this research, an Alberta provincial respondent noted 
that Part I (the employment insurance benefit) was on the table for discussion. This was 
m ost interesting to me, as this detail was missing from the information that was publicly 
available. This information, unexpectedly revealed early on during the interviews, was
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developed into a question, and hence incorporated into the schedule. The issue of 
whether or not Part I was discussed and perceived as negotiable, and the extent o f 
agreement among provincial and federal respondents about whether or not this was in fact 
true, is examined in Chapter 6.
A disadvantage o f the research interview includes the potential inaccessibility o f 
respondents to researchers because o f their geographical locations (Gochros, 1988). This 
was a problem confronted in this study as respondents work in various locations across 
the country. M ost respondents reside, and were interviewed in the capital cities o f each 
province, namely Edmonton, Alberta, and Halifax, Nova Scotia. In cases where 
respondents lived elsewhere, telephone interviews were arranged.
Another limitation o f the research interview is that it results in a loss o f anonymity 
for respondents (Gochros, 1988). While all respondents were guaranteed confidentiality 
o f  their responses, face-to-face interviews do not allow for anonymity. Yet, in this 
research, a written questionnaire that safeguarded their identity from the researcher may 
not have offered respondents much comfort about the anonymity o f their responses, given 
that both the study population and the sample population are quite small. This poses a 
challenge to the research strategy utilised in this study and will be elaborated on later in 
the discussion on ethical considerations.
A further disadvantage is that the presence o f the interviewer may result in 
distortions or errors in the process o f collecting and recording data (Gochros, 1988; Rubin 
and Babbie, 1997). In this study, error in recording respondents’ answers was minimised 
by taking notes, and tape-recording, and transcribing the interviews.
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Interviewers may introduce error through a lack o f standardisation in the interview 
process, whereby wording and sequencing o f questions, and actual questions asked may 
change from interview to interview. For the most part, all o f  the questions were asked in 
the order presented in the schedule. This research attempted to avoid error by following 
the question schedule as closely as possible, while retaining a flexible approach to gain 
comprehensive and in-depth information.
The interviews followed a semi-structured format, whereby a question schedule 
guides the interview, yet the researcher exercises plenty o f latitude to interject questions 
that probe respondents’ answers for greater clarity and detail (Gochros, 1988; Patton, 
1990; Rubin and Babbie, 1997). Also, an effort was made to ensure that all questions 
were asked o f  all respondents. On a few occasions however, questions were limited 
largely because o f time constraints on the part o f  some respondents.
In this study, a total o f 21 federal and provincial civil servants from Alberta and 
Nova Scotia were interviewed from June to November 2000. To clarify respondents’ 
answers and to ask additional questions, four respondents were interviewed twice. Most 
interviews were conducted in face-to-face interviews, save six interviews that were 
conducted over the telephone. Out o f these six telephone interviews, four were follow up 
interviews. All o f the face-to-face interviews were conducted in respondents’ offices.
The length o f the interviews ranged from 50 to 130 minutes. On average, interviews 
lasted for approximately 80 minutes. In sum, 25 interviews were conducted, comprising 
approximately 1,920 minutes or 32 hours. All interviews were recorded on audiotape and 
transcribed.
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Limitations o f  the methodology
To begin, in examining the influences o f one federal and two provincial governments, the 
research draws on two provincial experiences only. Perhaps a more in-depth account o f 
the political interest and public interest influences on devolution concerning this case 
study could have been reached with an additional province and larger sample size. A 
further limitation is the concentration on civil servants, and the inclusion o f only a few 
elected officials.
The negotiations took place between 1996 and 1997 and the interviews were 
conducted in 2000. On occasion, respondents would comment that I was taxing their 
memory because o f the three to four year time-lapse between the negotiations and the 
research interview. For example, early in the interview, one respondent states: “it was a 
long time ago so I don’t know that I have lot to offer”(AB-PR-A). Yet, this respondent 
and others who were concerned about the time lapse, and their ability to recall events and 
salient facts, noted towards the end o f the interview that they were surprised that they 
remembered as much as they did. In fact, some respondents stated that talking about 
events actually improved their recall. For example, one respondent was discussing some 
the difficulties encountered during the negotiation and comments: “So that was a 
problem...as we are talking here I am remembering more about the problems we had to 
deal with” (AB-PR-D).
Rather than trying to take detailed notes, tape-recording interviews assists in 
recording respondents’ input accurately, and it allows the researcher to focus on the 
respondent and what he or she is saying (Rubin and Babbie, 1997). Yet, some 
respondents may have felt uncomfortable because I was tape-recording their responses. It
119
should be acknowledged that the presence o f the tape-recorder might have inhibited their 
participation to some degree. For example, at times respondents were tentative in their 
responses. It is believed though that promising confidentiality o f responses tended to 
compensate for this limitation. This issue will be discussed in the next section that deals 
with ethical considerations.
Informed consent and other ethical considerations
Ethical considerations involve issues o f informed consent, confidentiality, and protection 
from harm (Fontana and Frey, 1998; Punch, 1998). Researchers must prepare for 
potential ethical issues and problems during the course o f the research process (Janesick, 
1998; Punch, 1998). And, as noted by Punch (1998), in reference to ethical 
considerations, each researcher must navigate ‘his or her own path’:
This is because there is no consensus or unanimity on what is public and
private, what constitutes harm, and what the benefits o f knowledge are.
(Punch, 1998: 179)
Prior to each interview, respondents read and signed informed consent forms that 
outlined: (a) the focus o f the study (b) that the study is conducted in part to fulfil PhD 
requirements (c) why the respondent was chosen to participate (d) what participation 
entails (e) that participation is voluntary (f) contact information concerning research 
supervision, and (g) how respondents would be identified in the study. See Appendix B.
While respondents offered, in most cases in great detail, their interpretation o f 
events and associated decision-making processes related to the proposal for devolution, a 
moderate level o f caution was noted in some interviews. Klassen (2000) notes that senior
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managers, who hold positions that are unprotected by collective bargaining agreements, 
may require more assurances o f confidentiality than mid-level managers who have the 
advantage o f  such protection.
It was important to some respondents to clarify with me that their answers to some 
o f the questions were based on their perceptions and opinions only, and did not 
necessarily reflect governments’ official public positions. These questions tended to be 
ones that tried to reveal the influences o f governments’ positions, and eventual decisions 
about devolution. In contrast, respondents tended to be less cautious responding to 
questions that sought clarification about information that was for the most part public, and 
not necessarily controversial in nature.
Though respondents work for governments, some o f the civil servants interviewed 
in this study tended to disagree with their political leaders, and this fact cannot be ignored 
in the ethical consideration o f risk to respondents. While some respondents who openly 
criticised governments (including their own) did not appear to be nervous or apprehensive 
about making such comments, others decided to refrain from answering questions that 
may have perhaps been perceived as sensitive.
When asked about future trends in federal proposals for devolution, one Nova 
Scotia federal respondent asserts: “Well, that depends on what the next federal 
government looks like” (NS-FD-O). When asked to comment further, the respondent 
replies: “I have no comments on that” (NS-FD-O). In addition, when asked a question 
about the extent o f devolution in the Nova Scotia LMDA, a Nova Scotia provincial 
respondent comments: “I’m being recorded so it’s hard for me to talk openly”(NS-PR-L). 
Further, when asked about the kind o f agreement that was preferred by the federal
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government, a Nova Scotia federal respondent prefaced his/her comments saying: “Well 
that’s a tough question first o f  all I have to watch what I say” (NS-FD-R).
Moreover, a few respondents asked that I strike particular statements. And on one 
occasion a respondent asked that the tape-recorder be turned off. It was as if the 
respondent felt obligated to answer my question, or simply wanted to get the thought into 
the open, but did not want to do so on tape. As a researcher, I acknowledge the fact that 
civil servants do to some extent take risks when making comments that surpass the 
threshold o f  so called stated rationale o f policy, and status quo political sentiment. In 
order to elicit respondents’ perceptions and opinions it was necessary to guarantee 
confidentiality o f their responses.
There is debate concerning the researcher’s responsibility to report on ‘abuses in 
public and business life’ and protecting the confidentiality and privacy o f respondents, 
and ensuring that respondents are not harmed (Punch, 1998: 173). Indeed as noted by 
Punch (1998) some would argue that the protection o f respondents can be rightfully 
waived in cases where public institutions are involved in dishonest, and unlawful 
activities. While this research did not uncover such grave insults upon public 
accountability, it was clear that many respondents were critical o f their governments, but 
were very careful to not state the case so severely.
Within the constructivist paradigm, to which this research is identified, ignoring 
or minimising the significance o f ethical issues is not acceptable. Rather than viewing 
civil servants as ‘subjects’, respondents are likened to ‘partners’ or:
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stakeholders in a constructivist paradigm that is based on avoidance o f
harm, fully informed consent, and the need for privacy and confidentiality.
(Punch, 1998: 169-170)
Issues o f anonymity and confidentiality are a concern in the present study for 
several reasons. The sample for the study is small, as respondents noted that the 
negotiations concerning the two studied LMDAs involved about 10 persons in each 
province only. While the study sample in this research includes respondents other than 
those directly involved in the negotiations, most o f the individuals who were directly 
involved were interviewed.
For Nova Scotia, about 70 per cent o f the individuals who were directly involved 
in the negotiations were interviewed, and about 80 per cent o f  the individuals who were 
directly involved in the Alberta labour market negotiations, were interviewed in this 
study. Anonymity is therefore a concern. Anonymity is lessened somewhat with the 
guarantee that individual research respondents are not identified by name. Furthermore, 
respondents were promised confidentiality o f their responses. Therefore, I have avoided 
the inclusion o f direct quotes that may identify individuals. For example, a few 
respondents made use o f slang language that could be identified by those familiar with 
these respondents.
Research respondents were invited to contact me should they choose to amend 
their comments, or offer additional insights. Respondents could choose to review the 
transcripts o f  their interview prior to the inclusion o f their comments into the analysis. 
Six out o f the twenty-one research respondents asked to review the interview transcripts 
in order to make changes or offer additional comments. Only three respondents made 
very minimal changes to their initial comments. No critical detail was amended.
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For the most part, participants were very interested in this research. In both 
Alberta and Nova Scotia, many o f the respondents were still involved in the LMDA and 
were keenly awaiting forthcoming formative programme evaluations. Many respondents 
from both provinces requested that I send them a paper outlining the study’s findings. It 
is important for researchers to share their findings with research respondents.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the chosen methodology for the study. Interpretive and 
constructivist paradigms have been evaluated, and the case for adopting a qualitative case 
study method has been suggested as the most appropriate for investigating the kind o f 
‘political’, and sensitive material related to the subject o f this study.
First, the questions and main thesis o f the study were addressed. As a way o f 
discussing the choice o f methodology, the chapter examined positivist and 
phenomenological research paradigms. It was argued that the interpretive - constructivist 
approach is superior to positivist quantitative methods for the purposes o f this study, the 
major aim o f which is the in-depth examination o f policy-making processes leading to 
devolution, and the wider influences on these processes. The chapter reviewed additional 
salient issues related to methodology, including the triangulation o f methods and data 
sources; sampling and recruitment strategies; civil servants as study subjects; the 
instrument used and procedures followed to collect data; limitations o f the methodology; 
and ethical considerations.
A number o f limitations o f the methodology were addressed including confining 
the examination to two provinces, and employing a sample that relies heavily on civil
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servants. Further limitations are associated with the length o f time that lapsed between 
the negotiations and the research interviews, and the difficulty o f preserving anonymity 
and confidentiality with an easily identifiable group o f civil servants. Despite these 
limitations, the research method was successful in shedding light on influences on 
government decision-making concerning the case study o f devolution. The next three 
case study chapters examine these influences in detail.
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Chapter 5
Federal Government Proposal to Devolve Labour Market Policy: Influence 
of Political and Public Interests
Introduction: Political environment from the 1980s to mid- 1990s
This chapter examines why the federal government put forward an official proposal to 
devolve labour market policy to provincial governments in 1996. Drawing from primary 
and secondary data, the influence o f the broader political environment o f the latter 1980s 
and early to mid- 1990s will be examined. Evidence will be presented in attempt to 
determine how far the federal offer was driven primarily by political interests. The 
significance o f other influences related to promoting the public interest, will also be 
examined.
The following hypothesis is examined: that the federal proposal for labour market 
devolution was influenced mainly by (a) political pressures resulting from the Quebec 
unity crisis, and (b) provincial calls for greater devolution concerning social policy, 
including the devolution o f labour market policy, more than it was by (c) the federal 
government’s intent to extend the public interest. In sum, it will be argued that the 
proposal was influenced by political imperatives facing the federal government more than 
it was influenced by the federal perception that devolution would result in greater 
effectiveness and efficiency o f labour market policy.
Faced with growing debt and deficit from the mid- 1980s to mid- 1990s, the 
federal government chose to impose severe fiscal cut backs to social policy. This chapter
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will discuss the influence o f provincial reactions to nearly a decade o f unilateral federal 
fiscal restraint, which included significant reductions in financial transfers to the 
provinces. Also examined are the pressures that stemmed from failed attempts at 
constitutional renewal, the threat o f Quebec secession, and the 1995 referendum on 
sovereignty.
In addition, this chapter will examine other potential influences that precipitated 
the federal devolution proposal, including reforms to the Unemployment Insurance Act 
and provincial reaction to these reforms. Reforms to Unemployment Insurance involved 
more than fiscal cuts. In fact, changes to the Act emphasised active measures and an 
enhanced provincial involvement in labour market training. The significance o f this, and 
o f provincial attitudes to proposed new policies on labour market training, will be 
examined.
Following an examination o f the saliency o f these pressures to influence the 
federal proposal for devolution, the chapter will also review how the federal government 
intended to evaluate the success o f the Labour Market Development Agreements 
(LMDAs). The accountability framework, which was devised by the federal government 
for this purpose, will be reviewed to throw light on federal priorities and political 
intentions, and to further discuss the hypothesis outlined above.
Federal government and fiscal restraint (1985-95)
As discussed in Chapter 3, the federal government played a pivotal role in establishing 
and maintaining social programmes in Canada. However, this strong federal presence 
began to fade in the 1970s when the Keynesian foundations o f the post-war settlement
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started to destabilise. Productivity waned as government spending and ensuing debt 
climbed. Economic recession in the early 1980s provoked governments to abandon full 
employment policies and focus on curbing inflation (Muszynski, 1995). Not unlike many 
other countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the burgeoning public debt in Canada added incentive to calls for social policy 
reform (Battle, 1998). Federal fiscal restraint was influenced by the extent o f debt and 
the growth in social spending and therefore, each will be examined briefly.
Considerable attention has been paid to the issue o f government debt and deficit 
problems since the mid-1980s. Canada’s federal government debt amassed rapidly during 
World War I and II, and during the Great Depression. In the 1980s, this pattern o f  rapid 
and surging federal debt repeated itself (Harris, 1994). Public debt rapidly accumulated 
during the 1970s, and could not easily be eliminated by subsequent budget surpluses. 
Long-term financing o f the deficit increased federal debt from $20 billion in 1971 to more 
than $545 billion by 1994-95. This resulted in a sharp increase in the federal debt to GDP 
ratio from 19 per cent in 1974-75 to 73 per cent in 1994-95 (Government o f Canada, 
1995a).
Instead o f pointing to factors such as declining tax rates and the diminishing tax 
base, Conservative and Liberal federal governments in power during the 1980s and 1990s 
chose to target social spending as a way to contain debt and deficits (Dyck, 2000). 
However, despite the attempts to contain increases in welfare and social spending, 
expenditure on social programmes has vastly increased since the mid-twentieth century 
(Battle, 1998). While in 1945-46 federal and provincial governments’ social programme 
spending was 4.7 per cent o f GDP, in 1980 it had reached 14.3 per cent. Notwithstanding 
cut backs on social programme spending during the 1980s and 1990s, costs rose to 21.1
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per cent o f GDP in 1992-93. When adjusted for inflation using 1998 dollars, the amount 
spent on social programmes in 1945-46 and in 1992-93 totalled $6 billion and $159 
billion respectively (Battle, 1998). As a result o f  major cuts in unemployment insurance 
and decreased spending in health and welfare programmes after 1992, spending was 
alleviated somewhat, totalling $158 billion or 19.5 per cent o f  GDP in 1994-95 (Battle, 
1998).
Public spending on social programmes has risen overall, yet in examining the 
differential rates o f growth in spending by the two levels o f government, it is noted that 
the federal rate o f growth is approximately half that o f the provinces. This declining 
federal role in social provision is evidenced by the fact that between 1958-9 and 1990-91, 
provincial spending increased thirteen times. This is contrasted against federal spending 
which only increased six times for the same period (Muszynski, 1995). This is 
understandable as social services and much o f the expenditure they entail fall under the 
jurisdiction o f the provinces (D.R. Cameron, 1994).
As noted by D.R. Cameron (1994: 436), the 1867 Constitution Act appointed 
responsibility for social issues to the provinces and as ‘health, welfare and social 
assistance, and education consumed an increasingly large portion o f the public purse’, 
provincial financial obligation grew accordingly. Higher rates o f growth in provincial 
spending stimulated provincial calls for greater autonomy and authority over how those 
dollars are spent. However, it is important to note that federal fiscal restraint has also 
contributed to provincial dissatisfaction with status quo federalism. And, as mentioned 
earlier in Chapter 3, the provinces have grown less tolerant o f centralised federal power, 
largely as a result o f the provinces’ increased ‘bureaucratic power and capacity’ (Cairns, 
1988: 114).
129
Federal fiscal reductions in transfers to provinces
Federal fiscal restraint is relevant to this thesis because it resulted in strong provincial 
demands on the federal government to devolve authority and responsibility for social 
policy to provinces. Further, it is argued here that, the federal decision to cut back 
provincial transfers was in the federal government’s best interest, as it could demonstrate 
to the public that it could deal with its fiscal crisis. However, cuts to these transfers 
shifted or ‘downloaded’ responsibility to the provinces and contributed largely to federal- 
provincial conflict, and hence, competition between provincial and federal interests.
Since the mid- 1980s the federal Canadian government has made it a priority to 
curtail its debt by making significant cut backs to social policy. Elected to federal office 
in 1984, the Progressive Conservative Party adopted a mandate o f welfare state 
retrenchment. Espoused in a policy document released shortly after the election entitled, 
‘A New Direction for Canada: An Agenda for Economic Renewal’ (Government o f 
Canada, 1984), the Conservatives asserted the priority to contain the debt and reduce the 
overall size and reach o f the federal government.
Federal fiscal transfers to the provinces began to decline in 1986 with changes to 
that year’s federal budget brought in by the Conservatives. Transfers earmarked for 
health and post-secondary education referred to as Established Programmes Financing 
(EPF), were reduced by limiting annual increases to two percentage points less than the 
rate o f the GNP. Prior to this change, federal transfers increased annually at the same rate 
as the GNP (Perry, 1997). The Conservatives’ 1989 budget reduced the annual increase 
for EPF by yet another percentage point, and the same government placed a permanent 
freeze on increases for this transfer in their 1990 budget (Battle, 1998).
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Given these changes to EPF, reductions to federal transfers to the provinces are 
estimated at $98 billion between 1986-7 and 1999-2000 (Battle, 1998). In addition, 
significant reductions were made in another federal-provincial transfer programme. The 
Canadian Assistance Programme, known as CAP, provided federal funds for provincial 
welfare and social services on a 50/50 federal-provincial cost-sharing basis.
In 1990, the Conservatives placed a 5 per cent limit on annual increases o f CAP 
for the three wealthier provinces- namely Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia. A 
recession in the early 1990s resulted in major increases in provincial welfare spending, 
but the reductions on CAP saved the federal government $5.8 billion from 1990-1 to 
1993-4 (Battle, 1998). It is not surprising that the decrease in CAP transfers were met 
with extreme disapproval from these so called ‘have-provinces’, because they felt that 
they had been unfairly targeted for these cuts at a time when economic recession was 
actually increasing their costs. These are the provinces that would take a lead role in 
demanding greater autonomy and authority from the federal government in the years to 
follow. O f relevance to this study is the influence o f Alberta in driving increased 
decentralisation in the Canadian federation. As will be discussed further, Alberta strongly 
asserted the position that labour market policy should be devolved to provincial 
governments.
In the 1990s, under a Liberal federal government, Canada would experience even 
greater fiscal reforms. Elected into federal government in 1993, the Liberals’ initial 
budget in 1994 ushered in further reductions to fiscal transfers to the provinces. In the 
1994 budget, the Liberals announced that increases to both EPF and CAP for 1996-7 were 
to be held at 1993-4 levels (Government o f Canada, 1994a). Then, in 1995 these two
131
social transfer schemes were eliminated and replaced by a new scheme that resulted in 
drastic cuts to provinces (Government o f Canada, 1995b).
Richards (1998: 76) refers to the Liberal 1995 budget as ‘a genuinely important 
break with past Canadian practice’. Policy papers released by the finance department 
served to forewarn Canadians o f what would come in the budget. The message was that 
social programmes, which accounted for almost two-thirds o f total public spending, had 
to be cut back in order to tackle the problem o f the deficit. The policy paper entitled, ‘A 
New Framework for Economic Policy’ (Government o f Canada, 1994b), emphasised the 
need to halt deficit spending to promote jobs and economic growth. The 1995 budget 
articulated a three-year strategy to decrease the deficit to 3 per cent o f GDP by 1996-97. 
Significant reductions to federal fiscal transfers to the provinces were part o f this strategy.
The 1995 budget announced that EPF and CAP would merge to form the 
Canadian Health and Social Transfer (CHST). Merging the two transfer programmes 
resulted in fewer federal conditions on how the funds were spent and it made significant 
reductions in the sum total o f funds received by provinces. Where CAP prescribed 
federal standards on social spending, the CHST removed all conditions with the exception 
o f disallowing provinces to impose residency requirements for social assistance benefits. 
Perhaps the most drastic change however was the overall reductions to the federal fiscal 
transfers to the provinces. The CHST, implemented in 1996-7, transferred $26.9 billion 
to the provinces where previously under EPF and CAP provinces would have received 
$29.4 billion (Battle, 1998). In its first three years, the CHST cut provincial transfers 
designated for education, health, and social services by $7 billion (MacDonald, 1998).
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Significantly, the federal government argued that this reform offered the provinces 
greater flexibility and autonomy concerning social policy. In the 1995 budget speech, the 
M inister o f Finance stated: ‘Provinces will now be able to design more innovative social 
programs - programs that respond to the needs o f  people today rather than to inflexible 
rules’ (Government o f Canada, 1995c: 18). This statement illustrates an attempt by the 
federal government to justify these reforms based on its desire to increase what they saw 
as overall public interests through greater provincial autonomy. Yet, it is argued that the 
motivation underlying these decisions had more to do with meeting fiscal problems than 
meeting public interests. Moreover, in recognition o f the federal government’s declining 
role in maintaining national standards, the 1995 budget supported the idea o f provinces 
working together to determine ‘a set o f shared principles and objectives that could 
underlie the new Canadian Social Transfer’ (Government o f Canada, 1995c: 18).
However, there is clearly a discrepancy or contradiction between the conservative 
right’s claims to be allowing provincial autonomy, while withholding from provinces 
funds that were once designated to meet social need. Intergovernmental competition is 
evident as federal and provincial interests are pitted against each other. Also, it should be 
questioned whether the federal government was being attentive to provincial rights 
concerning autonomy or whether, because it made debt reduction a priority, it was simply 
no longer able to impose standards. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Lazar (1998a) notes that 
the federal government’s authority to monitor national social policy was compromised by 
its own unilateral decisions to make such severe cuts to transfers in the early to mid- 
1990s.
Although there were fewer conditions attached to these fiscal transfers, provinces 
were very displeased by the unilateral federal decision to make such deep cuts to these
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funds. The significant decline in federal transfer payments to the provinces in the mid- 
1990s frustrated the provinces and led to provincial criticisms o f the federal government. 
In the months following the 1995 federal budget, provincial discontent was noted during 
inter-provincial meetings. For example, during an inter-provincial meeting in September 
1995, health ministers from across Canada declared the $7 billion reduction to transfer 
payments would seriously threaten the future o f Medicare. Also, during an inter­
provincial meeting o f finance ministers in December 1995, several provinces rendered 
strong criticism o f federal actions that severely reduced social policy expenditure in order 
to deal with the federal deficit (Tzembelicos, 1996).
The federal fixation on debt and deficit containment and decisions to invoke 
extreme reductions in transfers payments to provinces, illustrate some o f the important 
issues that confronted Canada from the mid- 1980s to mid- 1990s. When examining 
potential influences on the federal proposal for devolution, provincial reaction to federal 
fiscal restraint should be kept in mind. As mentioned earlier, other pressures existed 
during the 1990s, including powerful political events that would have serious impacts on 
the Canadian political scene. The next section will address these important historical 
events.
Provincial challenges to federalism
In addition to pressures stemming from fiscal concerns, both Conservative and Liberal 
federal governments were faced with a constitutional debate which occupied m uch o f  the 
1980s and early 1990s, and which exerted an equal, if  not stronger, pressure on the drive 
toward devolution. Strong provincial challenges to status quo arrangements concerning 
the roles and responsibilities between federal and provincial governments in Canada
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emerged from this debate. For a variety o f reasons, provinces, demanded greater 
responsibility and authority in social policy, including more control over labour market 
training.
Particular significance was attached to the case o f Quebec, which wanted to 
protect its cultural heritage and its uniqueness in Canada. The province o f  Quebec 
demanded constitutional recognition o f  its distinctiveness in social policy, as well as in 
language policy and a host o f other public issues. Other provinces also sought more 
control over social policy. To begin, this section will review a few critical events that are 
related to the debate over the constitution. Attention will then turn to provincial pressures 
imposed by Quebec, the unity crisis, and demands from other provinces for greater 
responsibility and authority over social policy.
In the 1960s, a variety o f political groupings and forces in Quebec asserted 
positions ranging from calls for greater devolution o f federal powers, and recognition o f 
Q uebec’s distinct position in Canada, to calls for complete independence. Yet, 
constitutional debate since the 1960s has resulted in only one major development - the 
1982 Constitution Act. The discord between the province o f  Quebec and the rest o f 
Canada is evidenced by the fact that Quebec is the only province that has not signed the 
1982 Constitution Act.
The 1982 Act was strongly supported by then Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott 
Trudeau, who was very reluctant to recognise Quebec as a distinctly different political 
unit, in fear this would lead to a special status for the province. Rejecting Quebec 
nationalism, and rejecting asymmetrical federalism, the 1982 Act declared the ‘equality 
o f  provinces’. Simeon (2001) notes how the idea o f equality among provinces, while not
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embraced by many Quebecers, is entrenched among Canadians outside o f Quebec 
(Simeon, 2001).
Constitutional debate continued to preoccupy provincial-federal relations during 
the 1980s and early 1990s and led to two additional failed attempts to bring Quebec back 
into the constitution. In 1987, the Meech Lake Accord expressed the consensus among 
the federal government and all ten provinces. It was considered an historic achievement 
as it recognised Quebec as a distinct society.
Because the Accord revised the constitution it required the approval o f  all 
provincial legislatures before the ratification deadline o f June 1990. Two provincial 
governments, namely Manitoba and Newfoundland, did not pass the resolution within the 
specified time frame. During the ratification time frame, Manitoba and Newfoundland 
elected new governments that demanded significant changes to the Accord.
The failure o f the Meech Lake Accord generated a great deal o f resentment among 
Quebecers and support for sovereignty increased (Pelletier, 1998; Simeon, 2001). Shortly 
thereafter, the premier o f Quebec, Robert Bourassa, announced that the province would 
not participate in future intergovernmental meetings and the Quebec National Assembly 
initiated plans for a referendum on sovereignty.
Two years after the failure o f Meech, constitutional negotiations resumed.
While the Charlottetown Accord encompassed many similar proposals found in Meech, 
including the recognition o f Quebec as a distinct society, from the Quebec perspective 
some o f the proposals fell short o f what was sought after (Jackson and Jackson, 2001).
For example, conditions concerning constitutional veto would not have allowed Quebec
136
to veto Senate reform or the creation o f new provinces. Also, constitutional veto was 
extended to all provinces. The Charlottetown Accord achieved consensus among 
governments, yet was rejected by Canadians, including the citizens o f Quebec, in a 
national referendum in 1992.
Constitutional proposals during the 1980s and 1990s were interpreted among 
many Quebecers as not far reaching enough, but were perceived as too accommodating 
by most o f English Canada. According to Simeon (2001: 50), ‘English-Canadian 
opinion became increasingly hostile not only to the idea o f sovereignty, but also to the 
idea o f a distinct society for Quebec’. These failed attempts to bring Quebec into the 
constitution serve as the background for the unity crisis that followed.
The unity crisis and the province o f Quebec
In September 1994, citizens o f Quebec elected a separatist provincial government. The 
Parti Quebecois asked Quebecers to vote “yes” in a sovereignty referendum set for 
October 30, 1995. During the referendum campaign, Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s 
avoidance o f constitutional issues, and his declaration that his government had no backup 
plan should the separatists succeed implied confidence that a “no” vote against 
sovereignty would triumph (Lazar, 1998b). In fact, rather than confronting the threat o f 
separation directly, in September 1994, Chretien declared that he would promote 
federalism through deficit reductions and job creation (Tzembelicos, 1995). It appears 
that the Prime Minister chose to disregard Quebec’s frustration with federalism and its 
calls for greater devolution, and attempted instead to deflect attention away from 
separation and towards the economic benefits o f remaining in Canada.
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However, as the referendum grew nearer, the polls indicated a close vote was at 
hand. One month prior to the referendum, a poll conducted by Leger and Leger on the 
question o f sovereignty, found that 45.1 per cent o f Quebecers intended on voting ‘no’, 
where 43.8 per cent planned on voting ‘yes’ to sovereignty. Just two weeks before the 
referendum, Leger and Leger polled Quebecers again and found that support for 
sovereignty had increased to 45 per cent where those opposed to sovereignty decreased to 
42.4 per cent (Tzembelicos, 1996).
In a speech to Quebecers on October 24, just six days before the referendum, 
Chretien acknowledged the imminent threat o f the break up o f the country and voiced his 
government’s intention to respond to provincial demands for greater decentralisation o f 
federal powers (O ’neil, 1995). Supporters o f sovereignty lost the Quebec referendum by 
the narrowest o f margins, with the “no” side winning with 50.57 per cent o f the vote 
(Montreal Gazette, 1995). Canadians were faced with the reality that half o f the Quebec 
population wanted to separate from Canada. The unity crisis invoked considerable anxiety 
among all Canadians. The federal government faced considerable criticism in its 
inadequate response to the threat o f succession and its lack o f planning for a possible 
victory for sovereignty (Simeon, 2001). This criticism was particularly worrisome for the 
federal Liberals because they were less than two years away from a federal election.
Chretien announced the federal government’s decision to withdraw from labour 
market training less than one month after the Quebec referendum (Macpherson, 1995). 
Some provinces, including Quebec, had for several years made the case for devolving 
federal labour market training. In fact, the Charlottetown Accord called for 
decentralisation o f federal authority including the devolution o f labour market training. 
Even prior to examining other pressures that may have influenced the federal
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government, it is probably safe to say that the timing o f the informal proposal for 
devolving labour market training was most likely not a coincidence. The federal proposal 
probably had much to do with the unity crisis and the poor federal handling o f 
secessionist threats. Nonetheless other pressures must be considered.
Challenges from the rest o f Canada (ROC)
In the 1990s, provinces asserted their demands for increased financial resources and for 
more jurisdictional powers over social policy. It is important to note that Quebec was not 
the only province frustrated by the state o f the nation during this period. Provincial 
governments other than Quebec, commonly referred to as the ‘rest o f Canada’ or ROC, 
also lodged challenges to the federal government. As noted earlier, provinces were 
disappointed by federal cuts to transfers. This frustration was expressed during inter­
provincial meetings that resulted in provincial calls for the federal government to 
respond. For example, at the 1994 annual meeting, premiers expressed concern over the 
lack o f efficiency and effectiveness o f national social programmes.
At the 1994 meeting premiers agreed to establish a mechanism that would allow 
provinces to ‘collectively assume a more co-operative leadership and co-ordination role 
with respect to their common national agenda in their areas o f responsibility’ (1994 
Annual Prem iers’ Conference Communique). Motivated by their desire to seek greater 
powers, the provinces agreed to collaboratively pursue an agenda o f social policy 
renewal.
Political interest influences are evident. Inter-provincial co-ordinated efforts to 
pressure the federal government for greater authority, illustrates the competition between
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province-building and nation-building dynamics within the Canadian federal state. In 
response to federal unilateral attempts to meet its interests, provinces organised and 
collectively pursued greater decentralisation in order to meet their own interests. With 
regard to these pressures for decentralisation, the province o f Alberta was extremely 
vocal. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, historically, Alberta has led the provinces in 
challenges against the federal government.
At the 1995 Annual Premiers’ Conference, premiers established the Ministerial 
Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal, and they commissioned a ministerial 
report. The Ministerial Council Report, released in early January 1996, represented a 
consensus perspective among all provinces except for Quebec.
The report offers a number o f observations from the provincial perspective during 
the mid- 1990s. Generally, the report is a reaction to several years o f federal (unilateral) 
fiscal decision-making, which had had the effect o f  increasing the costs o f  social service 
provision for provinces. The report calls for greater co-operation and dialogue between 
the two levels o f government prior to initiating major changes in social policy. Also, the 
report affirms the need for adequate levels o f federal fiscal transfer payments to the 
provinces to fund social welfare provision. The report criticises the way the federal 
government managed its fiscal problems, and especially the unexpected and dramatic cuts 
in the federal budget in 1995. Furthermore, the report expresses provincial frustration 
about not being consulted prior to implementing changes that significantly affect them.
The provinces observed that the federal government was instituting major changes 
in social policy, ‘while at the same time insulating itself from the negative financial 
impacts o f its actions’ (The Ministerial Council Report, 1995: 3). As the containment o f
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debt and deficit was on the agenda o f all provinces during the mid- 1990s, the report did 
recognise the need for federal fiscal cut backs. Yet, the report notes the cut backs in 
federal transfers to the provinces were three times greater than reductions in other federal 
spending. According to the 1995 budget, between 1995 and 1997, decreases to fiscal 
transfers to provinces amount to 25.4 per cent, where reductions in federal spending 
amount to 8.8 per cent (The Ministerial Council Report, 1995). The report calls for the 
federal government to cut its own spending by at least as much as it reduces transfer 
payments to provinces.
The Ministerial Council Report calls for intergovernmental co-operation in the 
reform o f social policy, including health, post-secondary education, income support, 
social services, and labour market programmes. The report emphasises the problem of 
high costs and loss o f accountability associated with the overlap and duplication o f 
federal and provincial programmes, and points to the need for clarifying roles and 
responsibilities o f both levels o f government. The report offers a number of 
recommendations in social policy.
With respect to labour market programmes, the Council Report suggests that 
national programmes should be flexible so that innovation across provinces is 
encouraged. The report states that any approach to labour market training:
must be sufficiently flexible to allow individual jurisdictions to experiment
to meet the particular needs o f all Canadians. Flexibility is key to ensure that
experimentation with new approaches can be undertaken.
(Ministerial Council Report, 1995: 11)
Provincial criticism o f federal actions is noted in the Premiers’ annual meetings in 
1994 and 1995, and in other provincial reaction to cuts to transfers as mentioned earlier.
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Provincial calls for clarity between federal and provincial roles and responsibilities, and 
for greater co-ordination among all levels o f government asserted pressures on the federal 
government to concede some measure o f  authority through the devolution o f policy.
Pressures from provinces other than Quebec must be acknowledged as a potential 
influence on the federal proposal for labour market devolution. This section has 
discussed the significance o f provincial pressures on the federal government’s decision to 
make the proposal to devolve labour market policy to provinces. Federal-provincial 
power struggles illustrate the competitive dynamic o f the political interest argument, as 
the two levels o f governments assert their interests at the expense o f the other.
The next section will address unemployment insurance policy in Canada, as part 
o f  this legislation is proposed for devolution. A brief historical review will be offered, 
and some o f  the major policy reforms will be addressed. The formal proposal for the 
devolution o f  labour market policy will be examined, and the significance o f changes 
made to federal Unemployment Insurance will be discussed, as these reforms influenced 
how provinces perceived the federal proposal.
Federal unemployment insurance policy: Reform and devolution
This section will examine the details and federal priorities o f the proposal for devolution. 
Prior to this, it is necessary to examine the historical background to Unemployment 
Insurance (UI), to illustrate the significance o f reforms that preceded the official proposal. 
As will be seen, reforms to UI set the parameters for the proposal to devolve labour 
market training policies to the provinces.
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O f significance is the trend o f fiscal cut backs, and the shift towards a greater 
focus on active measures in the 1980s and 1990s. Fiscal restraints imposed upon UI 
affect all provinces. However, such restraints are especially consequential for provinces 
like Nova Scotia, where historically high unemployment rates, coupled with a 
dependence on seasonal employment have made UI a very important source o f income 
for the province. Important to this thesis (and an issue to be discussed further in chapter 
7) is the fact that Nova Scotia’s fiscal vulnerability and the unreliability o f UI as an 
income source was instrumental in the province’s position on the federal proposal for 
labour market devolution. Consequently, a review o f UI’s historical significance, policy 
reform, and fiscal context will be offered.
Establishment and reform o f unemployment insurance
The original Unemployment Insurance (UI) Act was established in 1940, and has been 
succeeded by revised UI Acts in 1955, 1971 and most recently in 1996, when it was 
renamed the Employment Insurance Act. Each Act in its turn has undergone a number o f 
amendments. Prior to 1940, responsibility for issues concerning unemployment fell 
under provincial authority as prescribed by the Constitution Act in 1867. However, the 
hardships experienced during the Great Depression overwhelmed the capacity o f 
provinces and municipalities to provide relief to millions o f jobless Canadians who could 
not escape the economic downturns that led to unemployment.
The challenges posed by soaring unemployment pointed to the need for a national 
social insurance programme. The Employment and Social Insurance Act, introduced in 
parliament in 1935, was defeated on constitutional grounds as it was alleged the federal 
government had attempted to intrude in an area o f provincial jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
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the constitution was eventually amended to give the federal government the authority 
needed to pass the Unemployment Insurance Act in 1940.
Unemployment insurance was a creation o f the 1930s and 1940s and thus reflects 
the rationale and analysis o f  that time. It was held that economic expansion and 
contraction had a mirror effect on employment and unemployment. It was believed that 
workers could not control these cycles, and therefore ‘the costs in lost income to workers, 
should be shared among all workers and employers’ (Armitage, 1996: 72). The costs o f  
UI were actually divided among employees, employers and the federal government. Lin 
(1998) outlines the initial central objectives o f UI as follows: to contribute financial 
support to the unemployed; to assist people to find work; to relocate unemployed workers 
from high unemployment regions to low unemployment regions; and to provide the 
disadvantaged with some assistance. Coverage was compulsory; however, many workers 
were excluded from eligibility.
Initially, UI covered about 42 percent o f the labour force (Government o f Canada, 
1994c). Coverage was restricted to those employed in work considered to be at moderate 
risk for unemployment, whereas those employed in either relatively secure or highly 
unstable work, including seasonal employment, were excluded. Individuals with annual 
employment earnings exceeding $2,000 were also prohibited from receiving benefits. 
Some industries and services, including government services, were excluded.
In the decade o f its inception, the unemployment insurance system underwent 
many changes. In 1942, the administration o f the programme was transferred to the 
Department o f Labour. Other significant changes included the expansion to provide for 
discharged soldiers and an increase in the yearly earnings ceiling. Coverage was
144
broadened; and overall, benefits increased. H alf o f Canada’s workers were covered by 
unemployment insurance toward the end o f the decade. By the 1960s,coverage had 
expanded to 68 per cent o f the working population.
In the 1970s, reforms to the unemployment insurance system broadened coverage 
to the extent that it became almost universal. This period o f unemployment insurance 
reform is frequently characterized as a period o f liberalisation (Lin, 1998). The 
amendments o f  the 1971 Unemployment Insurance Act expanded coverage to almost all 
workers except those who were self-employed, those aged 70 years or older, and those 
who did not acquire the required minimum o f insurable weeks. The liberalisation o f the 
1970s can be contrasted with reform in the last ten years, as the programme has been cut 
back on several fronts. Cut backs concerning the extent o f coverage, eligibility 
requirements, and amount o f benefit accrued through the programme, will be addressed 
briefly.
The UI system was reformed following the release o f several government reports 
in the 1980s that called for major changes (Battle, 1998). There were concerns over high 
costs and about the economic incentives o f UI (Lazar, 2001). For example, 
unemployment insurance was seen as contributing to rises in unemployment by 
increasing the unit cost o f labour to the employer and by acting as a disincentive to accept 
work (Green, 1994). Armitage (1996: 54) summarises this line o f thought by stating 
‘Thus the fear is that the income security system is growing at the expense o f the 
willingness to work’.
In the latter 1980s, the federal Conservatives responded to criticisms o f the 
unemployment system through restricting access to UI by increasing the required number
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o f weeks worked needed for entitlement (Battle, 1998). Also, they discontinued the 
partial federal funding o f extended benefits to regions most affected by high 
unemployment, and they withdrew federal funding for training.
The financial responsibility o f UI grew far more onerous in the 1990s. The costs 
o f  UI nearly doubled from $9.3 billion to $18.5 billion over the course o f  two recessions 
during 1982-3 and 1991-2 (Green, 1994). In 1995, the Liberal government announced its 
plans to initiate significant reform to Unemployment Insurance, including changing the 
name o f the programme to Employment Insurance (El). Reforms resulted in a $2 billion 
cut to El. The federal government announced that half o f the savings would be reinvested 
in new programmes focused on active employment initiatives, and the other half would be 
used to reduce the federal debt (Tzembelicos, 1996).
The new Employment Insurance (El) Act implemented in 1996, introduced more 
extreme programme restraint than witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s. The Liberals’ 
reforms encompassed tighter eligibility rules, reduced benefit amounts, and shorter 
benefit periods (Battle, 1998). In 1989, 87.3 per cent o f unemployed employable workers 
received unemployment insurance benefits. In marked contrast, 41.7 per cent o f 
unemployed employable workers received benefits in 1997. The amount o f benefits 
received have decreased, where the average weekly benefit in 1997 was $249.72, the 
weekly amount in 1992 was $272.05.
Another way to look at the amount o f benefit received is to review the 
replacement benefit rate (RBR). In 1971, eligible persons with dependents could expect a 
replacement rate o f 75 per cent o f ‘insurable earnings’, where persons without dependents 
could expect to receive 66.67 per cent o f ‘insurable earnings’ (Lin, 1998: 67). In 1994,
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the replacement rate for persons with dependents and low income, ‘those with weekly 
earnings o f  less than half the maximum insurable earnings’ fell to 60 per cent and to 55 
per cent for all other persons (Lin, 1998: 74).
How the programme was funded was also changed. The responsibility for the 
funding o f  the unemployment insurance programme shifted to the employer and 
employee alone when, in 1990, the federal government withdrew its financial support for 
UI programmes. This change was in marked contrast from the Unemployment Insurance 
Act o f 1971, which deemed the funding o f the system to be the responsibility o f  workers, 
employers, and the federal government.
In sum, in the 1940s, the federal government fought to amend the constitution to 
implement a national unemployment insurance programme, yet as this historical review 
points out, federal support for this programme has dwindled significantly. Generally, 
reform to the UI/EI programme since the late 1980s represents a distinct contrast when 
compared to the liberalisation o f the 1970s. This retrenchment appears largely driven by 
the federal government’s desire to reduce the fiscal burden o f  El and to contain debt and 
deficits. Thus, reforms to unemployment policy serve to extend the federal government’s 
fiscal interests at the expense o f  promoting the interests o f unemployed Canadians. 
Further, as in the case o f Nova Scotia, provinces with high unemployment rates are 
especially vulnerable to federal retrenchment in this policy area. Consequently, reform to 
unemployment policy illustrates how federal and provincial political interests compete 
with each other.
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Parameters o f  the labour market devolution proposal: Accountability framework and 
eligibility
In the proposal, the federal government clearly stated its intention o f maintaining its 
responsibility for the delivery o f insurance benefits to El clients, (under Part I o f  the El 
Act) thereby remaining accountable to both the Parliament o f Canada and to Canadians 
who contribute premiums to the El account. As discussed in Chapter 3, the federal 
government made a proposal to provinces for the devolution o f responsibility for the 
design and delivery o f active benefits as outlined in Part II o f  the 1996 El Act. These 
active re-employment measures include targeted wage subsidies; earning supplements; 
self-employment assistance; job  creation partnerships; and skills loans, and grants.
The federal proposal outlines how accountability is to be evaluated. The federally 
created accountability framework sheds light on what influenced the federal proposal to 
devolve labour market training. Federal priorities concerning eligibility and financial 
savings for the federal government will be examined.
Under the heading ‘Principles and parameters for agreements’ the proposal 
highlights the accountability framework used to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in the 
design and delivery o f all labour market activities. The proposal outlines the federal 
government’s expectations around service priority for El clients and the reduction o f 
expenses related to Part I income benefits:
For planning purposes, results will be based on: priority access for El 
claimants, jobs secured for El clients, with emphasis on El claimants 
(persons currently eligible for insurance benefits), and saving to the El 
Account through reduced dependency on employment insurance benefits. 
(Canada, HRDC, 1996a: 3)
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It is interesting to note how the results sought after (concerning Part II-the policy 
to be devolved) actually served to reduce reliance on federal benefits (concerning Part I- 
the policy that remains under federal responsibility). While it is appropriate for all 
governments to be accountable, the federal government’s insistence that success be based 
on reducing costs to itself is noteworthy considering the significant fiscal surplus in the 
unemployment insurance fund. It is argued that the proposal prioritises federal 
government interest over public interest, because the federal government sought reduced 
costs for itself even when the unemployment insurance fund was fiscally abundant.
An explanation about the fiscal surplus in the unemployment insurance fund is 
required. Prior to 1993, the UI Programme operated under deficit conditions but since 
then the programme has garnered surpluses. In 1994, the surplus exceeded $3.5 billion 
and gained further ground with surpluses approaching $6 billion for the following two 
years (Lin, 1998). It is suggested that this surplus was created, in part, from the reforms 
to the UI/EI programme. As mentioned earlier, reforms to UI/EI from the 1980s through 
to the mid- 1990s affected significant restraint pertaining to eligibility, benefit amounts 
and time periods o f benefits allowed.
According to Lin (1998), the massive growth in surpluses can be credited to three 
interrelated factors. To begin with, improvements in the economy led to an 
unprecedented steady growth o f premium contributions from both employers and 
employees. Secondly, there has been a significant decline in the number o f people 
accessing the programme. In 1991, 1.16 million people received regular unemployment 
benefits, compared to 0.71 million by 1996.
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Another way o f illustrating this decline is to compare the number o f unemployed 
with the number o f people who receive regular unemployment benefits. This is known as 
the beneficiary/unemployed or (B/U) ratio. In 1989, the B/U ratio stood at 83.4 per cent, 
plummeting to 48.1 per cent in 1996.
Thirdly, benefit rates have significantly decreased. Naturally, given the sharp 
decrease in beneficiaries, the amounts paid out have also declined. In 1992, benefits paid 
out totalled in excess o f $19 billion, where in 1996, the pay-out dropped to $13 billion 
(Lin, 1998). Also, the benefit amount has decreased where the average weekly benefit in 
1997 was $249.72 the weekly amount in 1992 was $272.05 (Battle, 1998).
In sum, the dwindling federal fiscal commitment to El (as illustrated in the 
historical review) and the resulting significant growth in the unemployment insurance 
fund, are relevant to whether the federal government was influenced by self-interests, or 
the interests o f  the general public, in making the proposal for devolution. It is suggested 
that the federal government’s interests superseded the interests o f the public. Federal 
government self-interest is further illustrated by restrictions in the accountability 
framework, where success is measured by the amount o f money saved in the 
unemployment insurance fund.
Influences o f the federal proposal to provinces: Federal and provincial civil servants 
respond
This section o f the chapter will discuss the findings from the primary data. As reviewed 
in Chapter 4, primary data was gathered through interviews with 21 federal and provincial 
civil servants, who are knowledgeable about the development o f the Labour M arket
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Development Agreements (LMDA) in their province. As discussed earlier, the study 
examines the influences o f the federal proposal and the positions and decisions made 
about the LMDA in the provinces o f Alberta and Nova Scotia. This section o f the chapter 
will continue to make the argument that political interests are more influential in this 
regard than public interests.
The significance o f Quebec and the unity crisis
As suggested in the discussion on political pressures in the 1980s and 1990s, issues 
related to Quebec, including failed attempts at constitutional renewal and the referendum 
on sovereignty largely influenced the federal proposal for devolution. The majority of 
respondents interviewed in this study support the suggestion that the federal proposal was 
strongly influenced by “the political dynamic with the province o f Quebec” (NS-FD-R).
All o f  the provincial and federal respondents from Alberta, and just under three- 
quarters o f provincial and over three-quarters o f federal respondents from Nova Scotia 
noted that satisfying Quebec was the major incentive for the federal devolution proposal. 
These respondents held that the federal government was under pressure to respond to the 
needs o f Quebec in light o f  the unity crisis that followed the failed Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown Accords. As one Nova Scotia federal respondent comments:
I think it was pretty clear that the proposal was an attempt by the federal 
government to try to respect some provincial jurisdictions in relation to 
training o f  the workforce under the broader category o f education. I guess 
in more specific terms they were interested in Quebec and their claim that 
workforce training and related matters were provincial jurisdiction. And, it 
was an opportunity to show Quebec that federalism can work and is 
flexible and there’s good reason to stay in this country.
(NS-FD-Q)
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The respondents maintain that the federal government agreed to concede some 
control over labour market policy in response to the unity crisis. As noted by a Nova 
Scotia federal respondent, “we were very influenced by the Quebec referendum” and 
therefore, the devolution proposal was a response to:
political pressure around Quebec, after the referendum, to give Quebec 
more control over areas that were critical to Quebec. This area (labour 
market training) was obviously a key one for the province o f Quebec. 
(NS-FD-U)
A Nova Scotia provincial respondent agrees, and comments:
I think the proposal mainly had to do with Quebec’s position about taking 
control over training. From their perspective it was provincial jurisdiction 
and the proposal was partly to appease that political position.
(NS-PR-L)
Since the 1960s, Quebec has held that labour market training falls under 
provincial jurisdiction and has long argued for greater devolution in this area. However, 
as noted by all o f  the Alberta provincial respondents, their government has also long 
argued for devolution o f labour market training. Moreover, comparing the influence o f 
Quebec with the influence o f other provinces such as Alberta, one Alberta provincial 
respondent recalled that early in the 1990s Alberta was developing a position on labour 
market devolution, yet the federal government was not willing to discuss the matter. 
However, with the near loss o f the 1995 Quebec referendum, the federal government 
became more co-operative about devolving labour market policy. The respondent 
explains:
It was extremely frustrating in the early 1990s when we were developing 
an Alberta position on labour market devolution, because at that time we 
had a hell o f a time getting these guys (federal civil servants) to even listen 
to us. They just didn’t take us seriously at the time. So that was rather
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frustrating but then with this whole Quebec thing. I think it was 
specifically the last referendum and the whole thing around Quebec that 
changed the federal government’s mind and they said well OK, let’s go 
across the board and talk about this and then all o f a sudden they became 
much more co-operative.
(AB-PR-B)
H alf o f the Alberta provincial respondents suggested that provinces including 
Alberta, believed the offer was an attempt to appease Quebec and provinces took 
advantage o f  the federal government’s vulnerability to gain their own advantage. On this 
issue two Alberta provincial respondents comment:
Essentially, I think several provinces got on the band wagon and tried to-1 
wouldn’t go as far as saying exploit- but you know, we were quite aware 
o f  some o f the weaknesses o f  the federal government, and their 
preparedness to do something in order to keep Quebec happy and to try to 
benefit from that.
(AB-PR-B)
Alberta was pushing the federal government to do this and usually it’s 
Quebec and Alberta that are the ones that are pushing the fence on this 
one. Quebec o f course had wanted this. This was a long-standing Quebec 
issue. I think the feds offered it because o f Quebec but we were as eager 
to take advantage o f it as Quebec.
(AB-PR-A)
This suggests that the federal government could not have promoted asymmetry in 
this environment where other influential provinces such as Alberta, also wanted 
devolution. No doubt, provinces such as Alberta would have sharply responded to any 
special offers for devolution made to Quebec alone.
Before moving on, two other issues that relate to the significance o f Quebec are 
noteworthy. First, looking specifically at the data from federal respondents in both 
provinces, there is some reference to a lack o f federal planning in developing the proposal 
and a lack o f knowledge about the devolution proposal among elected officials.
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Respondents suggest that the proposal was initiated by the Prime M inister’s office 
without extensive consultation with senior bureaucratic officials and elected officials. On 
this issue, an Alberta federal respondent explains how he/she became aware about the 
proposal. The respondent remarks:
I was in an office in a national meeting literally days before the offer was 
going to be made. Our NHQ (national headquarters) folks connected the 
dots for us. Well this clause and that clause and two days from now our 
minister will be making this offer to provinces; a speech will be made, and 
then eventually this letter came out. This was news to us. Nobody had an 
inkling- so this would be Privy Council office, Deputy Ministers, super 
high.
(AB-FD-F)
Further, this Alberta federal respondent commented on what appeared to him/her 
to be an unexpected and sudden shift in federal policy. The respondent states:
The decision to withdraw from training activities came after a zillion years 
o f  saying that “provinces have jurisdiction over education, and training is 
not education”. I mean on a dime- they can turn 25 years o f rhetoric- and 
oh! by the way training is now provincial jurisdiction. That may come 
across as cynical but that’s how I see it. That’s why I say this was a 
politically driven, it’s not as if there was a wide body o f federal 
bureaucrats who had a hand in shaping and crafting this.
(AB-FD-F)
H alf o f the Alberta federal respondents and less than one-quarter o f the Nova 
Scotia federal respondents commented on the lack o f involvement o f a wide range o f 
federal civil servants in drafting the labour market devolution proposal. Also noted 
among these respondents was the lack o f a clearly thought out policy frame at the 
beginning o f  the negotiations. That Alberta federal respondents were more willing to 
openly criticize their own government is interesting and perhaps related to the fact that 
greater devolution took place in that province.
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Another Alberta federal respondent commented on the difficulty o f negotiating the 
first LM DA in Canada without a clear policy framework in place. The respondent is a 
senior official who talked about a conversation he/she had with the federal deputy 
minister from headquarters in Ottawa, a few days after the official proposal for devolution 
was announced. The respondent states:
...he came out to Alberta and he had been to Quebec. So, this was his 
second stop. He said, what to do you think? Are we going to do these 
deals? I said, well if  the government o f Canada wants to do them, w e’ll do 
them. And he looked at me and he said, you seem perplexed. He said, 
w hat’s worrying you? I said, well let me put it this way. I don’t worry 
much about the provincial government. I can sit down with them and 
figure out where they are coming from, I ’m worried about the feds. He 
said, what do you mean? I said, in my experience o f over 30 years 
sometimes I ’m hard pressed to understand where the feds are coming from 
and where our policy frame is. You know the offer has been made to all 
provinces, so our policy frame has to be formulated against a background. 
This is not a bilateral between me and Alberta, it’s a bilateral between 
Canada and Alberta; but Canada’s policy position is formulated relative to 
how will this fly in Ontario how will it fly in Quebec how will it fly in the 
NW T how will it fly in P E I.. .1 can’t sit down and do the deal with the 
Province o f Alberta without validating constantly what the federal 
government’s position is on any given issue. Short story: We didn’t have a 
solid policy frame so, essentially, it evolved.
(AB-FD-G)
This respondent went on to give an example where Ottawa gave approval for a 
matter and then changed their position. The respondent explains:
Another conference call, somebody else had come into the debate and said 
what about this and what about that; and well maybe we should give this a 
little further thought. I can’t recall exactly what piece it was but it was 
around whether or not a certain approach related to Part II would open the 
door to Part I. The question put to me was, where are you at with the 
Province o f Alberta? I said, well, based on the last discussion I ’ve got a 
letter signed o ff by the provincial deputy. Oh, well do you think you could 
pull it back?
(AB-FD-G)
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Also, comments were made about how politicians did not understand the nature 
and the full extent o f the federal proposal. For example, politicians did not understand 
that provinces were also offered responsibility for the counselling programmes that 
accompanied federal labour market training. One Nova Scotia federal respondent 
explains:
When the federal politicians were briefed on the offers in each province- 
they thought they only offered training...they got a little bit scared...We 
said no, this is really what you offered and here’s w hat’s going to the 
provinces. There was all o f  a sudden oh- we didn’t really mean that did 
we?
(NS-FD-T)
Second, looking at the Alberta data, half o f the provincial, and half o f the federal 
respondents thought that the federal government wanted to avoid creating the impression 
that the proposal was offered primarily to appease Quebec. Moreover, the pressure to 
sign with an influential English-speaking province first, was described by one federal 
respondent as “intense” (AB-FD-F). On this issue, a provincial respondent comments:
Certainly the federal government very much wanted us to be the first to 
sign an agreement. They didn’t want to be seen signing the first agreement 
with Quebec and felt that Canadians would interpret that as one more time- 
giving the farm away to Quebec, and so they were pretty anxious for us to 
make a deal.
(AB-PR-D)
The argument is made that the federal government acted in its own interest when 
it made the proposal for devolution. It is suggested that the federal government attempted 
to recover from the near loss in the referendum on sovereignty, by devolving labour 
market policy to Quebec and the rest o f Canada.
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In sum thus far, it would appear that pressures from Quebec and the unity crisis in 
general, influenced the federal proposal. Further, some respondents offer support for the 
political interest argument when they draw attention to the lack o f common knowledge 
and overall policy framework to oversee or guide the negotiations. Also, the suggestion 
that Alberta was chosen as the first province to enter a devolution agreement, in order to 
deflect attention away from Quebec, adds further support for the notion that the federal 
government was in fact attempting to appease Quebec. However, the respondents offer 
other explanations that need to be addressed. As will be seen, these additional 
explanations are closely connected to the issue o f Quebec.
Provincial pressures and federal attempts to promote the perception o f co-operative 
federalism in Canada
All o f the Alberta provincial and federal respondents, and just under three-quarters o f the 
federal and less than half o f the provincial Nova Scotia respondents voiced the opinion 
that the proposal was influenced by provincial pressures concerning long-standing 
constitutional, and jurisdictional debate over labour market policy. Respondents note that 
in particular, Alberta and Quebec have long argued that labour market policy falls under 
provincial jurisdiction.
Respondents point to the fact that both Quebec and Alberta have pushed for 
provincial rights based on the argument that labour market training is part o f the 
education sector, and therefore falls under provincial jurisdiction. The political interest 
argument is relevant to this because it demonstrates how federal and provincial 
governments have different views about jurisdiction over particular policy matters. 
Discord about distinctions between ‘education’ and ‘training’ illustrate federal-provincial
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competition over jurisdiction where governments are viewed as attempting to increase 
their power and extend their political reach.
One Nova Scotia provincial respondent notes that although the federal 
government officially stated it was responding to the ongoing lobbying efforts from 
several provinces for the repatriation o f provincial jurisdiction over training, the Nova 
Scotia view was that the federal government was mostly motivated by the demands o f 
Quebec. This respondent remarks:
The federal government’s view was that they did it in response to on-going 
provincial lobbying for repatriation o f provincial jurisdiction over 
education and training. That was not something that Nova Scotia bought 
into. Our view was that this offer was a response by the federal 
government to demands by the province o f Quebec and that the rest o f  the 
country was, in fact, drawn into that through this offer. When we finally 
got down to signing an agreement, we tried to have reference to the 
provincial interest in repatriation o f training removed from the agreement.
We felt that was misleading in terms o f Nova Scotia. We had never asked 
the federal government to get out o f the business o f supporting training. 
(NS-PR-N)
This comment illustrates an important difference between the two provinces 
compared in the thesis. While Alberta had long advocated labour market devolution, 
Nova Scotia took a very cautious position on this matter. These themes will be explored 
further in this thesis, because they illustrate how divergent provincial experiences o f 
federalism result in different perceptions about devolution. And, consequently, the 
models o f  LMDAs vary across the country. Wealth and overall access to fiscal and 
policy resources vary among provinces, and this is illustrated through the Alberta and 
Nova Scotia LMDAs.
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As noted above, most o f the respondents viewed the federal government labour 
m arket proposal primarily as an attempt to appease Quebec. Yet, given the failed 
attempts at constitutional renewal and the growing fatigue and frustration o f the Canadian 
electorate, the proposal could also be seen as an attempt to demonstrate to all o f  Canada 
that federalism could work. In other words, the proposal illustrated the federal 
governm ent’s willingness to become more co-operative than before, thus promoting the 
legitimacy o f  federalism (as embodied in the Liberal federal government).
This interpretation was supported by three-quarters o f the Alberta provincial and 
half o f  the federal respondents, and ju st over half o f the Nova Scotia federal and none of 
the provincial respondents. One Alberta provincial respondent commented that the 
federal government saw labour market devolution as an opportunity to deal with some of 
the outstanding provincial issues at a time when the idea o f “rejigging social policy roles 
and responsibilities” (AB-PR-B) among provinces and the federal government was a 
popular one.
Perhaps most notable is the absence o f Nova Scotia’s provincial support for this 
interpretation. When discussing the rationale o f the federal government proposal, Nova 
Scotia provincial respondents focused mainly on the political imperative o f Quebec.
Also, as will be seen in Chapter 7, Nova Scotia did not have a great deal o f policy 
expertise, and they lacked resources and experience related to labour market training. 
Traditionally, Nova Scotia has not pushed the federal government for devolution in this 
policy area. Accordingly, perhaps this is related to why Nova Scotia provincial 
respondents did not perceive provincial demands for greater devolution in labour market 
policy as a credible explanation for the federal proposal.
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Before moving on to examine public interest influences, it should be observed that 
less than one-quarter o f the respondents in both provinces pointed to the upcoming 
federal election as a notable influence on the federal proposal. Those respondents that did 
think the election was influential suggested that there was federal pressure to make a deal 
as soon as possible because the election date was near. This is particularly significant to 
Nova Scotia because the period during the negotiations was closer to the election date 
than it was in the case with Alberta. The Alberta and Nova Scotia agreements were 
signed respectively, on December 6, 1996, and April 24, 1997. The federal election was 
on June 2, 1997. On this, one Nova Scotia provincial respondent remarks:
We were within, I think, days o f the federal election call. The Prime 
M inister made it clear that he wanted agreements signed across the 
country... The election shouldn’t be dismissed in terms o f being a critical 
time-line. Nova Scotia had a Liberal government. The Government o f 
Canada was Liberal. The federal government wanted to be able to move 
with agreements across Canada and I can’t imagine that Nova Scotia 
politically, wouldn’t want to try and work something through...W e felt we 
could work with the framework that w e’d come to and we signed. 
(NS-PR-N)
While it would appear that the federal government was influenced to make the 
proposal in response to the political imperatives it faced, including the unity crisis and 
calls from provinces including Quebec and Alberta for increased autonomy over labour 
market policy, it is important to note that some respondents offered additional 
explanations. These latter explanations are related to the public interest argument.
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Influence o f  public interests
The official federal proposal suggests that public interests will be better served by 
devolving federal labour market responsibilities to provinces. The proposal supports the 
notion that federal-provincial bilateral labour market agreements will result in greater 
policy efficiency and effectiveness. As stated in the proposal these, ‘new arrangements 
will improve client service, create more and better employment opportunities for 
Canadians and eliminate overlap and duplication’ (Canada, 1996a).
For some respondents, the devolution proposal was influenced by the federal 
governm ent’s desire to improve labour market programmes for Canadians. The thought 
was that devolution could lead to effective policy because local control would facilitate a 
better understanding o f labour market needs. Further, efficiencies could be gained 
because devolution would reduce overlap and duplication between federal and provincial 
labour market policies. Yet, the respondents support these explanations to a far lesser 
degree, compared to the support that exists for ‘political’ explanations.
For example, one-quarter o f the Alberta federal and just over one-quarter o f the 
Nova Scotia federal respondents thought that the proposal was influenced by the belief 
that provincial governments could design and target services and programmes more 
effectively than the federal government. In this scenario, compared to the federal 
government, the provincial government is envisioned as being closer to citizens.
Three-quarters o f the Alberta provincial respondents believed that their closer 
proximity to citizens, led to greater awareness o f local labour market needs, and therefore,
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policy would be more effective than before. However, these Alberta provincial 
respondents did not offer this as an explanation for the federal proposal.
A similar trend is noted with respect to the extent to which respondents held the 
proposal was influenced by the desire o f the federal government to reduce inefficiency 
resulting from overlap and duplication. Less than one-quarter o f Nova Scotia federal 
respondents noted that the federal offer was motivated to improve efficiencies related to 
overlap and duplication.
While all o f  the Alberta provincial respondents agree that overlap and duplication 
between federal and provincial programmes results in significant inefficiencies, they do 
not support the view that the federal government perceived this as a problem which 
needed to be resolved.
Moreover, while three-quarters o f the Alberta federal respondents acknowledged 
the popular assumption (primarily among provincial counterparts) that inefficiencies 
resulted from overlap and duplication, they doubted these problems existed to any 
significant extent. On this issue an Alberta federal respondent states:
Even though programmes may have been similar, the provincial 
government targeted its job search programme at social assistance and 
non-EI recipients and the federal government targeted its programme at El 
recipients. So in effect- even though there was a perception o f significant 
duplication and overlap when you looked at a little bit further, maybe the 
duplication and overlap w asn’t as great as it may have been thought to be. 
Nonetheless, as if often the case, the perception was that there was a lot o f 
duplication and overlap.
(AB-FD-H)
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None o f the provincial respondents from Nova Scotia noted that the federal 
government was motivated to improve the effectiveness and efficiency o f the labour 
market. As will be seen in Chapter 7, Nova Scotia’s perception on how it could affect 
greater effectiveness and efficiency through devolution and local autonomy was 
complicated by the province’s lack o f capacity and resources available to devote to labour 
market development activities. While Alberta respondents strongly support the view that 
local control would facilitate effective and efficient labour market outcomes, the province 
o f Nova Scotia was cautious about its capabilities in this area. This disparity o f opinions 
between Alberta and Nova Scotia reflects the fact that these provinces have very different 
histories with labour market training.
Alberta, being a relatively wealthy province, has invested substantial resources 
into developing its own labour market policies. Thus, in that province, both provincial 
and federal policies and programmes are operating at the same time. As mentioned 
earlier, and as will be discussed later in the thesis, overlap and duplication among federal 
and provincial policies is a considerable problem according to the Alberta respondents. 
Nova Scotia, on the other hand, has far less wealth than Alberta and has not developed an 
integrated provincial labour market policy. In that province the federal government has 
historically taken the lead in labour market policies and therefore, overlap and duplication 
is not viewed as a concern. Nova Scotia and Alberta’s unique experiences in this regard 
will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
Conclusion: Political and public interest influences on devolution o f federal powers
To set the context for this chapter, some o f the pressures facing Canada and in particular 
the federal government, from the mid- 1980s to mid- 1990s were examined. In
163
examining the rationale o f the Canadian federal proposals for devolution o f labour market 
and social insurance policies in 1996, this chapter has discussed several influences.
These influences include constitutional discord, the unity crisis and Quebec, provincial 
demands for greater devolution, and the federal intent to improve labour market policies 
for Canadians.
This chapter also examined federal reforms to the Employment Insurance 
Programme, some o f which closely preceded the proposal for devolution. Noted was the 
significance o f the federally imposed accountability framework that defines success, in 
part, as savings to the federal government.
In response to fiscal problems brought on by accumulated debt and deficit, the 
federal government significantly decreased fiscal transfers to provinces in the early 
1990s. These deep cuts to federal transfers to provinces contribute to the increasingly 
significant provincial role in financing social programmes. Federal fiscal restraints have 
contributed to provincial discontent, which has served as an additional pressure on the 
federal government to extend greater authority to the provinces through devolution.
It was argued in this chapter that the federal devolution proposal was a response 
primarily to the unity crisis invoked by the Quebec referendum, and provincial demands 
for both jurisdictional clarification and realignment regarding several policy files, 
including labour market training. It is suggested that the proposal was part o f  the federal 
government’s strategy to build more collaborative relationships with provinces in order to 
demonstrate that federalism could be flexible enough to respond to provincial concerns.
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Most o f the respondents commented on the influence o f jurisdictional positions 
asserted by Quebec and other provinces, as a significant impetus for the federal offer. 
However, respondents strongly support the premise that the primary driver o f  the 
proposal was to appease Quebec. In comparison, little support was offered by 
respondents for the thesis that the proposal was influenced by public interests. Relatively 
few respondents thought that the proposal was made in part to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency o f policies for Canadians.
This chapter set out to offer some preliminary assessment concerning whether the 
federal proposal was influenced primarily by political interests, or whether public 
interests were significantly involved. In the devolution proposal, the federal government 
recognised the long-standing provincial demands for clarification and realignment in 
labour market responsibilities. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, the federal 
government claimed it wanted to improve labour market policy for Canadians. Yet, the 
political environment o f the mid- 1990s demanded that federalism be more responsive to 
regional issues than it had been in the past. The evidence offered thus far supports the 
premise that the proposal to devolve labour market training can be seen as a response to a 
set o f political imperatives facing the federal government in the early to mid- 1990s.
In the next two chapters the thesis turns its attention to provincial experiences and 
positions taken when considering the federal proposal. The thesis that- decisions made by 
Alberta and Nova Scotia governments about devolution are influenced more by political 
interests than by public interests will be examined. Although the primary focus will be 
‘provincial’ per se, federal priorities and influences will continue to be examined. As will 
be seen, the process o f negotiating the LMDAs allows for further examination o f federal 
motivations and priorities.
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Chapter 6
Devolution of Federal Labour Market Policy to Alberta
Introduction
This chapter will focus on the devolution o f federal labour market policies to the province 
o f  Alberta. This issue, and the negotiations between Alberta and the federal government 
that led up to devolution, will be examined to determine both federal and provincial 
priorities, attitudes and overall positions. The main thesis is that the devolution o f 
governmental power and authority, as illustrated by the labour market policy case study, 
is driven primarily by political influences, and that other pressures- for instance those of 
public interest- are secondary. Therefore, the chapter will review the extent to which, 
both governments’ positions are determined by either political or public interests.
It will be suggested that Alberta’s experience o f Canadian federalism shaped its 
political response and perceptions o f policy-makers and politicians on the federal 
proposal. Historical political events will be reviewed and evaluated as potential 
influences on Alberta’s stance towards labour market devolution. This historical review 
will provide background for an evaluation o f the federal-provincial negotiations and 
positions asserted by the respective governments. In light o f this historical context, the 
primary data will be reviewed in attempt to draw some tentative conclusions pertaining to 
labour market devolution and the significance o f political and public interests in the case 
o f the Canada-Alberta LMDA.
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Alberta’s experience o f  Canadian federalism and the significance o f  ‘western alienation’
Central Canada and Alberta: Centre and periphery relations
Alberta did not become a province in its own right until 1905. Much o f Alberta’s 
experiences as a relatively new member in Canadian Confederation have been affected by 
its geographical location and by the size o f its population. O f importance is the 
province’s proximity to the centre o f Canada. Alberta is very far away both literally 
(3,574 kilometres or 2,220 miles) and figuratively from Ottawa, the country’s capital city, 
which is located in the province o f Ontario (Colombo, 1992).
Ontario and Quebec are the two provinces with the largest populations, and they 
are located at the political centre o f Canada. As o f 1996, Ontario and Quebec’s 
populations amount to 11, 258.4 and 7, 388.4 respectively, and Alberta’s population o f 2, 
793.3 is comparatively smaller. Proportionately, Alberta’s population represents only 9.3 
per cent o f  Canada’s population. In contrast, Ontario and Quebec respectively comprise 
37.6 per cent and 24.7 per cent o f the Canadian population (Jackson and Jackson, 2001). 
The striking differences in the size o f Alberta’s population compared with Ontario and 
Quebec is significant as Alberta’s smaller population limits the extent to which it is 
represented in the capital city o f Ottawa, otherwise known as the political centre o f the 
country.
As noted by Diane Ablonczy, a M ember o f Parliament (MP) for Alberta, because 
Ontario and Quebec hold most o f the seats in the House o f Parliament, the federal 
government has lesser regard for other provinces. Ablonczy (2001) states:
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Because there are so many seats in Ontario and Quebec, as long as the 
federal government has a stranglehold on that area, it doesn’t really matter 
so much whether they’re responsive or respectful or inclusive o f the input 
from other parts o f the country.
(Ablonczy, 2001: 11)
The formula for the allocation o f seats in the House o f Commons is driven 
strongly by the principle o f representation by population. This results in fewer seats 
allocated to western Canada. For example in 1993, out o f the 282 parliamentary seats 
available, Ontario and Quebec held 95 and 75 seats respectively, where Alberta held 21 
seats (Archer et al., 1999). To govern the country, national political parties must secure 
the electorate in usually both and at least one o f these central Canadian provinces 
(Brooks, 2000).
Consequently, the interests o f Ontario and Quebec are paramount to federal 
governments and this is reflected in the subordination o f those interests stemming from 
peripheral regions namely northern, western and eastern Canada (Brooks, 2000). This 
domination o f central and subordination o f peripheral regions is demonstrated in the 
greater tendency o f the federal government to implement its constitutional power and 
disallow provincial laws in peripheral regions. Although disallowance has not been 
exercised since 1943 (Dyck, 2000), the federal government has exercised this 
constitutional power on 112 occasions, and rarely have Ontario and Quebec’s provincial 
laws been disallowed (Brooks, 2000).
According to Archer et al. (1999: 384), the ‘regional distortion o f votes into seats 
has reinforced regional alienation in Canada’. For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s 
the Liberal federal government initiated a series o f energy policies that were vehemently 
opposed by Alberta. At that time there was no Liberal representation in Alberta and
168
therefore no Albertan representation concerning these policies in the House o f  Parliament 
(Archer et al., 1999). The issue o f  energy policy and the divide between federal and 
provincial interpretations o f its control is extremely significant to understanding the 
concept o f western alienation and will be discussed further.
Moreover, Quebec’s substantial political strength within central Canada has 
contributed to western frustration and bitterness. With reference to Quebec and the 
concept o f  ‘western alienation’, it must be noted that many westerners resent the fact that 
issues most relevant to Quebec have predominated national politics over the last few 
decades (Brooks, 2000; Resnick, 2001; Gunter, 2001). In sum then, the considerable 
power wielded by central Canada (as embodied in the provinces o f Ontario and Quebec) 
is significant to centre-periphery relations and to the existence o f western alienation.
Before moving to the next section, it is important to recognise that the inter­
provincial tension between and Alberta and Quebec and Ontario, as just mentioned, 
illustrates the competition for power between regions. Governmental competition 
discussed thus far in this thesis has concentrated mainly on the tension between national 
and provincial interests. Yet, it is critical to acknowledge that competition among 
provinces/regions is a salient factor in the political interest argument as addressed in this 
research. This inter-regional conflict is relevant to both provinces examined in this study. 
Conflict between the Maritime region and other regions o f Canada, will be examined in 
the case study chapter on the development o f Nova Scotia’s LMDA.
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Natural resources and federal energy policy as an influence o f  western alienation
According to Elton (1988), the roots o f western alienation and the dissonant nature of 
federal-western provincial relations can be traced back to the fact that the three prairie 
provinces were not extended the same constitutional protection as were all other 
provinces, when they joined the federation. For example, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and 
Alberta were not accorded rights over property and natural resources. The federal 
government reasoned that in the interest o f the nation, it must retain control over crown 
lands to oversee the immigration and settlement o f the region. (Elton, 1988; Brooks, 
2000). This serves as an early remnant o f competition between national and western 
regional interests in Canada.
Ottaw a’s treatment o f western Canada pertaining to withholding property rights 
and natural resources is suggestive o f colonialism, and perhaps represents a form o f 
internal colonialism (Elton, 1988; Brooks, 2000). This unequal treatment among the 
provinces served as the central focus for relations between the federal government and the 
three prairie provinces for the first three decades o f the twentieth century (Elton, 1988). 
There is a long-standing western perception that central Canada has taken advantage o f 
the west’s vulnerability by usurping and diverting its resources to benefit industry in 
central Canada. A cartoon quite popular among westerners was published in the Grain 
Growers Guide in 1915, and it illustrates the prairie provinces’ frustration with their lack 
o f control over natural resources. The cartoon depicts Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Manitoba as three farmers who are feeding a cow, which is being milked by three men 
dressed in formal attire, and the milk is being poured into three containers marked: 
Ottawa, Toronto and Montreal (Dyck, 2000).
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In 1930, following thirty years o f  demands from the prairie provinces for the same 
control over property and natural resources accorded to the other provinces, the federal 
government finally conceded. Yet, according to Elton (1988: 349) the precedent had 
been set- the federal decision in the early years o f  Canadian federation to withhold from 
the prairie provinces constitutional rights extended to all other provinces, and thus deny 
them o f  equal treatment, would contribute to a ‘legacy o f distrust and animosity which 
has never dissipated’.
In later years when Alberta amasses significant wealth through the royalties it 
collected from oil and gas industries, and attempts to maintain that wealth by fiercely 
opposing what it perceived as federal intrusion into provincial jurisdiction, some 
commentators interpret Alberta’s actions as stubbornly self serving (Lalonde, 1990). This 
is a sensitive issue for Albertans like Gunter (2001) who argue against the notion that 
western alienation is about western greed.
Instead, what irks westerners according to Gunter (2001: 15), is that central 
Canada fails to respect the differences in ‘mind set and culture’ that exist between central 
and western Canada; he suggests that westerners’ positions on for example,
‘parliamentary reform ’ and ‘language policy’ are ‘dismissed as the product o f  less subtle 
and sophisticated m inds’. Gunter (2001) describes an analogy that portrays central 
Canada as an overbearing father who recognises that his son is an independent adult, but 
he decides to continue to take his son’s money and interfere in his life - telling him what 
to do at every turn.
W hile Gunter is probably one o f  the more outspoken westerners, the sense o f 
alienation is widespread. According to survey research conducted between 1979 and
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1985, four out o f five western Canadians support the belief that Canadian political 
institutions are more accommodating to Ontario and Quebec than they are with western 
provinces; however, only one in twenty westerners said they would support separation 
(Elton, 1988). Moreover, even though four out o f five westerners voice their frustration 
with Ottaw a’s favouritism o f central Canada, they strongly identify with Canadian 
political institutions (Elton, 1988).
It would seem that western discontent stems more from a sense o f marginalized 
status and alienation from the political and economic powers located at the centre o f 
Canada, than it stems from the desire to become independent from the country as a whole 
(Jackson and Jackson, 2001). Given western Canadians’ strong perception o f  being 
exploited by central Canada, politicians have an incentive to build upon and to 
consolidate their electoral support. As noted in the political interest argument in this 
thesis, internalisation o f collective regional experiences serves to meet governm ents’ 
objectives to maximise power and extend their political reach.
An economic boom in the 1970s and early 1980s fuelled a resurgence o f  western 
regional sentiment. The Social Credit party’s thirty-six year rule came to an end in 1971 
with the provincial election o f Peter Lougheed and the Conservatives into government. 
Alberta’s shift in political allegiance was mirrored in its transformation from an 
agricultural and primarily rural-based economy to an urban environment founded upon 
the development o f the lucrative oil industry (Bickerton, 1999). As the former image o f  a 
financially weaker province was shed with the onset o f extreme wealth produced from the 
marketing o f oil and gas, ‘the region finally found itself capable o f challenging what it 
considered the intolerable domination o f central Canada’ (Jackson and Jackson, 2001: 
251).
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The energy policy debates that took place in Canada in the 1970s and early 1980s 
illustrate the conflict between national and regional interests, and thus are relevant to the 
political interest argument, which espouses, that governments compete for power. Also, 
this historical examination o f Alberta’s transformation from a poorer to richer province, 
serves as a contrast to Nova Scotia’s experience o f a province that initially benefited from 
Confederation only to be disappointed by federal decisions linked to its economic 
downfall. It is argued that- the historical development o f Alberta and Nova Scotia’s 
competitive relationship with central Canada, and other regions in the federal system, 
affected these provinces’ positions and ultimate decisions during the LMDA negotiations.
National energy policy: Standoff between federal-national and Alberta interests
In 1972, the National Energy Board released a report that foresaw a shortage o f  oil 
resources for domestic consumption. High export rates were blamed for the anticipated 
domestic oil shortages. For example, even though Canada increased its oil production 
between 1962 and 1972 from 700,000 to 1, 7000,000 barrels per day, exports to the U.S. 
increased from 236,000 to 995,000 per day (Lalonde, 1990). In 1973, an oil embargo 
inaugurated by the Organisation o f  Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an 
artificial rise in the cost o f petroleum products.
With the onset o f the 1970s, financial insecurities escalated in Canada. The 
federal government grew concerned over the country’s ability to compete internationally, 
and to maintain the once seemingly continuous growth in employment and in the incomes 
o f  Canadians (Bickerton, 1999). With economic stagnation and rising inflation associated 
with the OPEC oil crisis in 1973, the federal government became deeply concerned about 
manufacturing industries in central Canada (Bickerton, 1999). While the OPEC crisis led
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to extreme hikes in the price o f petroleum products for oil-consuming regions, these 
changes constituted dramatic increases in profit for oil-producing regions, such as 
Alberta.
With the objective o f safeguarding enough domestic supply o f petroleum products 
to maintain Canada’s central industrial region, the federal government restricted oil and 
gas exports. In 1973, the federal government froze the domestic price o f oil and imposed 
an export tax on oil to be exported to the US. (Elton, 1988). According to Marc Lalonde, 
a Federal M inister for the Liberals between 1972 and 1984, without the export tax, U.S. 
demand for oil ‘could have siphoned o ff much o f Canada’s supply at fire-sale prices’ thus 
threatening domestic supply (Lalonde, 1990: 54). However, and not surprisingly, the 
premier o f  Alberta, Peter Lougheed, responded defensively. In a speech to the Canadian 
Club o f  Calgary (Wood, 1985: 147), shortly after the federal government placed a ceiling 
on oil and gas prices, Lougheed drew attention to the fact that the federal government 
chose not to place an export tax on resources from other provinces such as ‘pulp and 
paper, asbestos, and gold from Ontario and Quebec’. Lougheed further remarked:
This appears to be the most discriminatory action taken by a federal 
government against a particular province in the entire history o f 
Confederation. The natural resources o f the provinces are owned by the 
provinces...we are going to be forced to take certain actions....we have to 
try to protect the Alberta public interest- not from Canada as a whole but 
from central and eastern Canadian domination o f the West.
(Wood, 1985: 147)
Several federal-Alberta bilateral meetings took place between 1973 and 1976, and 
led to a compromise where Alberta withheld control over most o f the revenues created as 
a result o f  increased prices o f gas and oil, and the federal government retained control 
over inter-provincial and international trade. The federal government also secured
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enough resources through oil and gas tax revenues to ensure affordable oil and gas prices, 
below the international market price, for central and eastern Canada (Elton, 1988). 
However, this compromise was short-lived. Oil prices would once again experience a 
significant rise in 1979, and tensions that were barely under the surface exploded into yet 
another federal-provincial standoff over growing energy revenues.
In response to mounting federal-provincial tension, Lougheed orchestrated a 
number o f  meetings with other western and Atlantic premiers to gain support for 
Alberta’s position. In 1980, at the Annual Premiers’ Conference, Lougheed was 
successful in securing the support from nine o f the ten provinces who agreed that the 
federal government should refrain from interfering with Alberta’s management o f 
producing and selling natural resources (Elton, 1988). Notably, Ontario would not agree 
to this position.
In exchange for retaining a substantial profit from the non-renewable natural 
resource industry, Alberta stated it was willing to provide all provinces with oil and gas 
well below international prices. Yet, Alberta’s offer differed from the position put 
forward by Ontario as outlined in a report entitled, ‘Oil Pricing and Security: A Policy 
Framework for all Canadians’ (Ontario, 1979). Ontario held that oil and gas consuming 
provinces along with producing provinces should have the responsibility to set the price 
o f  oil. Moreover, Ontario held that all royalties and taxes accruing from the industry 
should be funnelled through a federal mechanism, and be redistributed to all provinces. 
Elton (1988) makes the interesting observation that the Ontario report neglects to support 
provincial revenue sharing from natural resources such as electricity to which Ontario’s 
economy was dependent upon. These opposing positions o f Alberta and Ontario illustrate 
the inter-provincial dynamic o f competition for power between provinces.
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Even after years o f negotiation, federal-Alberta consensus pertaining to pricing 
and revenue sharing was not achieved. Central to this problem according to Lalonde 
(1990: 55), was a ‘systemic flaw in the structure o f revenue sharing in Canada’ in that 
there was no system already in place to equitably redistribute oil revenues. Much to the 
indignation o f  Alberta, in October 1980, the federal government announced its plans to 
implement the National Energy Programme (NEP). The NEP made several changes to 
federal energy policies. The policy established new federal taxes and reserved a greater 
share o f revenues for the federal government. Also, the price o f oil for domestic 
consumption was maintained below international levels. In addition, the policy 
encouraged more exploration and development o f oil and gas resources. And, finally, the 
NEP promoted Canadian ownership o f the energy industry (Dyck, 2000).
The federal government’s main aim was to institute a policy o f national self- 
sufficiency to insulate Canada’s energy sector from the volatile international market, and 
to secure greater control over oil and gas reserves (Duquette, 1995). Yet, this attempt to 
protect the economy o f Canada as a whole had a high political cost, exacerbating the 
divisiveness in Canadian centre-periphery relations. Moreover, according to Duquette 
(1995: 397), the NEP exemplified the actions o f ‘political elite leaders from Ontario and 
Quebec’ who perceived little merit in ‘the recriminations o f the peripheral provinces 
about this encroachment on provincial jurisdiction in resource development’.
In response to the NEP announcement, Lougheed declared that the province 
would, in a series o f reductions, slow down the production o f oil by increments o f  60 000 
barrels per day. The Alberta government scheduled these reductions in production for 
April 1, 1981, just five months after the federal announcement o f the NEP, and further 
reductions were scheduled for June 1 and September 1 in the same year. This action
176
taken by Alberta forced refineries in central Canada to purchase oil on the international 
market, thus obliging the federal government to increase its subsidies to these industries 
(Elton, 1988).
The federal and Alberta governments initiated a series o f meetings beginning 
shortly after the first scheduled slow-down in oil production. A five-year federal-Alberta 
agreement over oil pricing was finally reached ju st before the third scheduled reduction 
was to be implemented. Later in 1985, the NEP was eventually dissolved with the 
signing o f  the Western Accord. Federal regulations concerning pricing were replaced 
with international market standards. With the deregulation o f prices and significant 
changes in natural resource taxation, the federal share o f oil and gas revenues fell to 4.6 
per cent in 1986, a substantial decline from its revenue share in 1982 that amounted to 26 
per cent (Senate o f Canada, 1985). And, with the shift to a Conservative federal 
government and the signing o f the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement in 1989, according 
to Lalonde (1990: 74), Canada abdicated its ‘sovereignty in the energy field’.
The NEP debate centred on disputed jurisdiction over natural resources and the 
federal government’s power to regulate inter-provincial and international trade.
However, Elton (1988) argues that while the formal debate concentrated on jurisdictional 
and constitutional issues, the real debate was about which government would control the 
energy industry, and thus profit the most from billions o f dollars in oil and gas revenues. 
Moreover, the disaffection o f the Alberta government for what is perceived as federal 
intrusion into provincial affairs was not eradicated with the Western Accord. The federal 
government’s push to implement greater resource sharing and Alberta’s intense resistance 
to this intrusion are testimony to the significant gulf between the two governments’ 
priorities, attitudes and motivations.
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The federal government might defend its actions by drawing on the perception o f 
federalism as a means to redistribute wealth from richer to poorer provinces. And, the 
province might assert that federalism’s most imperative characteristic is the division o f 
powers and responsibilities between the two levels o f government, to which neither 
government can usurp from the other, nor amend unilaterally. Clearly, when it comes to 
energy policy, the federal and Alberta governments’ perceptions o f Confederation differ 
markedly. It is argued that this centre-periphery tension illustrates the competitive 
dynamic among governments, and is exemplified in the federal-Alberta LMDA 
negotiations.
The culture and development o f Albertan politics
Pivotal to an understanding o f  western alienation is the protective and proactive stances it 
induces in Alberta politics, to maintain and extend the province’s political scope. 
Moreover, A lberta’s perceived isolation from the political centre o f the country, has led to 
efforts to increase its impact and representation at the centre (Jackson and Jackson, 2001). 
For example, Alberta has attempted to shape national politics through intergovernmental 
means, and through its efforts to reform Canada’s senate to attain greater provincial 
powers. A lberta’s efforts to assert its interests by affecting pan-Canadian governmental 
institutions are pertinent to the political interest argument.
A lberta’s actions to assert its position through a strategy o f intergovernmental 
politics is understandable, given the earlier discussion about the unfavourably biased 
proportion o f parliamentary seats held in the west compared to the considerably larger 
proportion o f  seats held by provinces in central Canada. To align with several other
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provinces to advocate for provincial rights is viewed as a possible route to defend its 
interests through exerting pressure for change at the federal/national level.
As noted earlier, since the early 1970s, Alberta has enjoyed financial success 
largely as a result o f  international occurrences in the energy industry. Supported by its 
amassing wealth and associated political visibility, Conservative provincial premiers have 
made concerted efforts to influence national politics for over three decades (Gibbins, 
1998). Asserting itself in intergovernmental endeavours has been a well-used and useful 
strategy for Alberta in its quest to make a decisive impact on powers centralised in 
Ottawa. As noted by Gibbins (1998), compared to other provinces, Alberta has:
carried disproportionate weight within intergovernmental councils, and has 
played an active role in shaping the norms and practices o f 
intergovemmentalism...for Alberta, the practice o f intergovernmental 
relations...is a philosophy o f government and a strategic response to the 
province’s perceived (and demonstrated) weakness within parliamentary 
institutions.
(Gibbins, 1998: 247-248)
With respect to increasing provincial input at the national level and thus placing 
constraints on the federal government, Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed put forward a 
proposal in 1982 to reform the senate and to replace it with a House o f the Provinces 
(Gibbins, 1998). Furthermore, in the early 1990s, Premier Don Getty argued for senate 
reform as envisioned under the Triple E Senate (elected from each province, equal 
representation from each province and effective provincial powers) that would again 
assert a greater provincial presence at the national level.
Arguments put forward by Alberta, pointed to the domination o f the principle o f 
majority, and the failure o f parliament to counter the central Canadian precedence over
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western and eastern Canada. Also, it was argued that many issues which directly affect 
the west, such as transportation and international trade, can only be dealt with at the 
federal level (because the constitution allocates these matters to the federal government) 
and therefore, western Canadians require meaningful representation at the national level 
o f government. Although both attempts at senate reform failed, they nonetheless 
represent Alberta’s concerted political efforts to affect change at the national level, and to 
constrain what has been perceived as federal interference into provincial jurisdiction.
The federal government decision to initiate the National Energy Programme 
(NEP) in 1980 was from Alberta’s perspective, a unilateral federal decision that resulted 
in a direct attack on its wealth (Gibbins, 1998). Not unlike the resentment that resulted 
from the federal government’s unequal treatment o f prairie provinces with respect to 
jurisdiction over property and natural resources in the early twentieth century, the NEP 
was perceived by westerners as an attempt to abscond with its resources to benefit 
industry in central Canada (Martin, 2001; Jackson and Jackson, 2001). Federal 
unilateralism was seen as the root o f  this threat. As noted earlier, to exert pressure on the 
federal government in order to counter unilateralism, the province formed alliances with 
other western provinces and Quebec.
In 1972, Alberta established the department o f Federal and Intergovernmental 
Affairs, and this institution served as the means to build alliances among provinces.
These efforts were productive for Alberta as demonstrated by the province’s success in 
achieving particular objectives during the intergovernmental negotiations that led to the 
Constitutional Act (1982). In fact, Alberta played a major role in devising the revised 
amending formula that was entrenched in the 1982 Constitution Act (Gibbins, 1998). The 
revised amending formula recognises the equality o f  all the provinces by requiring the
180
sanction o f  a minimum o f seven provinces that must constitute no less than fifty per cent 
o f the population. Thus, any one province is denied an absolute veto.
The 1982 Act also instituted increased protection for provincial control over 
natural resources such as oil and gas, where the only remaining stipulation is that 
provincial practices pertaining to taxation and regulation must be applied uniformly 
across the nation (Elton, 1988; Gibbins, 1998). Overall, despite the difficulties it has 
encountered since 1905 when it joined Confederation, it appears that Alberta has 
exercised considerable influence in intergovernmental relations in Canada.
The Alberta government’s efforts discussed thus far have been focused primarily 
upon increasing provincial power at the centre. As will be discussed, in the 1990s, the 
province turns its attention to the merits o f decentralisation and devolution. For Alberta, 
devolution is perceived a strategy to gain greater powers. However, devolution is not 
always viewed as an unequivocal advantage. In sharp contrast to Alberta, Nova Scotia’s 
views on devolution are more complex and have much to do with the fact that divergent 
regional experiences lead to relative advantageous positions in the Canadian federation. 
This comparison will be taken up later in the thesis.
Gibbins (1998) notes a shift in Alberta government policy with the most recent, 
and current administration under the tutelage o f Premier Ralph Klein. Where the past two 
premiers, Peter Lougheed and Don Getty, were concerned chiefly with strengthening 
Alberta’s voice in shaping the national policy o f the federal government, Ralph Klein, not 
unlike his Quebec counterparts, has opted to strive for devolution o f federal powers to 
provincial jurisdictions. While the provincial government could claim some success in 
asserting Alberta’s interests at the national level by way o f the 1982 Constitution Act, the
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province was faced yet again with more federal unilateral actions as demonstrated in the 
significant cut backs in fiscal transfers to the provinces. As noted earlier, the merging o f 
the Established Programmes Financing and the Canadian Assistant Plan into the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer, and the accompanying fiscal retrenchment was met with 
extreme disapproval and frustration by all provinces including Alberta.
For almost a decade, the government o f Alberta under Klein has consistently 
called on the federal government to clarify respective federal and provincial roles, 
especially in the areas o f provincial jurisdiction (Gibbins, 1998). The province has 
asserted its insistence on reaching such clarity o f  understanding largely by putting 
forward arguments that claim that inefficiency results from the overlap and duplication o f 
federal and provincial policies and programmes. Just one year after being elected into 
office, Klein played a leadership role at the Annual Premiers’ Conference in 1994, when 
he and the other premiers called on the federal government to support the provinces in 
assuming greater responsibility in reforming social policy and related programmes that 
fall under provincial jurisdiction.
As mentioned earlier, cuts to fiscal transfers placed extreme pressures on 
provincial governments who remained responsible for social policy and programmes yet 
had to meet these obligations with dwindling fiscal resources. Faced with fewer fiscal 
resources provinces reasoned that the setting o f standards for social policy could be best 
achieved through inter-provincial agreements in contrast to adhering to federally imposed 
standards.
As a result o f its experience in the Canadian federation, Alberta is sensitive to 
what it perceives as federal breaches in respecting provincial jurisdiction. Gibbins (1998)
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succinctly summarises the themes asserted and encouraged by Alberta in inter-provincial 
forums:
Although both orders o f government may remain active in some fields, 
there should be less duplication; the constitutional division o f  powers 
should be respected; the governments with the jurisdictional authority 
should have the financial resources to do the job; and unilateral action, 
particularly by the federal government, must be avoided at all costs.
(Gibbins, 1998: 258)
Alberta’s insistence upon respecting constitutional boundaries and differentiating 
between provincial and federal responsibilities highlights the province’s desire for 
autonomy to maintain its jurisdictional stability. However, it is doubtful that 
constitutional division o f powers is ever straightforward and unquestionable. When one 
government perceives a particular sector as its jurisdiction alone, yet the other 
government disagrees, as in the case with energy policy, then which point o f view takes 
precedence?
The federal government believed it had a mandate to oversee the national energy 
sector because o f its impact on the nation. And, the federal government thought that it 
had the right to share in the revenues, and a responsibility to redistribute, and thus provide 
a similar advantage for all provinces. The harmonisation o f federal constitutional 
responsibilities to control inter-provincial and international trade and commerce with 
provincial jurisdiction over development o f natural resources was indeed difficult to 
achieve. In fact, in the case o f energy policy such reconciliation proved to be extremely 
elusive. It will be interesting to examine the extent o f harmonisation between federal and 
provincial positions on labour market jurisdiction as perceived by senior civil servants 
who negotiated the LMDA. The next section will compare and contrast federal and
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provincial points o f view in the case o f labour market devolution in the province o f 
Alberta.
Negotiating the federal-Alberta labour market development agreement: Political and 
public interest influences
This section o f the chapter will examine federal and provincial positions taken and 
decisions made about the Alberta-Canada LMDA in order to explore the thesis that 
governments are influenced more by political interests than public interests. This section 
will discuss the major issues that arose from the interviews, including federal and 
provincial perceptions on (a) jurisdiction (b) the option o f co-management 
(c) effectiveness and efficiency o f policy, and (d) provincial capacity.
Alberta and federal labour market programmes
Responsibility for the labour market, and in particular labour market training was not 
assigned to either level o f government in the 1867 constitution. However, Quebec and 
wealthy provinces including Alberta, have maintained that training is a provincial matter 
largely because education is a provincial responsibility. The federal government 
rationalises its jurisdiction over the labour market by pointing to its authority to ensure 
the proper functioning o f the economy, and its general power to spend money in any area 
that influences Canadians (Haddow, 1995). As mentioned earlier, Alberta has played a 
key role in advocating for the clarification o f federal-provincial responsibility, while 
insisting that overlap and duplication o f federal and provincial policies results in 
inefficiencies. Labour market training is an area in which the province has sought such 
clarification. Alberta made this point during the Charlottetown Accord negotiations, and
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the province’s position is also reflected in the report from the provincial Ministerial 
Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal (Ministerial Council, 1995).
Alberta has paid for and operated provincial labour market training programmes 
since the 1970s. Therefore, given the existence o f both federal and provincial labour 
market training schemes, the presence o f problems related to overlap and duplication 
appears possible. However, as raised by federal respondents as discussed in Chapter 5, 
the extent o f duplication and overlap is debatable, given that federal programmes are 
directed at employment insurance clients, and provincial programmes target social 
assistance clients. Furthermore, and as discussed in Chapter 3, instead o f focusing on 
fiscal issues alone, problems associated with overlap and duplication might be best 
overcome by improved management and better working relationships between the two 
levels o f  government (Lindquist, 1999). In fact, prior to the labour market proposal, 
Alberta and the federal government entered into co-operative arrangements, and had 
established co-located sites where both federal and provincial programmes shared the 
same physical space, but the programmes remained separate. The perceived success o f 
these Canada-Alberta Service Centres influenced Alberta’s position on the kind o f 
devolution model it preferred and will be discussed further.
It is expected that interviews with federal and provincial civil servants who are 
knowledgeable about and directly involved in the labour market negotiations will lead to 
a greater understanding about the respective governmental positions and influences 
pertaining to devolution. In regard to labour market devolution in the case o f  Alberta, 
governmental positions will be evaluated to determine the significance o f political interest 
and public interest influences.
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Alberta and federal perceptions on jurisdiction
Provincial and federal respondents had differing views about the jurisdictional 
significance o f the labour market proposal and the parameters o f the negotiations. A 
resistance towards federal intervention in this policy area was expressed by all o f  the 
provincial respondents. Furthermore, all o f the Alberta respondents took the position that 
both before and after the signing o f the Labour M arket Develop Agreement (LMDA), the 
authority over labour market training has fallen under the provincial realm. The 
provincial perspective was that by making the proposal, the federal government was 
acknowledging that labour market policy was indeed a provincial responsibility. One 
provincial respondent states:
In Alberta we didn’t see it as the devolution o f powers really because in 
effect we had constitutional responsibility for education. The federal 
government was simply recognising that and then transferring the 
resources for that responsibility.
(AB-PR-C)
Federal respondents offered a different perception. According to one federal 
respondent, the federal point o f view concerning the proposal to the provinces was:
We have this money but we will give it to you because we decided we are 
going to get out o f this jurisdiction, however, we have certain conditions 
and we want to have some control.
(AB-FD-H)
The province understood this federal position as all o f  the provincial respondents 
recognised that the federal proposal, while creating an opportunity for greater provincial 
control over this area, does not give the province exclusive authority and control over 
labour market development. With reference to the federal proposal to devolve authority
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and control to the provinces, one provincial respondent comments, “it was clear though 
that the federal government was only really stepping out o f part o f that activity” (AB-PR- 
C).
Under devolved LMDAs, provinces have the authority to allocate fiscal resources 
and to design and deliver programmes, yet this provincial control is subject to certain 
principles and objectives set out in the agreement. As discussed earlier, provinces are 
accountable to the federal government for outcomes as defined in the accountability 
framework. The accountability framework was seen as limiting from the provincial 
perspective. For instance, half o f the Alberta federal respondents and three-quarters o f the 
Alberta provincial respondents noted that the prioritising o f El clients was a contentious 
issue for Alberta, as the province wanted the flexibility to offer El services to social 
assistance clients as well.
All o f  the federal respondents noted the importance o f the accountability 
framework to ensure that provincial policy and programmes were similar and consistent 
with federal policy and programmes. It was clear that while the federal government was 
transferring money and authority to design and deliver policy and programmes, it wanted 
to know how that money and authority was going to be utilised. The fact that a main 
objective from the federal standpoint was to maintain the federal status quo provokes a 
question about what was actually being proposed for devolution. In fact, one federal 
respondent disagreed with using the term devolution to describe the federal proposal and 
the LMDAs. The respondent states:
Often the term devolution is used. I think that’s a very inappropriate term 
but all kinds o f people use it, including the most senior officials. This is 
not a devolution. In my definition o f devolution you’re basically selling
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the store and moving out o f town and what the heck you do with the store 
is your business. Here, all we are doing is delegating the responsibility 
and it’s conditional! So we are leasing the store so to speak and we still 
have an interest.
(AB-FD-E)
Yet, not all o f  the federal respondents interpreted the accountability framework as 
so uncompromising. In fact, one federal respondent noted that National Headquarters 
(NHQ) in Ottawa encouraged the federal officials who were negotiating the agreement to 
not take a hard line approach and to be responsive to provincial issues. When asked 
about N H Q ’s bottom lines and directives to negotiating officials, one federal respondent 
noted that NHQ wanted them to “get the deal done”. This federal respondent also 
remarks:
I f  it came to falling on one side o f the argument or the other, it was to be 
provincial friendly...so similarity and consistency; are you tough on that or 
are you not tough on that? The whole notion was if  there is going to be 
any benefit from devolution to make it more suitable for Albertans, then- if 
our negotiating position was simply to make sure that provinces design 
programmes and deliver them exactly the way we did, then what was the 
point? The point was to give them some flexibility with the accountability 
framework.
(AB-FD-F)
While there was some variability among federal respondents about how stringent 
the federal position should be, all federal respondents recognised that the accountability 
framework had to be adhered to and that, in fact, it was the federal government who was 
initiating this proposal and the conditions o f agreement. This implies a continued federal 
presence and influence attached to the authority devolved to provinces. Indeed all o f the 
respondents observed a dynamic o f discord and tension between federal and provincial 
perspectives on jurisdiction. For example, one federal respondent states:
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The province was basically saying give us the money and get out o f our 
face. W e’ll manage it responsibly. W e’re responsible for our own 
programme design, our own policy, and we don’t need that kind o f 
intrusion or paternalism. So in the negotiations, that became a difficult 
issue... The sticking points were not so much on the operational or the 
service delivery side; they were more on matters o f principle related to 
what kind o f  an agreement are we striking here.
(AB-FD-E)
Federal-provincial disagreement on jurisdiction was illustrated by the frustration 
expressed by all o f  the provincial respondents about the federal conditions attached to the 
proposal. For instance, the level o f detail requested by the federal government was 
perceived as too overblown. One provincial respondent noted that the federal 
government wanted to know too much, and the province replied by saying:
D on’t tell us that we have to tell you how w e’re going to do it and that 
you’re going to examine what we do...and what are the programmes and 
services? and what are the outcome measures?...the feds wanted to know 
every step that you were going to take along the way and we said no, w e’re 
responsible for outcomes, we will demonstrate outcomes. We will agree to 
outcomes but don’t ask us how w e’re going to do it!
(AB-PR-A)
The federal priority for the provincial programmes to be comparable to the 
programmes offered by the federal government was a contentious point as the issue o f 
similarity and consistency caused a great deal o f strain in the Alberta negotiations. 
Regarding the test o f similarity one federal respondent remarks:
The province would question...why in the world do we have to design a 
programme that is similar to your programme? What counts are the 
outcomes, the bottom line. And we actually ground to a halt at one point 
and had to have the deputies intervene to get us moving again and it was 
only because there was such intense pressure politically that finally the 
thing got unstuck and moved along again...The province felt 
fundamentally this was a government to government transfer o f broad 
principles, broad sets o f conditions, broad accountabilities, don’t get down 
here telling us how to mow our grass.
(AB-FD-E)
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All o f  the federal respondents addressed how the province was steadfast in its 
perception that labour market training was rightfully under provincial jurisdiction. To 
this end, federal respondents noted that Alberta did not want to be seen as subservient and 
they resisted federal conditions pertaining to the agreement. However, as outlined above, 
the proposal had several conditions attached to it, illustrating that the federal government 
still saw a prominent role for itself in provincial labour market training.
This fundamental difference in perspective between the two levels o f government 
concerning jurisdiction surfaced throughout the negotiations. For example, the federal 
government is deemed as a defender o f  bilingualism in Canada, and thus, it was a very 
important issue discussed in the labour market negations. In accordance with the Official 
Languages Act (1969), which declares all federal institutions must be bilingual, a priority 
for the federal government was to ensure all services be accessible in both English and 
French. In lobbying efforts to the federal government, minority language groups 
expressed their concern that devolution to provinces would not guarantee the delivery o f 
labour market programmes in both French and English as stipulated in the Official 
Languages Act (Wells, 1996).
In the Alberta Labour M arket Agreement (LMDA) the province agrees to offer 
services and programmes in the French language when demand is warranted only. H alf 
o f the provincial respondents identified the French language issue as a federal priority. 
One respondent noted that although the province was providing this service to some 
extent prior to the negotiations, the LMDA requires a broader application o f this service.
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Three-quarters o f federal respondents noted that although the federal and 
provincial stances differed to some degree, the province was willing to make some 
changes. One federal respondent asserts:
The province was quite accommodating overall and really they only staked 
out ground in a few significant areas that had to do with more so the 
constitutional sensitivities and the principle o f accountability...On things 
like official languages, where some people were concerned that “redneck 
Alberta- none o f that damn French”, but the province was not like that at 
all.
(AB-FD-E)
In the end, Alberta agreed to be guided by the Official Languages Act. One 
federal respondent notes that the province did not want to be legally obligated by the Act, 
and to be ‘guided’ was viewed as a compromise. The federal respondent comments:
The province had made the decision to be co-operative and actually use the 
Official Languages Act. The wording was important because it didn’t say 
the province is legally obligated, it said the province would be guided. So 
some o f these things had to be looked at on a good will basis because the 
province wouldn’t have signed it if  it had said the province is legally 
obligated under the Official Languages Act; that would have been viewed 
as too strong o f a condition.
(AB-FD-H)
The process o f negotiating decisions about authority as discussed thus far, 
exemplifies efforts to reach a compromise over how power and control over labour 
market training was to be divided between the federal and provincial governments. 
Divergent perspectives on jurisdiction among federal and provincial respondents illustrate 
how both levels o f government sought as much political control as possible.
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Alberta and federal positions on the option o f co-management: The issue o f federal 
visibility
As referred to earlier, provinces could opt for either full devolution or for co­
management. With full transfer, provincial governments have the authority to make 
independent decisions, pertaining to design and delivery o f the devolved federal 
programmes and corresponding budget. In contrast, where co-management models are 
chosen, programmes are still implemented by the federal infrastructure, but federal and 
provincial representatives make decisions jointly about the design and delivery o f  labour 
market programmes. All o f  the provincial respondents insisted that the co-management 
model was not an option the province would choose freely. Again, the province asserted 
its view that labour market policy falls under provincial jurisdiction to begin with, and 
any discussion concerning co-management as a potential option seemed to belittle that 
fact.
Officially, the kind o f model adopted was a provincial choice. Notwithstanding 
this fact, according to three-quarters o f the provincial respondents, the federal 
government asserted its preference for a co-management agreement over a full devolution 
arrangement. The provincial respondents reasoned that their federal counterparts 
favoured co-management primarily because they wanted to maintain their public profile 
and visibility.
All o f  the Alberta provincial respondents perceived that visibility was important to 
their federal colleagues, and they acknowledged that, in general, devolution would lessen 
the reach and profile o f the federal government. For example, one provincial respondent 
remarks, “we talked about whether there should be both federal and provincial logos on
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the cheques”, noting that it was a federal preference for the Canadian flag to be a 
prominently visible (AB-PR-B). The respondent commented that the federal government 
was caught in a difficult situation, as they had to find a way to propose and negotiate a 
devolution agreement, while simultaneously trying to demonstrate their continued 
relevance to citizens in this policy sector.
Another provincial respondent held that the federal politicians or Members o f 
Parliament (MPs) were unsupportive o f full devolution “because they wouldn’t have the 
direct ties and influence” over labour market training “back in their constituencies” (AB- 
PR-D). W hile another provincial respondent observed that the federal government was 
perceived as not willing to concede their visibility, “even though ironically” they were 
proposing “to give away all o f their infrastructure for delivery in those programmes” 
(AB-PR-C).
Federal respondents also articulated the theme o f federal visibility. Three-quarters 
o f the federal respondents expressed concern over reduced federal visibility and the 
diminished “measures o f influence” which would result from the devolution o f federal 
labour market policies to provincial jurisdictions (AB-FD-E). As noted by one federal 
respondent, in provinces where a co-management agreement was signed there is “greater 
capability to influence the nature o f the expenditure and therefore better reflect the 
interests o f  the federal politicians” (AB-FD-G).
It should be mentioned that the issue o f  devolved LMDAs and federal visibility as 
it affects the power and influence o f  federal politicians, is less significant in Alberta as 
very few Liberal MPs represent constituencies in western Canada. And therefore, the 
issue o f federal visibility is perhaps more salient in central and eastern Canada, where the
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numbers o f  Liberal MPs are much higher than they are in the west. Yet, it could be 
argued that given the paltry representation o f Liberal MPs in Alberta, the federal 
government could perceive devolution as a loss o f opportunity to promote its profile and 
therefore it relevance in the lives o f Albertans. That the federal government was 
concerned over a loss o f visibility and a diminishing relevancy to the electorate, supports 
the notion that political interests were salient to the federal position during the LMDA 
negotiations with Alberta.
Type o f  model and perceptions on effectiveness and efficiency
From the provincial perspective, the full devolution model was preferred based on the 
belief that devolution promoted more effective and efficient policies than the co­
management model. All o f the provincial respondents asserted the superiority o f 
provincial authority. This argument was based on the perception that the provincial 
government is closer to the Alberta citizen and the community at large, and therefore, 
more knowledgeable about local labour market needs than the federal government. 
Consequently, the provincial government is in a better position than the federal 
government to respond to issues and challenges unique to the Alberta labour market. As 
one provincial respondent explains:
W e always felt that this was a provincial responsibility and it shouldn’t be 
the federal government directing these sorts o f things for people in Alberta 
out o f  Ottawa. This is something that is better done locally. Why would 
Ottawa be in the best position to tell our oil industry what kind o f skills 
our workers would need? Our needs would be so different from other 
provinces...These are local decisions in a local labour market.
(AB-PR-A)
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As noted earlier, Alberta had long argued that the presence o f federal training 
programmes created overlap and duplication because the province offered similar 
programmes. Consequently, in the early 1990s, prior to the federal proposal for 
devolving labour market policy, the Alberta and federal governments initiated co­
operative arrangements by establishing federal-provincial co-located sites. The purpose 
o f these Canada-Alberta service centres, which were established in Calgary and 
Edmonton and Lethbridge, was to provide a convenient and co-ordinated service to all 
Albertans seeking employment programmes. Federal and Alberta employees exchanged 
information and discussed strategies in attempt to improve the accessibility and co­
ordination between federal and provincial employment programmes. The Canada-Alberta 
Service Centres were intended to ensure that clients were provided with the most 
appropriate programme regardless o f  whether it was delivered by the federal or provincial 
government.
From the provincial perspective, co-location went a long way in overcoming the 
problems associated with overlap and duplication however, there were several challenges 
to these arrangements. Three-quarters o f the provincial respondents commented on the 
difficulties and limitations associated with co-location. Problems with co-location ranged 
from difficulties with incompatible computer systems and different levels o f pay (federal 
employees received higher wages) to problems related to the access and privacy o f 
information. Mainly because o f these problems related to territoriality and organisational 
incongruity, it was suggested that the experience had taught them about the importance o f 
designating responsibility and control over policy to one level o f government only.
Experience with co-location led the province to conclude that extending these co- 
locations was not going to meet Alberta’s objectives to improve the effectiveness and
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efficiency o f  labour market policy. Alberta wanted the added authority that would allow 
them to make decisions independent from the federal government. One provincial 
respondent comments, “Our view was that we had taken all those co-locations as far as 
we could take them and that we needed something more significant to take us further 
down the road” (AB-PR-D).
Policy coherence
Greater provincial authority over labour market policy was lauded by the province as a 
means to promote policy coherence. All o f the provincial respondents noted that labour 
market policy is strongly connected to other provincial policy files such as social services 
and economic development. Therefore, the province wanted to integrate labour market 
policy in order to develop a coherent approach to policy development across different 
provincial departments. One provincial respondent explains:
Why have two o f these infrastructures here if in fact we have one that is 
operating very well, that can adapt to the local conditions, that’s linked to 
both the social services system and the education system as well as the 
economic development activity in the province...The province saw an 
opportunity to shape the expenditures o f those federal dollars that were 
directed to the province for the purpose o f employment training. That 
meant you could integrate policies and programmes, based on need. It 
could be very responsive not only to the regional or local conditions but 
also to the needs o f the individuals.
(AB-PR-C)
Three-quarters o f the provincial respondents discussed the merits o f integrating 
programmes and tailoring services to citizens based on need instead o f determining the 
type o f service by how citizens were funded. In other words, the provincial view was 
that, an individual’s eligibility to income benefit programmes (such as social assistance or 
employment insurance) should not determine the employment training plan; but rather,
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the individual’s training needs should guide the development o f the plan. According to 
these provincial respondents, integration is best performed at the provincial level.
In relation to provincial support for policy coherence, three-quarters o f  the 
provincial respondents addressed the notion o f integrating the social assistance and the 
employment insurance income policies and programmes. The suggestion was made that 
during the Canada-Alberta labour market negotiations discussions took place about the 
possibility o f  devolving El Part I (the income programme) - a major policy area not 
included in the official federal proposal. In fact, in the May 30, 1996 proposal, the 
federal government made clear its intention to retain Part I responsibility. Yet, it is 
interesting to note the difference in perspectives between Alberta provincial and Alberta 
federal respondents about whether or not Part I was officially negotiated.
Provincial respondents noted that Alberta requested that Part I be included in the 
devolution proposal. According to three-quarters o f the provincial respondents, Part I 
was considered to be on the table early in the negotiations, but removed by the federal 
government soon afterwards. This provincial perception differs from three-quarters o f 
federal respondents who held that although the province was interested in Part I, and 
discussions related to Part I took place, it was however, never officially a negotiable 
matter. In addition, half o f the provincial respondents noted that failing to secure Part I 
was not considered to be a major loss, as one respondent remarks:
We asked for Part I at first. But after awhile we started talking about how 
really that wasn’t our prime focus., .we decided it wouldn’t be one o f the 
hills we would die on.
(AB-PR-C)
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Furthermore, politicians who were wary o f the lobbying issues surrounding the 
tightening o f  El eligibility (as addressed earlier) were not very keen to acquire Part I 
responsibilities. One respondent noted that local Members o f the Legislative Assembly 
(provincial elected officials) receive so many calls o f complaint concerning individual 
eligibility for employment insurance, they are relieved to be able to say: “sorry, this is a 
federal issue” (AB-PR-D).
The provincial position on policy effectiveness and efficiency, as well as the 
preference for policy coherence across provincial departments indicates that public 
interests influenced provincial decisions on devolution. That all o f the provincial 
respondents supported devolution, in part, because o f  the perception that public interests 
would be served through provincial authority and responsibility, reflects the trend in 
Alberta provincial politics in the 1990s to promote decentralisation, as discussed earlier.
The importance o f capacity
When addressing the readiness o f the province to take on full authority for labour market 
training, all o f  the provincial respondents pointed out that Alberta had the capacity to 
assume these responsibilities. As mentioned earlier, Alberta has been delivering 
employment training programmes since the 1970s when it began to offer these services to 
social assistance recipients. All o f the provincial respondents pointed to the fact that 
Alberta has had considerable experience in designing and delivering labour market 
training programmes. According to one provincial respondent, Alberta had a “very well- 
regarded and well-functioning infrastructure on the ground” and had gained the 
experience necessary to develop employment policy (AB-PR-C).
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Perhaps most significant is that since the 1970s, Alberta has had the fiscal 
capacity to sustain these undertakings. Supported largely by the province’s fiscal 
capacity, Alberta had a well-developed physical and policy infrastructure in place prior to 
the federal proposal. Consequently, the province thought it was quite capable o f 
assuming the added responsibilities that would accompany the devolution o f federal 
labour market programmes. In addition, all o f  the provincial respondents commented that 
the province was very self confident in its ability to take on these additional 
responsibilities. Respondents suggested that through its fiscal advantages, the province 
has had the opportunity to develop labour market expertise and infrastructure, and thus, 
its competence in this area.
With regards to Alberta’s capacity, three-quarters o f  the federal respondents 
acknowledged that the province’s physical and policy infrastructure complemented its 
ability to assume greater labour market authority. Federal respondents perceived Alberta 
as portraying a self-sufficient attitude towards assuming greater authority in this policy 
sector. For example, one federal respondent noted that in contrast with other provinces 
with less overall infrastructure and experience, in the case o f Alberta, “you know that 
you’re turning it over to a mature environment where they’ve got some policy capability” . 
In addition the respondent states:
Alberta is probably one o f the most mature provinces in the country when 
it comes to attempting to put together a cohesive labour market policy, 
active measures, income supports -  the range o f what would constitute 
employment service for Albertans/Canadians.
(AB-FD-G)
In sum, this section o f the chapter has reviewed the major issues that influenced 
federal and provincial positions on the federal proposal for devolution and the 
negotiations leading to the Alberta-Canada LMDA.
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Conclusion
This chapter has focused on Alberta’s experience o f Canadian federalism and has 
provided relevant historical and contemporary political background to analyse the case 
study o f  federal labour market devolution to provinces. As addressed herein, the political 
culture o f Alberta and indeed the political culture o f the western region o f Canada are 
influenced by a perception o f exclusion from national decisions made in Ottawa.
As seen through the example o f energy policy, this sense o f alienation is 
fundamental to Alberta’s political identification and overshadows its relationship with the 
federal government. As reviewed in this chapter, Alberta is disquieted by federal 
interference especially when it involves a policy area where jurisdiction is not agreed 
upon by federal and provincial governments. Such is the case with the respective policy 
sectors o f  natural resources and labour market development. Alberta has long argued its 
jurisdictional authority in both cases. Moreover, Alberta has perceived federal activity in 
these areas as an extreme violation in the case o f energy policy, and as an unwelcome 
meddling in provincial affairs, in the case o f federal activity in labour market 
development.
Federal perceptions are also consistent across both policy sectors where it has 
argued in the name o f its authority in the national realm to make decisions in areas that 
affect all Canadians. In both cases, the federal government has stood its ground in 
claiming jurisdictional authority. Moreover, both governments rely, at least in part, on 
their own interpretations o f the constitution that tend to favour each respective 
government’s greater claim to jurisdictional authority.
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An examination o f the federal-Alberta labour market development negotiations 
has shown that governmental positions are influenced by both political and policy 
interests. For example, for the federal government the co-management option was 
perceived as an opportunity to retain some o f  its authority and hence, desired visibility 
and a greater measure o f political influence. In contrast, the province regarded the option 
o f  co-management as unacceptable, as such a choice would not offer it the extent o f 
political autonomy it desired in what it perceived as an area o f provincial jurisdiction. 
Competition between federal and provincial interests is evident as both levels o f 
government assert positions that serve to lessen the political reach o f each other.
Yet, the province also put forth public interest arguments that served to strengthen 
their case that labour market development is chiefly a provincial concern. The province 
argued that given greater authority and responsibility, it could enhance policy 
effectiveness through its superior understanding o f  the local labour market, and it could 
improve efficiency by eliminating federal-provincial overlap and duplication. Further, 
from the provincial view, policy could be improved through achieving policy coherence 
with other provincial sectors such as social assistance.
It is not possible to claim beyond doubt that political interests are more influential 
than public interests. Yet, it is suggested that public interests are asserted in defence o f 
the provincial position on jurisdiction. It is likely that overlap between political and 
public interest influences exist. This issue will be addressed further later in the thesis. 
However, it is argued that political interest influences are stronger than public interest 
influences. This argument is based mainly on the strong provincial resistance to federal 
involvement, for instance, concerning the federal control related to the accountability 
framework, and the firm provincial stand that labour market training was a provincial
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responsibility prior to the proposal. The province was very clear in its insistence that it 
had the mandate to carry out labour market training as an extension o f its jurisdiction over 
education. Further, it is argued that political interests dominate because o f the strength o f 
the historical provincial opposition to federal intrusion that culminated into the 
Conservative Party’s strong stance against federal activity in this area, and the greater 
attention paid to devolution in the 1990s by this provincial administration.
In chapter 8, the thesis will compare and contrast the Alberta-Canada LM DA with 
the Nova Scotia- Canada LMDA and political interests and public interest influences will 
be further examined. The thesis will now turn to the province o f Nova Scotia and its 
experience o f Canadian federalism including its response to the federal proposal for 
labour market devolution.
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Chapter 7
Influences of Nova Scotia’s Position on the Devolution of Labour Market
Development Policy
Introduction
This chapter will examine Nova Scotia’s response to the federal proposal for the 
devolution o f  labour market policy. In this chapter, Nova Scotia’s perceptions and 
decisions about devolution will be examined from the perspectives o f both ‘political’ and 
‘public’ interest arguments.
Nova Scotia’s experience o f  Canadian federalism influenced the kind o f labour 
market agreement sought by the province. Thus, historical factors and political aspects o f 
federal-provincial relations point to the prominence o f  political influences on provincial 
decisions. To understand Nova Scotia’s unique experience o f federalism, it is necessary 
to examine briefly the historical factors that have led to that province’s comparatively 
disadvantaged position in the Canadian federation. This chapter will examine Nova 
Scotia’s perception that its underdeveloped economic status is directly caused by 
discriminatory federal policies that simultaneously favour central Canada, and hinder 
economic development in Nova Scotia. This historical review will lead to a description 
o f the province’s political, fiscal and social environment in the early to mid- 1990s.
This background information will highlight the particular circumstances that 
confronted the province when the federal proposal for devolution was made in 1996. As 
will be seen, the context o f dependency exemplifies the salience o f political over public
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interest factors, when assessing the influences o f the provincial position on devolution. 
Primary data from interviews with Nova Scotia provincial and federal civil servants will 
be examined to test the hypothesis that political interest influences dominate over public 
interest considerations when contemplating the option o f devolution.
Historical context o f Atlantic Canada
Nova Scotia, along with the provinces o f Newfoundland-Labrador, Prince Edward Island, 
and New Brunswick, make up the Atlantic region in Canada. When Canada became a 
federation in 1867, the Atlantic region had a thriving economy (White, et al., 1998).
Nova Scotia’s prosperity was based on its fishery, forestry, agricultural and shipbuilding 
industries, and the region benefited significantly from its ‘intermediary role in triangular 
trade with Britain and the West Indies’ (Bickerton, 1999: 219).
Yet, from the very beginning o f Confederation, tension existed between federal 
and provincial governments. In particular, federal and provincial governments disagreed 
on the implementation o f policies related to tariffs and national transportation. For 
example, support for the tariff was very strong in central Canada, ‘where its basic design 
was prefigured by the pre-Confederation policies o f various colonial administrations’ 
(Bickerton, 1999: 220). Between the 1880s and 1930s, a federal initiative known as the 
National Policy helped to cultivate a single national economy, and promote the 
development o f industry in Canada. As noted by Bickerton (1999):
The National Policy combined tariffs, transportation, and western 
settlement in a national development strategy that privileged and protected 
those industries producing for the domestic market.
(Bickerton, 1999: 219-220)
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Towards the end o f the nineteenth century, the National Policy helped to firmly 
root the industrialised superiority o f central Canada over Atlantic Canada. By 1890,
Nova Scotia’s industrial profits declined significantly in comparison with profits in 
Ontario and Quebec (Candow, 2001). Moreover, protecting and maintaining the National 
Policy was necessary to sustain the electorate’s support, and resulting parliamentary seats 
in Ontario and Quebec (Beck, 1968).
To encourage the industrial advantage o f the National Policy outside o f central 
Canada, railway transportation costs were subsidised in Atlantic Canada. Also, Atlantic 
Canada was given the control over the Intercolonial Railway that linked the region with 
Montreal. These policies allowed Atlantic Canada to access growing markets in western 
and central Canada, and they fostered the region’s industrial development in the late 
1800s to early 1900s. However, these policies that benefited Atlantic Canada faced sharp 
criticism from both western and central Canada (Forbes, 1977).
Following World War I, Atlantic Canada’s control over the Intercolonial Railway, 
along with the subsidies for railway transportation were brought to an end. In 1918, the 
headquarters o f  the Intercolonial Railway was moved to Toronto, Ontario, and in the 
following year, transportation costs were raised to match the rates in Ontario (Forbes, 
1977). In 1920, a general rate increase was imposed on freight transportation costs that 
resulted in an increase o f 111 per cent for Ontario and Quebec, and an increase o f  140 to 
216 per cent for Atlantic Canada (Forbes, 1977).
The loss o f  transportation subsidies resulted in the economic decline o f  the 
region’s businesses and manufacturing industries (Burrill and Mckay, 1987). For 
example, at one point in the 1920s, nearly half o f all the jobs in the manufacturing sector
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were lost, and in general, the availability o f  employment in Nova Scotia was 
comparatively smaller than such opportunities available to workers in western and central 
Canada (Acheson, 1972). The establishment o f  the Maritime Rights M ovement 
demonstrated the sharp and angry response from Atlantic Canada. This movement 
attempted to bring attention to and redress, federal decisions that led to the economic 
decline in the region. The Maritime Rights M ovement sought to increase awareness and 
a sense o f regional alliance among Atlantic provinces in a quest to counterbalance the 
‘growing metropolitan dominance o f central Canada’ (Forbes, 1977: 378).
With the introduction o f post-war welfare state development, the National Policy 
was abolished. Reduced economic and political ties to Britain, and the establishment o f 
strong economic relations with the U.S. accompanied the elimination o f the National 
Policy. The reconstruction o f  the economy and implementation o f the post-war welfare 
state was facilitated by significant political centralisation o f policies at the national level. 
Consensus for these post-war endeavours was strong in Canada, with the notable 
exceptions o f Quebec and Atlantic Canada. According to Bickerton (1999: 224), from 
the perspective o f Atlantic Canada ‘centralised Keynesian policies’ that were ‘concerned 
with (and designed for) managing overall national levels o f economic growth and 
employment, with little regard for regional distribution’, resulted in stunted economic 
growth, lower levels o f family income and higher unemployment rates for the region.
Towards the end o f the Korean War in the early 1950s, Atlantic Canada’s plight 
o f  structural inequality and ensuing economic hardships provoked calls from provincial 
governments for the federal government to respond. Preferring to adhere to post-war 
welfare state development through a ‘highly centralist bias’, the federal government
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resisted the idea o f regional development to redress disparities in regional economic 
growth across Canada (Bickerton, 2001: 51).
In brief, the early years o f Canadian federation witnessed the significant decline o f  
the Atlantic region’s economy relative to other regions in the country. The federal 
strategy to centralise and strengthen the national economy, primarily by supporting 
development in central Canada, was viewed by the Atlantic provinces as unfair, because 
it privileged some regions over others.
The initiation and failure o f  regional development programmes
Regional development is affected by competition between federal and provincial 
interests. As suggested by Savioe (1986: 12), ‘regional development has often been a 
pawn in the continuing struggle between “nation-building” and “province-building”’. As 
will be discussed, federal and provincial interests collide when considering the notion o f 
regional development.
Despite its initial resistance in responding to demands from Atlantic Canada to 
address the region’s problems, the federal government initiated the Department o f 
Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) in 1969. The mandate o f DREE, as first 
envisioned by the federal Liberal Party, was to tackle underdevelopment in Atlantic 
Canada and eastern Quebec. Yet, in response to the oil crisis in the 1970s, the federal 
government began to divert a substantial amount o f DREE’s discretionary funds to 
M ontreal (Bickerton, 1999).
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Additional regions were given access to regional development funds by the mid- 
1970s, which resulted in relatively fewer DREE dollars for Atlantic Canada (Savoie, 
1986). For example, in 1970-71, Atlantic Canada received over 50 per cent o f  DREE 
funds, and by 1977-78 this amount decreased to 39 per cent (Savoie, 1986). Moreover, 
by 1980, Atlantic Canada received only 15 per cent o f DREE’s industrial incentive funds 
(Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 1982). Hence, the original intent was changed 
from promoting regional development in Atlantic Canada and eastern Quebec, to 
responding to federal political imperatives induced by the oil crisis and pressures from 
Quebec. Bickerton (1999) notes:
This siphoning o ff o f DREE funds to already highly industrialized regions 
convinced the department’s first deputy minister, Tom Kent, that DREE’s 
original mandate had been discarded and that regional development 
programming would henceforth respond to political imperatives, rather 
than rational planning objectives.
(Bickerton, 1999: 227)
Furthermore, commentators such as Alexander (1983) and (Savoie, 1988: 295), 
suggest that the federal government would not have be so keen to implement 
developmental policies if it had not been for the ‘political and economic troubles o f 
Quebec’. In fact, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1969: 14) likened regional 
economic disparities in Atlantic Canada to the ‘French-English confrontation’, remarking 
that both problems could undermine national unity. Atlantic premiers charge that 
regional programmes reflect less than satisfactory attempts to make reparation to the 
region. These premiers are disquieted by the fact that distribution o f regional 
development monies are not allotted according to need, as exemplified by the diverting o f 
funds to well developed areas in Canada (Savoie, 1988).
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With the combination o f the equalisation programme, instituted in 1957, DREE in 
1969, and the liberalisation o f unemployment insurance in 1971, federal government 
spending in Nova Scotia supported the establishment o f a contemporary provincial civil 
service, and provided needed economic infrastructure (Bickerton, 2001). However, even 
though federal fiscal transfers helped to ensure relative equity among regions concerning 
quality public services, economic problems persisted in Nova Scotia. According to 
Bickerton (1996: 19), as these measures ‘failed to transform the region’s private sector 
economy into a dynamic engine o f  economic growth’ disparities in regional development 
persisted.
The limited success o f regional development is widely acknowledged (Savoie, 
1986; MacDonald, 1998; Bickerton, 1999). The ineffectiveness o f these programmes is, 
in part, caused by the fact that Nova Scotia has had to compete with other regional 
development programmes in more affluent regions such as southern Ontario. These 
wealthy locations are more sought after by investors than those with limited fiscal 
strength and stability (Savioe, 1986; MacDonald, 1998).
Regardless o f why these programmes failed, the fact remains that support once 
deemed integral to the Atlantic Canadian economy has been severely reduced. In fact, 
federal subsidies to Nova Scotia businesses have been reduced to some o f  the lowest per 
capita levels in Canada (Nova Scotia, 1998). For example, federal regional subsidies and 
capital assistance to businesses in Atlantic Canada have dropped from 12.7 per cent o f 
GDP in 1980 to 2.1 per cent in 1994 (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 1996). As 
will be discussed in the next section, Atlantic Canada has been critical o f the federal 
government, given the failure o f national programmes to foster and maintain economic 
growth in the region.
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Atlantic Canada’s long-standing criticism o f federalism
Atlantic Canada’s perception o f being exploited and alienated by central Canada is 
strong, and politicians from this region have long used this sentiment to consolidate 
electoral support and remain in power. Since the early 1970s, provincial governments in 
Atlantic Canada have consistently blamed their economic weakness and 
underdevelopment on federal policies and programmes (Savoie, 1988). Their charges 
have moved beyond historical complaints, such as the restructuring o f the railway and 
National Policy, to more contemporary federal policies that impede development in the 
region. Not unlike the grievances coming from western Canada, Atlantic premiers assert 
that federal policies favour central Canada, primarily, because o f the influence over 
national policies wielded by comparatively larger populations in Ontario and Quebec 
(Savoie, 1988).
In fact, drawing from 1996 data, the Atlantic provinces constitute the least 
populated region in the country (Jackson and Jackson, 2001). Compared to the prairie 
provinces and the province o f Ontario, which make up 16.5 per cent and 37.6 per cent o f 
the population respectively, the Atlantic provinces constitute only 8.1 per cent o f the 
Canadian population. Furthermore, Alberta’s population o f 2 793.3, constitutes 9.3 per 
cent, and Nova Scotia’s population o f 943.2, makes up only 3.2 per cent o f  the overall 
population in the country (Jackson and Jackson, 2001).
According to Savoie (1986), Atlantic Canada faces a predicament: I f  federal 
policies are responsible for their underdeveloped status, the region might prefer greater 
decentralisation to make their own decisions that favour their economic interests. 
However, as a result o f  their economic disadvantages, they lack the capacity to design and
210
implement economic policies that benefit themselves independent o f the federal 
government. In other words, federal decisions that tend to favour central Canada actually 
prevent Atlantic Canada from building its capacity, and acting on its own behalf and 
safeguarding its interests (Savoie, 1988).
Furthermore, it is questionable whether or not capacity alone is sufficient to 
guarantee provincial interests. For example, as seen in the case o f  Alberta, its 
comparatively wealthy position in Canada has not always protected that province’s 
interests in energy and labour market policies. Nonetheless, Savoie’s point has merit as it 
highlights the dilemma confronted by Nova Scotia in its reliance on the federal 
government to achieve goals as defined by the province.
This section o f the chapter has focused on historical circumstances that have led to 
the comparatively disadvantaged conditions o f Atlantic Canadian provinces. Historically, 
federal political imperatives to establish a vibrant national economy have privileged 
business in central Canada, and have resulted in significant political and economic 
disadvantages for Atlantic Canada (Brodie, 1990; Bickerton, 1990). This historical 
context helps to explain successive Atlantic provincial governments’ experiences, 
interpretations, and perceptions. It is necessary to address historical circumstances, 
because these issues point to a long-standing dynamic o f regional inequality that 
influences provincial government decisions.
Competition between nation-building and province-building is evidenced by the 
provincial perception that their economic and social hardships are strongly linked to 
structural inequality promoted by national decision-making in Ottawa. It has been argued 
that federal decisions that tend to favour central Canada effectively prevent Atlantic
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Canada from acting autonomously and protecting its own interests. It will be important to 
keep this historical context in mind when the chapter examines the province’s response to 
the federal proposal for devolution. Furthermore, related to historical circumstances 
concerning regional social and economic inequality is the concept o f dependency. This 
chapter will explore the salience o f dependency as a critical factor in determining the 
provincial position on labour market devolution.
Nova Scotia’s economic environment: Early to mid- 1990s
Federal fiscal restraint
The Atlantic provinces have witnessed more severe decreases in federal fiscal resources 
than any other region in the country (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 1996; 
M acDonald, 1998). Noting the severity o f  cuts to the region, MacDonald (1998) observes 
that from 1980 to 1995, federal expenditures in Atlantic Canada have decreased from 38 
per cent to 19 per cent o f GDP (MacDonald, 1998). While federal expenditures grew 
relatively consistently from the 1960s to the 1980s, this trend was reversed in the early 
1980s. By the mid- 1990s, federal expenditures in Atlantic Canada were similar to the 
levels witnessed in the mid- 1960s (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 1996; Nova 
Scotia, 1999a). In addition, from 1980 to 1994, federal expenditures in Nova Scotia have 
decreased by 6 per cent, while federal expenditures have increased in Alberta by 0.6 per 
cent (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 1996).
As a result o f cut backs to federal transfers, which became more significant in the 
latter 1980s to mid- 1990s, all provinces have had to become more fiscally self sufficient. 
Yet, cuts to federal transfers have been particularly hard on Nova Scotia, because o f the
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high dependency on these funds to operate government agencies (Bickerton, 2001; 
M acDonald, 1998). Wealthy provinces, like Alberta, are more financially independent, 
and therefore more fiscally capable o f assuming greater financial responsibility than 
poorer provinces, like Nova Scotia, where federal reductions in transfers result in 
substantial losses in total revenues. For instance, where Alberta’s share o f revenues from 
transfers decreased from 23.5 per cent in 1970-71 to 14.5 per cent in 1992-93, Nova 
Scotia’s revenues from transfers decreased from 47.1 per cent in 1970-71 to 37.3 per cent 
in 1992-93 (Boadway and Flatters, 1994).
Moreover, a comparative examination o f provincial expenditures also reveals the 
greater fiscal capacity o f richer provinces. For example, in 1993, provincial and local 
government expenditures (measured on an equal per capita basis) in Alberta and Nova 
Scotia totalled $19,390 and 6,723 million, respectively (Clark, 1998). These expenditures 
for the same year are even greater in central Canada. Provincial and local government 
expenditures in Ontario and Quebec (measured on an equal per capita basis) totalled 
$78,059 and $52,298 million, respectively (Clark, 1998).
Cut backs in the mid- 1980s to the mid- 1990s to Established Programmes 
Financing (EPF) and the Canadian Assistance Programme (CAP) have been noted in 
previous chapters. It is important to notice that decreases in federal fiscal transfers to 
poorer provinces, like Nova Scotia, are also caused by significant reductions in 
equalisation payments. The equalisation programme mirrors increases and decreases in 
provincial prosperity across the country. And, as most provinces suffered financial 
setbacks in the early 1990s, overall decreases in provincial economic growth led to lower 
equalisation payments to poorer provinces. For example, between 1990-91 and 1991-92,
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total equalisation entitlements to Nova Scotia decreased from $949 million to $850 
million (Hobson, 1998).
Low provincial revenues
Despite equalisation and other federal transfer programmes, per capita revenues for 
Atlantic Canada are significantly less than the national average (MacDonald, 1998; 
Jackson and Jackson, 2001). For example, in 1996, the average family income in Canada 
was $56,629. For the four Atlantic provinces namely, New Brunswick, Newfoundland- 
Labrador, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia, the average family income was 
$45,587. Newfoundland-Labrador had the lowest family income at $43,564, followed by 
Nova Scotia with the second lowest in the country at $45,087. Also, for the same year, 
Alberta had the third highest family income at $57,735, and Ontario had the highest 
family income at $62,614 (Jackson and Jackson, 2001). In 1977, the average family 
income for Alberta was $21,300, and for Nova Scotia the average family income was 
$16,500 (Lithwick, 1989). A comparison shows that the gains in average family income 
from 1977 to 1996 are significantly greater for Alberta ($36,435) than for Nova Scotia 
($28,587).
Low per capita income for Nova Scotia and the Atlantic region in general, is 
related to low rates o f economic productivity (Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, 
1998a). For example, in 1995, Atlantic Canada’s labour productivity in the total 
economy, as measured by output per hour, stood at 83.7 per cent o f  the national average, 
and represented the lowest output in the country. In sharp contrast, Alberta’s output per 
hour was 123.2 per cent o f the national average, and reflected the highest output in the 
country. Furthermore, an examination o f Canada’s total economic productivity growth
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rates from 1984 to 1995, indicate an average annual growth rate o f 0.61 per cent for Nova 
Scotia, while Alberta’s growth rate was twice as high at 1.22 per cent (Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency, 1998a). This trend is also reflected in Atlantic Canada’s lagging 
GDP growth rates as compared to the Canadian average. From 1993 to 1997, while 
Canada’s average growth in GDP was 2.8 per cent each year, Atlantic Canada’s yearly 
growth in GDP stood at only 1.4 per cent (Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency,
1998b).
High debt and deficit loads
The combination o f recession and cuts to federal fiscal resources contributed to 
significant increases in debt and deficit for Nova Scotia. As a result, the province’s debt 
and deficit soared during the 1980s and 1990s. This was caused chiefly by economic 
recession that consumed revenues from income taxes, and by the province’s dependence 
on fiscal transfers, which as just mentioned, accounted for approximately 37 per cent o f 
revenues in the early 1990s (Cameron, 1995). The problems associated with debt and 
deficit were exacerbated by reductions in EPF and CAP, and decreases in equalisation 
payments caused by a slow down in provincial economic growth across the country.
In the early 1980s, provincial debt totalled nearly $800 million, which amounted 
to about $900 per capita. But by 1990, the debt climbed to $4.5 billion, which 
represented almost $5,000 per capita (Cameron, 1995). By 1993, the debt reached $6.9 
billion representing about $7,500 per capita. Moreover, the interest on the debt 
compounded rapidly amounting to $142 million in 1980, and rising to $571 million in 
1990, and climbing still to $804 million in 1993 (Cameron, 1995). In 1980, 1990, and 
1993, interest charges represented 9.4, 15 and 18.25 per cent o f provincial operating
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expenses, respectively. In 1993, interest payments on Nova Scotia’s debt rivalled 
provincial operating expenditures, and were higher than all other expenditures with the 
exception o f health and education (Cameron, 1995).
Provincial attempts to reduce expenditures and mounting debt
Following the 1993 provincial election, the Liberals formed the provincial government in 
Nova Scotia, and they introduced measures to counter the growing debt and deficit in 
their first budget tabled in September 30, 1993. For example, all civil servants were 
required to take fives days o f unpaid leave prior to the end o f the 1993/1994 fiscal year. 
Also, the provincial government set a goal to decrease its expenditures by 3 per cent per 
year for 1994-95 and 1995-96, and expenditure reductions were set for 2 per cent per year 
for 1996-97 and for 1997-98 (Nova Scotia, 1993).
Additionally, the Liberals adopted a strategy to restructure the top four most 
costly public sectors, including health, education, community services, and transportation, 
as these consumed over 80 per cent o f provincial expenditures. As a result o f  partial 
economic recovery and expenditure reductions, the provincial government broke the trend 
in annual increases in debt accumulation, as the 1993-94 deficit decreased to $396 million 
from $471 million in 1992-93 (Cameron, 1995).
The 1994-95 budget introduced further cut backs for civil servants, including a 
three-year 3 per cent roll back in wages. Through early retirement agreements, freezes in 
hiring, and attrition, approximately 5000 government jobs were lost in Nova Scotia from 
1994 to 1997 (MacDonald, 1998). During the 1994-95 fiscal period, the province saw 
further improvements in the economy and it managed to lower the deficit to $99 million.
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Yet, notwithstanding growth in the economy and projections o f an operating surplus by
1996-97, N ova Scotia’s interest charges on the debt amounted to $18 million in 1995. 
Cameron (1995: 102) remarked that the province required significant improvements in its 
fiscal situation to overcome the debt-deficit dilemma, noting that in Nova Scotia, debt 
servicing costs ‘is the fastest growing expenditure item in the public accounts’.
Finally, to capture the essence o f the financial problems that confronted the 
province in the early to mid- 1990s, it must be noted that regardless o f the gains made in 
economic recovery during this time period, Nova Scotia, like all other provinces, would 
have to shoulder further reductions in federal transfers that resulted from the 1995 federal 
budget. As mentioned earlier, the 1995 federal budget announced the governm ent’s 
intention to eliminate EPF and CAP and to replace these programmes with the Canadian 
Health and Social Transfer (CHST). For Nova Scotia, compared to 1995-96 (pre CHST) 
standards, the introduction o f  the CHST resulted in decreases to federal transfers 
amounting to a loss o f $64 million in 1996-97, and a further reduction o f $104 million in
1997-98 (Milne, 1998).
It is critical to acknowledge the pressures and circumstances faced by the Nova 
Scotia government when examining provincial perceptions o f the merits and 
disadvantages o f devolution, and the eventual decisions made about the federal proposal.
Nova Scotia’s social environment: Early to mid- 1990s
Nova Scotia’s long-term economic problems and underdevelopment have resulted in 
social hardships for Nova Scotians, including high rates o f poverty, high unemployment, 
and low educational levels. As will be evidenced in the next section, Nova Scotia’s
217
decision on the proposal for labour market devolution was influenced by the impacts o f 
these social hardships on citizens. Moreover, in recognition o f these disadvantages, the 
provincial government promoted the adoption o f social development and community 
capacity building strategies, as important means to address labour market issues. In fact, 
when the federal-provincial agreement was implemented, two o f the three issues 
identified as priority areas for labour market development were directly related to social 
development concerns. The three priorities identified are, (a) to enhance literacy skills 
(b) to address the needs o f children aged 0 to 6 years, and (c) to improve information 
technology skills among Nova Scotians (Nova Scotia, 2000a, b, and c,). A provincial 
respondent explains:
In the province we see things like literacy, information technology, and the 
development o f children in their early years as priorities. We see that from 
a provincial perspective to a great extent; we see it across all departments 
and we see it with the agencies that we work with. We see it in terms o f 
social assistance. We see it in terms o f child welfare. Some o f those 
priorities are immediate some o f them are preventative.
(NS-PR-M)
As mentioned earlier, it is important to understand how the social environment 
influenced the labour market negotiations, and the agreement finally reached in April 
1997.
High poverty rates
During the 1990s, the Atlantic region experienced some the highest rates o f poverty5 in 
the country. For example, in 1997, the poverty rate for single-parent mothers in central 
and western Canada stood at 57 per cent and 55.3 per cent respectively, while the poverty
5To calculate poverty rates, the numbers o f poor persons or families are compared to all 
persons or families in the same category.
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rate for the same category in Atlantic Canada was 64.4 per cent (Canada National Council 
o f Welfare, 1999). In general, the poverty rate in Nova Scotia has increased from the 
early to mid- 1990s. For example, the percentage o f persons falling below the poverty 
line6 has risen from 13.4 in 1990, to 16.5 in 1993, and climbed still to 18.1 in 1996 
(Canada National Council o f Welfare, 1999). While the percentage o f all persons falling 
below the poverty line in Nova Scotia decreased slightly in 1997 to 17.4 per cent, the 
poverty rate was slightly higher than the national average o f 17.2 per cent, and 
moderately higher than Alberta’s poverty rate o f  15.5 for the same year.
However, child poverty rates are more disturbing and justify the province’s focus 
on the need to improve the well-being o f  young Nova Scotians. For example, from 1990 
to 1997, the poverty rates for children under 18 years o f age increased from 16.8 per cent 
to 23.4 (Canadian National Council o f Welfare, 2001). Moreover, in 1997 in Nova Scotia, 
the rate o f poverty among children o f  single-parent mothers was 69.7 per cent, 
representing a total o f 23,000 children, which accounts for half o f all children living in 
poverty in Nova Scotia. Both the national average o f 60.4 per cent, and the Alberta rate 
o f 58.2 per cent, fall significantly below Nova Scotia’s rate o f poor children with single­
parent mothers (Canada National Council o f Welfare, 1999).
A final note concerning poverty in Nova Scotia must recognise the increase in all 
categories o f poor from the early to mid- 1990s. This is particularly noteworthy when 
considering that Nova Scotia had the third lowest poverty rate o f 13.4 per cent in 1990, 
and by 1996, the province’s poverty rate o f  18.1 per cent was the third highest in the 
country (Canada National Council o f  Welfare, 1999).
6A poor person or family has an income below the poverty line, which is relative to 
family and community size. For example, in 1997, for a family o f  3 in a community o f 
100,000 people, the poverty line is $24,700 (Canada National Council o f W elfare, 1999).
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High rates o f  unemployment
The unemployment rates in Nova Scotia and the Atlantic region are in general, among the 
highest in the country, and have ‘worsened considerably following recessions in the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, resulting in permanent job loss’ (MacDonald, 1998: 393). From 
1993 to 1997, the average unemployment rate for the country was 10 per cent, while for 
Atlantic Canada the unemployment rate averaged 14.3 per cent (Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency, 1998b). In 1996, Nova Scotia’s unemployment rate o f 12.3 per 
cent was higher compared to both the average rate o f unemployment for the country, 
which was 9.6 per cent, and Alberta’s unemployment rate o f 6.9 per cent (Canada, 2002).
Long-term unemployment rates reflect the incidence o f unemployment for two 
years (the year o f the census plus the preceding year). In 1996, the long-term 
unemployment rates for Canada and Alberta were 3.3 per cent and 1.7 per cent, 
respectively. In contrast, Nova Scotia’s long-term unemployment rate o f 3.2 per cent was 
slightly lower than the national average, yet significantly higher than the rate found in 
Alberta (Canada, 1996d).
While Nova Scotia’s long-term unemployment rate is only slightly lower than the 
national average, the real long-term jobless rate in Nova Scotia may be higher than 
indicated by official estimates. Statistics Canada’s official estimates o f long-term 
unemployment, as just reviewed, does not take into consideration ‘discouraged w orkers’ 
who are no longer actively searching for work (Sinclair, 1994: 9). As a cohort, those 
individuals who are actively searching for employment are represented by employment 
participation rates. Nova Scotia’s participation rates for 1991 o f 62 per cent is lower
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compared to the national average o f 66 per cent, and Ontario’s average o f 70 per cent 
(Sinclair, 1994).
Low levels o f  education and literacy: Implications for employability and income
To gain an appreciation o f some o f  the challenges and circumstances faced by the 
province while negotiating the labour market agreement, it is important to address some 
o f  the variables related to employment and unemployment. Both federal and provincial 
civil servants noted the importance o f understanding the implications o f literacy and 
education for employability in a changing labour market in Nova Scotia. Over the last 
few decades, Nova Scotia has shifted from a primarily resource-based economy to a 
knowledge and service-based economy, and as such, employment trends mirror this shift. 
For example in 1997, 67 per cent o f Nova Scotians were employed in the service sector, 
and in contrast to this, only 6 per cent were employed in the resource sector, such as 
agriculture, mining, fishing, and forestry industries (Nova Scotia, 1998).
In Atlantic Canada, from 1992 to 1996, the availability o f jobs for those with a 
high school diploma or less decreased by 32,500, while employment opportunities for 
people with some post-secondary education increased by 35,600 (Nova Scotia, 1999b). 
Furthermore, with regard to Nova Scotia, in 1997, Human Resources Development 
Canada (HRDC) projected an increase in employment that requires advanced literacy 
skills and higher levels o f education, and a decrease in employment opportunities that 
require only minimal literacy skills and education for the latter 1990s and early 2000s 
(Canada, 1997a). For instance, HRDC’s study predicted that from 1998 to 2003, the 
demand for mine labourers would decrease by 55.8 per cent, and that jobs in computer 
programming would increase by 36.1 per cent (Canada, 1998).
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Also, results from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) provide support 
for provincial priorities that point to the salience o f literacy skills in Nova Scotia. The 
IALS assessed literacy competency based on scales from one to four, with higher scales 
representing higher levels o f  literacy. The IALS identified literacy as an indicator o f 
employment income, whereby people with lower literacy skills earn less than those with 
higher literacy competency (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and Human Resources Development Canada, 1997). For example in Canada, 
the IALS found that:
Nearly half (47 per cent) o f  adults at the lowest level o f literacy on the 
prose scale were living in low-income households, compared with only 8 
per cent o f those at the highest level o f  literacy. The risk o f living in a 
low-income household was thus six times greater for individuals at Level 1 
than for those at Level 4/5.
(Canada, 1998: 14)
Furthermore, the relationship between income and literacy was stronger for men 
than it was for women, yet, nearly 40 to 45 per cent ‘o f the economic return yielded by 
education is due to literacy skills’ (Canada, 2000). Given the shifting requirements in the 
workplace, it is noteworthy that the IALS found literacy competency in Atlantic Canada 
to be slightly to moderately lower than the national average. For example, on literacy 
scales from one to four, 53 per cent o f Atlantic Canadians function at the two lowest 
levels, indicating limited to extreme deficiency in literacy ability (OECD and Statistics 
Canada, 1996). In contrast, the national average for scores on the two lowest levels 
stands at 48 per cent. In addition, the national average for scores on the highest level, 
indicating very high literacy skills, stands at 21 per cent, in comparison to 15 per cent o f 
Atlantic Canadians who achieved the highest rating. While these statistics provide 
evidence for the existence o f literacy problems nation-wide, Atlantic Canada’s slightly 
greater disadvantage is noted.
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In addition to literacy, education is an indicator o f employment income and 
unemployment (Canada, 1996b and 1997b). Moreover, in 1995 in Nova Scotia, the 
average employment income for people holding a university degree was $34,871 
compared to the average incomes o f  $17,388 and $19,182 for those with less than grade 
nine, and those with a high school diploma, respectively (Canada, 1996b).
Also, it is important to note the correlation between education and unemployment. 
For example, in Nova Scotia in 1997, the unemployment rate for those with a university 
degree was 8 per cent, whereas the rate for those with a high school diploma was 19 
percent, and the rate increased again to 36 per cent for those with less than grade nine 
(Canada, 1997b). The lack o f at least a high school diploma is a significant concern for 
the province. In Nova Scotia, out o f all o f the students who attended grade seven in the 
mid- 1960s, two-thirds left school prior to grade 12. Although high school retention rates 
have improved, the labour market in the early to mid- 1990s was still dominated by older 
employable workers with relatively low levels o f education (Osberg, 1994). In fact, 
during the labour market negotiations during 1996-97, those workers who did not 
complete their high school education in the 1960s, were in their mid to late 40s, and 
therefore were expected to remain in the labour market for at least another twenty years.
As mentioned earlier, a moderate improvement in high school achievement in 
Nova Scotia is noted in the 1980s and 1990s. High school achievement percentages have 
increased to 46.46 per cent for 1986, 54.87 per cent for 1991, and 58.97 per cent for 1996 
(Canada, 1996c). While the numbers o f people achieving their high school diploma has 
improved since the 1960s, for the years just mentioned, 1986, 1991, and 1996, Nova 
Scotia still only ranks fifth highest in the country on high school attainment. In 
comparison, Alberta ranks third for all three years (Canada, 1996c).
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In brief, this review o f some o f Nova Scotia’s social and economic challenges 
highlights the province’s vulnerability to federal decisions concerning El Part I policy 
(the income benefit) and El Part II policy that was proposed for devolution. As 
mentioned earlier, the accountability framework for El Part II prioritises eligibility for El 
Part I clients. And, prior to the proposal, the federal government introduced tighter 
eligibility rules, reduced benefit amounts and shorter benefit periods for E l Part I. These 
federal stipulations would limit the breadth o f services available and the number and 
range o f  citizens who could actually benefit from El Part II active measures. Therefore, 
the combination o f relatively high unemployment rates, comparatively low education and 
literacy levels, and the declining availability o f work to match these lower level skills, 
served to restrict the number o f citizens that could qualify for either El Part I or Part II 
programmes.
These social and economic considerations influenced provincial positions asserted 
during the labour market negotiations. From the provincial perspective, population 
characteristics such as relatively low levels o f education and literacy, and the correlation 
o f these with unemployment and income levels, were challenges that needed to be 
addressed by a labour market development agreement between itself and the federal 
government.
Dependency
As discussed in this chapter and the one that follows, the dynamic o f dependency as an 
influence on federal-provincial relations, is pertinent to this thesis. Bickerton (2001) 
notes Nova Scotia’s dependency on federal-provincial economic development 
arrangements to build the province and states:
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A provincial economy so dependent on transfers and federal spending o f 
one sort or the other is not driven by its own internal dynamism, but by the 
economic vitality o f other regions and the fiscal resources this provides to 
the national government for redistribution.
(Bickerton, 2001: 58)
Accordingly, Atlantic Canada’s social and economic conditions have strongly 
affected federal-provincial relations, whereby, ‘their struggle for economic development 
has served to condition their response to federal government initiatives’ (Savoie, 1988: 
291). Explaining definitions o f  the concept o f dependency is contingent upon the 
theoretical perspective adopted. Savoie (1988) points to two conflicting perspectives that 
stem from radical political theory and neo-classical theory. Radical political theory7, 
holds that accumulation o f capital results in amassing wealth for elite social classes, and 
within ‘particular places as well, leading to polarization o f development’ across 
geographic regions (Savoie, 1988: 292).
The radical political perspective draws attention to the systematic depletion o f  
Atlantic Canada’s capital and resources by other regions. This argument is similar to 
A lberta’s contention that its resources have been used to accumulate wealth in central and 
eastern Canada. According to the radical perspective, economic inequality among 
regions is in fact ‘functional’ to the larger economy as economically weaker regions 
provide ready labour for upwardly mobile regions (Savoie, 1988: 292).
For Nova Scotia and the other three Atlantic provinces, the high rate o f out­
migration is viewed as a ‘systematic draining’ o f human resources that are needed to 
build the region (Savoie, 1988: 292). While immigration to Nova Scotia is low, at about
7Brodie (1990: 37) compares other dependency theories similar to radical political theory, 
including metropolitan-hinterland and Marxist theories that ‘posit that regions are defined 
as an effect o f their relationship with other regions’.
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half that o f  the national average in 1996, out-migration is high (Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency, 1997). For example, one-quarter o f those bom in Atlantic Canada 
reside outside o f the region (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 1998). Simeon and 
Elkins (1980) remark:
The low level o f immigration may mean little importation o f new ideas;
and the high level o f  emigration may mean that some o f the most
“m odem ” individuals have left.
(Simeon and Elkins, 1980: 69)
There is a trend in the out-migration o f young, educated, and highly skilled 
workers (MacDonald, 1998). Between 1991 and 1996, out o f  the entire population who 
moved out o f  the region, 34 per cent possessed a university degree, while 14 per cent 
graduated from high school, and only 2 per cent had less than a grade nine education 
(Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 1999). According to radical political theory, 
dependency is understood as a purposeful strategy o f privileged regions to usurp 
resources from disadvantaged geographical regions.
In contrast to radical political theory, neo-classical theory holds that federal 
development programmes and financial transfers serve to create and maintain dependency 
on the federal government (Savoie, 1988). To encourage independence, the proper course 
o f action according to neo-classical theory, is to rely on market forces. From this 
viewpoint, the high unemployment in Nova Scotia, ‘results from a failure to equilibrate 
labour supply and demand’ (Savoie, 1988: 293). Neo-classical theorists argue that 
provincial dependency on transfers and individual dependency on employment insurance, 
for instance, create disincentives for provinces and individuals alike, to actively seek 
ways and means to achieve independence (Courchene, 1994; Green, et al., 1994; 
McMahon, 2000).
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In relation to neo-classical theory and the dependence on the market to balance 
supply and demand o f labour, Atlantic Canadians are sometimes criticised for being 
unwilling to relocate to other provinces to search for employment (Atlantic Provinces 
Economic Council, 2000). Yet, as just mentioned, out-migration is high in Atlantic 
Canada. Between 1991-92 and 1998-99, approximately 46.5 thousand Atlantic 
Canadians moved to other provinces, which represented the highest percentage o f  
mobility when compared with mobile populations from all other regions in the country 
(Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, 2000).
Brodie (1990), Savoie (1988), and Bickerton, (2001) suggest that the Atlantic 
region has attempted to become independent and overcome its heavy reliance on the 
federal government. Since the federal government established its regional development 
mandate in the late 1960s, provincial governments in the Atlantic region have adopted a 
pragmatic approach to political and economic province-building (Savoie, 1988). 
Provincial governments have attempted to build-up their provinces through participating 
in numerous federally initiated regional development projects, and by predictably 
agreeing to cost-share with the federal government on other programmes when such 
opportunities arise (Savoie, 1988). Bickerton (2001: 58) describes Nova Scotia as a 
‘policy taker’ and ‘passive recipient’ o f federalism and the system o f redistribution in 
Canada.
The problem is, in part, that public policy and economic planning efforts to work 
toward independence tend to be overly dependent on federal-provincial jo int initiatives 
that are largely supported by federal resources, including federal civil servants (Savoie, 
1988). A repercussion o f these arrangements is the significant federal presence and 
influence over provincial policy. In addition, the over reliance on federal government
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participation has led to a deficiency in policy expertise in provincial bureaucracies that 
would otherwise allow Atlantic provinces to ‘to rival Ottawa or even other provinces’ and 
to assert their own ideas on policy, or even disagree with the federal government (Savoie, 
1988: 297). The lack o f adequate bureaucratic expertise is related to the fact that Atlantic 
governments ‘simply do not have the human resources to devote their attention to more 
than a handful o f major policy issues’ at any one time, and ‘what personnel is available is 
invariably earmarked for the operational side o f government’ (Savoie, 1988: 297).
In light o f these assertions, the lack o f provincial challenges to the federal 
government is noted. Savoie (1988) observes that since World War II, the region has not 
severely challenged the federal government, and unlike Alberta, the Atlantic provincial 
governments are reserved in their relations with Ottawa. Bellamy (1976) and Savioe 
(1988) suspect that this controlled demeanour is influenced by the excessive federal 
activity in provincial affairs, and by a political culture based on loyalist and conservative 
values.
The last two sections o f the chapter have reviewed several facets o f Nova Scotia’s 
economic and social environments evident during the early to mid- 1990s. Challenges 
encountered by the province during this time were discussed, and included (a) federal 
fiscal restraint (b) low provincial revenues (c) high debt and deficit loads (d) high rates o f 
poverty and unemployment, and (e) and low levels o f education and literacy. While 
various explanations for Nova Scotia’s disadvantages exist, noteworthy is the provincial 
perception that federal decisions that favour interests in central Canada, serve to 
disadvantage the Atlantic region. Nova Scotia’s struggles to build the province to 
improve conditions for citizens, and overcome dependency, are somewhat ironically 
‘dependent’ on federal government intervention. The dynamic o f dependency proved to
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be most germane in the case study o f labour market devolution, as evidenced in the 
interviews undertaken with federal and provincial civil servants in Nova Scotia.
Nova Scotia’s responses to federally proposed labour market devolution
An examination o f the interviews with provincial and federal civil servants in Nova 
Scotia reveal several influences that shaped the provincial response to the federal offer, 
and the type o f  labour market agreement eventually adopted. This chapter will now 
review respondents’ views on Nova Scotia’s reliance on the federal government regarding 
labour market development, and perceptions related to provincial capacity limitations. 
Also examined is the provincial position on the risks associated with devolution, and the 
importance attached to social development and community capacity building, as critical 
components to labour market development. These factors will be examined in an attempt 
to shed light on the political and public interests that underlie governmental perceptions 
and decisions pertaining to the federal-provincial negotiations.
Provincial reliance on the federal government and capacity limitations
To begin, all o f  the provincial and all o f the federal respondents pointed to the long­
standing provincial dependency on the federal government as a pivotal influence on the 
provincial attitude towards devolution. Respondents pointed to Nova Scotia’s historical 
struggle with high levels o f unemployment, and widespread out-migration o f young 
workers who receive training in Nova Scotia, and then relocate to other regions in Canada 
to secure employment. Also, respondents noted the high provincial poverty rate and 
Nova Scotia’s high per capita deficit and debt load. Respondents observed the province’s 
reliance on the federal government to fund and oversee labour market programming, and
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how the potential loss o f this federal involvement was worrisome, considering the lack o f 
province fiscal capacity to compensate for such losses.
Yet, not all provinces in the Canadian federation are confronted by the same 
extent o f  capacity limitations. One federal respondent makes this distinction and states:
Certain provincial governments are much better able to take on broader 
responsibilities from the federal government and wish, I would dare say, to 
get more. That probably has to do with their capacity as a provincial 
government and their fiscal situation. So as fiscal situations improve 
amongst provincial governments, their abilities to become more 
jurisdictionally sound in terms o f delivering federal programs and services 
or even their own, becomes much more apparent. But, in a region like 
Nova Scotia, it’s a small region with a population o f  940,000, so the 
challenges around capacity and the challenges around size have some real 
bearings on these issues.
(NS-FD-O)
The issue o f limited capacity was an overarching concern. All o f the provincial 
and federal respondents argued that, in general, Nova Scotia’s capacity was not sufficient 
to incorporate labour market responsibilities as outlined by Part II o f  the Employment 
Insurance (El) Act. To recapitulate, the federal proposal was to devolve to provinces 
authority and responsibility for active employment services and benefits such as targeted 
wage subsidies; self-employment assistance; job  creation partnerships; and skills loans 
and grants.
Respondents maintained that the province, independently, could neither improve 
nor maintain labour market programmes for citizens o f  Nova Scotia. Respondents 
asserted that a lack o f fiscal resources limited the ability o f the province to invest in 
provincial labour market programmes. Apart from adequate funds, perceptions about the 
province’s lack o f capacity included limited physical resources (primarily buildings,
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equipment and related technology) human resources in general, and a deficiency in policy 
expertise more specifically.
These shortcomings impeded the establishment o f an infrastructure to support 
comprehensive provincially led labour market activities. For example, there was no 
official department within the provincial government to house and to administer the 
labour market responsibilities that were associated with the proposal for devolution. In 
addition, Nova Scotia did not have an integrated labour market strategy. According to the 
respondents, there was no comprehensive policy framework to link various labour market 
services provided by different provincial departments. One provincial respondent 
comments:
We had not, as a province, developed a labour market strategy or human 
resource development plan...it was difficult to imagine how we could even 
enter into a negotiation in the absence o f that kind o f  policy position. We 
did not have a department that was clearly responsible and staffed only to 
deal with the administration and delivery o f the types o f benefits and 
programmes being contemplated or being provided under the El Act. 
(NS-PR-N)
On this topic, another provincial respondent states:
We didn’t have a comprehensive policy framework that would tie together 
the various labour market services provided by different provincial 
departments. So there was nothing to link skills training to welfare reform 
to entrepreneurship. So, we were in a position where we couldn’t negotiate 
devolution because o f a lack o f administrative capacity and lack o f 
strategic capacity within government to deal with that offer.
(NS-PR-L)
Furthermore, and in relation to the level o f capacity, there is evidence to 
substantiate Savoie’s (1988) observations as noted earlier, about the extensive federal 
involvement in provincial affairs. Two-thirds o f the provincial, and over half o f  the
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federal respondents, referred to the federal government’s significant involvement in the 
day-to-day deliberations and activities o f the provincial government. As an example o f 
this, one provincial respondent explains:
We may be more inclined toward looking for joint solutions and, in fact, 
looking to the federal government for partnering. W e’ve done that a lot in 
the work I ’m doing with information technology. Everything w e’re doing 
is in partnership with the Government o f  Canada- on the policy side, and 
on the implementation side as well. It’s the only way we can do it.
(NS-PR-K)
Also, respondents thought that during the labour market negotiations, the province 
was occupied by competing demands on its attention, and that it could only deal with a 
limited number o f issues at one time. For example, the province was engaged in other 
pressing initiatives, including restructuring and collapsing the municipal and provincial 
welfare systems. Respondents noted that this was a taxing initiative for the province to 
take on, as it involved integrating municipal workers and former municipal welfare 
programming into the provincial system.
In relation to provincial staffing, another problem pertaining to capacity 
limitations was the transfer o f federal employees. This was perceived as a very difficult 
issue to negotiate. As pointed out earlier, where provinces accepted responsibility for 
active measures in El Part II, it was expected that federal Human Resource Development 
Canada employees would be transferred along with the programmes. In Nova Scotia, this 
meant that the provincial civil service was expected to hire approximately one hundred 
federal employees.
To briefly review, a significant priority for the federal government was ensuring 
that employees who were transferred to provinces received a certain level o f job
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protection for a period o f three years. There were several federal requirements attached to 
the transfer o f  staff including conditions o f salary, job assignment, classification, 
seniority, and benefits. The federal requirement o f provinces to protect these workers 
was complicated by the trend in provincial and federal downsizing o f the civil service. In 
fact, in both Alberta and Nova Scotia, federal and provincial governments had undergone 
significant downsizing in the 1990s (Peters, 1999).
The decline in employment across both levels o f governments was preceded by a 
significant growth o f  government workforces by 1,198 per cent from 1941 to 1991. 
Between 1991 and 1996, however, government workforces decreased by 22 per cent, and 
15 per cent for provincial and federal governments respectively. Taking a closer look at 
the case study provinces reveals that in Alberta, the decrease in government employment 
was much more dramatic with a decline o f 34.8 per cent, compared to Nova Scotia’s 
decline o f 15.7 per cent (Peters, 1999). The majority o f  respondents in both Alberta and 
Nova Scotia noted that working with federal and provincial employee unions to negotiate 
the protection o f some workers, within a climate o f downsizing, was difficult for all those 
involved.
In Nova Scotia, over three-quarters o f provincial and all o f  the federal 
respondents identified the transfer o f staff and conditions associated with this transfer as a 
significant barrier to devolution. As noted already, respondents were concerned about the 
lack o f a central locale for labour market development activities. According to the 
respondents, much o f the challenge to negotiating devolution stemmed from a concern 
over the lack o f  infrastructure to incorporate these employees. Moreover, respondents 
noted that it was very difficult for the province to guarantee prior federal employees’
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employment and job security when provincial civil servants were losing their jobs. One 
provincial respondent comments:
In Nova Scotia in 1997, we had just finished a seven-year wage freeze. 
Civil servants had taken a 3% wage roll back and the relationship between 
the government and the union was very tenuous. Devolution would mean 
that we would have to hire federal HRDC employees at a level o f pay, 
seniority and benefits that were much higher than those o f existing 
provincial civil servants. So that means a lot o f things. It means that the 
collective agreement would have to be breached or those employees would 
have to be treated as a separate bargaining unit and it would also affect 
seniority and bumping rights if  there were layoffs. So, from just the 
personnel administrative point o f view, devolution was very difficult, 
especially given the timing o f the offer.
(NS-PR-L)
As discussed earlier, Nova Scotia is dependent on the redistributing mechanisms 
o f Canadian federalism. The respondents observed that this reliance extended to fiscal 
resources, infrastructure, and policy expertise in the case o f labour market policy. The 
themes o f ‘capacity’ and ‘dependence’ tended to overshadow the provincial desire to be 
more involved in labour market activities. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that 
the province was not interested in increasing their participation in this policy area. As 
will be discussed, the province was very keen to have as much impact as possible on 
labour market initiatives. Yet, given their lack o f capacity, clearly the province was 
overwhelmed by its responsibilities irrespective o f additional labour market obligations 
that would be generated through devolution. As will be seen, the province was concerned 
not only about their capacity to assume labour market development responsibility; they 
were also concerned about the potential losses that would result from devolution.
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Perceptions o f  the political disadvantages o f  devolution
All o f the provincial and over three-quarters o f  federal respondents acknowledged Nova 
Scotia’s concern that devolution, and the simultaneous loss o f federal involvement, could 
result in substantial costs to the province over the years to come. In general, respondents 
noted the provincial worry that without consulting the provinces, the federal government 
could make changes to El legislation that would reduce the quality and availability o f 
labour market benefits to Nova Scotians. For example, Ottawa could make changes to El 
Part I that could result in yet further reductions in income benefits to the unemployed. 
Also, it was suggested that devolution could lead to the province paying an increased 
share o f labour market costs should the federal government significantly alter the status o f 
the agreement in the future.
For instance, there was some uncertainty regarding whether or not the funds 
guaranteed over the first three years would continue once the initial agreement lapsed. 
Further, without a consistent and adequate level o f  federal funds allocated for labour 
market activities, the province would be placed in a highly vulnerable political and fiscal 
position, given its accountability for El Part II responsibilities, including its obligation to 
protect the job  security o f the newly hired federal employees. Should fiscal resources be 
significantly cut back or eliminated, the province would be left to shoulder these 
responsibilities on its own. This provincial concern was acknowledged among federal 
civil servants, as two federal respondents remark:
There was a concern that- and this is not something I would suggest would 
occur- but- the province has had examples in the past where funds were 
transferred to the provinces and then that structure erodes so the province 
will have inherited the jurisdiction but lost some of the fundamental 
support in the carrying out o f activities in supporting that. So there was
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some concern around that possibility. That was a risk that our provincial 
colleagues were aware of- not that we were suggesting that was something 
that would happen.
(NS-FD-Q)
There was provincial distrust o f the federal government and whether or not 
with a poorer province, a financially strapped province, whether or not the 
federal government would change the rules in a few years and leave them 
holding the bag. I think there was probably some o f that reluctance based 
on scepticism o f being left holding the bag.
(NS-FD-R)
Overall, given the potential for unknown federal unilateral fiscal and policy 
changes in the future, the province could face increased fiscal costs, and decreased access 
to effective labour market policy and programmes.
Another related concern expressed was that devolution would lead to less federal 
acknowledgement regarding circumstances that affect the province. In contrast, keeping 
the federal government responsible for the provision o f the provincial labour market 
offers some assurances that the province’s labour market needs will have a voice in 
Ottawa. On this issue, one provincial respondent remarks:
We felt that there was benefit to having a federal presence in Nova Scotia.
It meant that there were managers and workers, employees here, who were 
living in the context o f Nova Scotia and taking that perspective to Ottawa 
and to meetings where they met with their colleagues.
(NS-PR-N)
In connection with the idea o f wanting to retain a federal presence in Nova Scotia, 
half o f  the provincial respondents noted the provincial attitude that labour market 
development was a federal responsibility, and that it was inappropriate for the federal 
government to step away from these activities. One provincial respondent commented
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that without federal involvement, policies and programmes associated with labour market 
development would erode over time. The respondent goes on to say:
I do believe the federal government has a role to play in Nova Scotia and I 
think they should have a direct emphasis on the people in this province...in 
order to fulfil my idea o f federalism .. .The federal government has to be 
here and has to maintain a presence and has to deliver things that impact 
Nova Scotians’ lives.
(NS-PR-J)
Respondents commented that there was a lack o f  provincial political will to accept 
devolved labour market responsibilities. Given the province’s limited capacity and the 
uncertainty o f  circumstances that might be thrust upon them in the future, respondents 
suggested that the province was extremely concerned that devolution would result in 
considerable political costs for the Nova Scotia government. Prior to addressing 
examples o f  political costs, it is important to examine the limitations o f the devolved 
responsibilities as perceived by the province. This is significant because respondents 
thought that limitations in the effectiveness o f the policies proposed for devolution might 
actually lead to political costs for the province.
From the provincial perspective, El Part II benefits and measures proposed for 
devolution had limited ability to improve the employability o f Nova Scotians. In 
particular, provincial respondents thought that the restrictions imposed by the 
accountability framework, such as priority service to El clients, were worrisome, given 
the fact that many Nova Scotians would be ineligible to receive El services. As noted 
earlier, reforms to El in 1996 made it more difficult for people to access benefits, as the 
eligibility requirements were made more stringent. Addressing the loss o f  benefits for the 
unemployed, one provincial respondent explains:
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When El reform was announced, my immediate reaction was this isn’t 
good; this will disenfranchise many o f the groups that I work with because 
many o f  them are not El eligible. W hat I saw was that many o f the young 
people who I was dealing with probably couldn’t benefit from any o f the 
tools and measures from Part II. Many o f  the African-Canadians didn’t 
have that type o f long-term work experience that El now requires. So they 
were now disenfranchised.
(NS-PR-J)
It was the perception o f provincial respondents that federal El legislation hindered 
the effectiveness o f  the responsibilities proposed for devolution to adequately meet the 
needs o f the unemployed in the province.
Given the social and economic disadvantages discussed earlier, it is 
understandable that there was little political appetite for devolution. As mentioned earlier, 
federal and provincial governments made significant cuts to social policy and related 
programmes to curb expenditures, and to contain growing costs associated with debt and 
deficits. Consequently, cuts in the mid- 1990s to federal El and provincial community 
services, including social assistance programmes, were met with criticism from the 
general public.
Further, the provincial government’s attempts to reduce expenditures and 
constrain the growing debt problem, received criticism from labour movements and the 
civil service unions as a result o f  downsizing in the civil service and undermining the 
rights o f workers. As an example, in 1994, the delivery o f the provincial budget speech, 
that was to announce significant reductions in expenditures, had to be cancelled because 
o f a public demonstration outside o f the legislature building. This violent demonstration 
was led by construction workers who were protesting the government sanctioned practice 
o f permitting union and non-union workers to work side by side on the same projects 
(Cameron, 1995). Public frustration with government restraint led to a lack o f provincial
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political enthusiasm for accepting devolved responsibilities that might result in the loss o f 
electoral support.
Respondents noted the political hazards o f  devolution for the provincial 
government that were associated with closer identification with El Part I and Part II 
policies and programmes. As a result o f shifts in the economy, and the decline o f  several 
resource-based industries, it was expected that more workers would lose their jobs. With 
high unemployment levels expected to continue, accepting devolution ran the risk o f 
further negative political repercussions. For example, under a devolved labour market 
agreement, Nova Scotians could hold the provincial government accountable for lack o f 
access to El benefits. Following an early briefing by federal representatives as to the 
details o f the federal proposal, one provincial respondent recalls being overwhelmed by 
the federal expectations o f the provincial government. Noting the terms o f  the proposal 
the respondent comments:
My first reaction was wow, the federal government wants us to hire 105 
federal staff people that they’ve identified, and put them over to a 
provincial government that doesn’t have any infrastructure. We don’t have 
Employment Support Services Offices to the extent that Alberta and 
Quebec has them. W e’re already in a period o f downsizing within our 
own provincial government. W e’re going to have all o f these people 
coming out o f the fishery, coming out o f forestry and the mining industry, 
because in Nova Scotia our economy is restructuring daily. Who are they 
going to blame? Well, will they remember that it’s been 20 years o f  this 
older system that hasn’t been a very good system o f matching workers to 
jobs or are they going to blame who has the money now and who holds the 
jurisdiction now? And so I just said why would Nova Scotia want this 
agreement?
(NS-PR-J)
Federal respondents also noted the provincial political vulnerability associated 
with devolution. One federal respondent pointed to the provincial need to be politically
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sensitive to human resource and labour issues, and parameters around programme 
accessibility. The respondent remarks:
I thought they were being fairly sensitive to the political situation that they 
were in and knowing that they were just going through a transformation o f 
their own public service at the same time, and they had very strong unions. 
They had to be very careful and cautious about how they handled this 
process.. .1 think they also realised that some o f the decisions about 
funding projects were fairly political and would mean, because o f  the 
conditions o f some o f the programmes, that it would mean saying “no” to 
their own citizens; and they felt in some way, perhaps, that it was better to 
have some o f those decisions remain federal decisions as opposed to 
provincial ones.
(NS-FD-U)
In sum, the provincial position was influenced by the perception that several costs 
could arise from devolution. The province was concerned that federal unilateral changes 
to El legislation, or to the labour market agreement, could result in increased provincial 
fiscal costs. This was particularly worrisome considering the province’s capacity 
limitations. Also, the provincial government was concerned about the public 
unpopularity associated with El Part I and II. Given the reductions in the income benefit, 
and notwithstanding the possibility o f further cuts and the restrictions surrounding 
eligibility to employment benefits, devolution was perceived as a political risk. The 
provincial government worried that it could expect political repercussions should it 
become more closely identified with El through the devolution o f Part II benefits and 
measures. In general, the provincial position on devolution was marked by extreme 
cautiousness.
240
Declining the proposal for devolution
When compared to the transfer o f responsibility in the devolution model, all o f  the 
provincial respondents agreed that a federal presence would ensure a more preferable 
agreement that would offer better labour market opportunities to Nova Scotians. In the 
early days following the federal proposal, it first appeared that the provincial government 
was agreeable to devolution, and acted to initiate such an agreement. Yet, as the 
negotiations progressed, the province became more cautious about adopting the full 
transfer devolution model.
As federal government bottom lines became clear, such as the stipulations 
surrounding the transfer o f federal civil servants, the province backed away from its 
initial favourable response. In fact, as one federal respondent noted, the absence o f 
provincial interest made negotiations quite difficult, because at one point, the province 
did not want to pursue further discussions. The respondent comments:
The province didn’t want to negotiate so we had a strategy group that 
worked on a series o f papers to examine options. A lot o f informing- and 
we had at one point said it would be easier to negotiate if we had someone 
to negotiate with. There was little interest. But as we continued with the 
information sessions and meetings we began to understand some o f the 
provincial issues in terms o f where they felt there were significant barriers 
or why they wouldn’t particularly be interested in the nature o f a labour 
market development agreement that Ottawa had originally offered. Once 
that was understood we began to really focus on “well, that’s not an option 
but there are other options” and we worked through them.
(NS-FD-T)
Less than half o f the federal respondents remarked that Nova Scotia was not the 
only province that was tentative in negotiating a devolution agreement. Moreover, as 
time wore on, some provinces began to consider the co-management model. The co­
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management option involves a shared responsibility between both levels o f government 
for labour market development under El Part II. This partnership involves a sharing o f 
resources, including fiscal and physical infrastructure, and an exchange o f information on 
current labour market initiatives.
It is noteworthy that less than half o f the respondents in the total sample for Nova 
Scotia had any knowledge about the provincial position on the option o f co-management, 
even when the subject was raised in the interviews. In fact, only half o f the provincial 
respondents even acknowledged that the option was broached during negotiations. This 
may indicate the provincial desire to move as far away from devolution as possible, and it 
also may be related to the provincial hesitancy in participating in the negotiations.
Further, the experience o f failing to negotiate devolution heightened the provincial 
perception o f  its vulnerability.
Among those respondents who did comment on the model it was noted that co­
management would require the province to be an equal partner with the federal 
government. On this, respondents noted that the province did not perceive itself as being 
able to enter into an equal partnership with the federal government. This perception was 
recognised by a federal respondent who comments:
I think that the province might have stayed away from co-management 
because the co-management model requires a lot, I believe. You need 
somebody to relate to us. You need somebody with an organization that’s 
close to the same size as us to be on equal footing. Well, what they had 
was a couple o f people in a Labour Market Secretariat. They didn’t have 
the horses to match us.
(NS-FD-S)
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All o f  the provincial, and over three-quarters o f federal respondents, noted the 
presence o f a collaborative attitude towards the end o f the negotiating period. 
Respondents suggested that negotiators believed it was possible to reach consensus on an 
alternative partnership model that could take into consideration the federal-provincial 
power differential, and the provincial desire to play an influential role in labour market 
development. Yet, whichever model was chosen, it was the perception o f  the province 
that the approach would need to proceed cautiously. Pertaining to this circumspect 
approach, and the avoidance o f the co-management model, one provincial respondent 
states:
It’s an issue o f trust. I think that people weren’t ready for co-management. 
Devolution seemed like an awful axe, you know, to fall down on our 
necks. But when we couldn’t have that, I think there was recognition that 
we w eren’t ready for anything in-between. We had to start out slow and 
easy and so a strategic framework agreement would allow us to discover 
and to develop that relationship to be able to work together differently. I 
think that’s why it went from one extreme to the other.
(NS-PR-I)
It is important to note that the provincial position to not accept either devolution 
or co-management, and its brief reluctance to participate in negotiations, are not 
indications o f a lack o f interest in labour market development policy. In fact, all o f  the 
provincial respondents noted the immense importance pertaining to this policy sector. 
The province was well aware o f the need to improve and maintain the employability o f 
Nova Scotians. As discussed in the next section, the province strongly promoted a 
macro-structural view o f labour market development policy. As mentioned earlier, the 
notion o f  social development emerged as a salient theme in the negotiations.
243
Social development as a policy focus for labour market development
According to all o f the provincial, and over three-quarters o f federal respondents, the 
recognition and inclusion o f  social development issues were given primary status in the 
provincial position. The province was eager to integrate economic and social issues in a 
labour market strategy for Nova Scotia. As a consequence o f  provincial social and 
economic disadvantages, limitations on employability were noted. The ‘social’ provincial 
context was a factor that influenced the negotiations. A federal respondent explains:
Social issues are important in the Atlantic provinces. There is the 
traditional perspective that goes back now a good long time o f being a 
‘have not’ province. So there have traditionally been issues in Nova Scotia 
that have a social fall out. Economic bad times here have created pretty 
bad social conditions for a lot o f people. I think there was some obvious 
perspective that simply addressing the economic issues isn’t good enough 
in this kind o f context. There has to be a recognition o f the social aspects 
as well; and also that addressing economic issues potentially should 
improve social conditions if  people are conscious o f it.
(NS-FD-P)
Provincial respondents expressed a concern for individuals who had been 
marginalized from participating in the Nova Scotia labour market because o f the lack o f 
opportunities available. One provincial respondent comments:
In Nova Scotia there is a recognition that you can’t have economic 
development, or labour market development, without social development.
The agreement is very specific about that and everything that we do; the 
three are tied together, very intrinsically. And, I mean if  you look at the 
three priority areas adopted, “ literacy”, “early years” and, “technology” 
two are certainly in the realm o f social development...So we see getting 
people ready for life, ready for school and ready for work as very 
important; just as important as the skill side. They complement one 
another and prevent people from having to further readjust.
(NS-PR-L)
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The notion o f community capacity building was very influential in shaping the 
provincial position. Facilitating capacity building in communities was an essential 
component to the labour market agreement eventually adopted in Nova Scotia. The 
importance o f community capacity building is clearly outlined in the official agreement 
and reads as follows:
Canada and Nova Scotia have an interest in promoting the concept o f 
community capacity building so that communities can have a greater 
control over their interests, needs and opportunities. Citizens will require 
the support, skills and tools to allow them to build self-sufficiency. The 
partners to this agreement are prepared to explore the long-term potential 
o f  this approach.
(Nova Scotia, 1997: 4)
On April 24, 1997, the two levels o f government signed the Canada-Nova Scotia 
Agreement on a Framework for Strategic Partnerships. Although this model offers 
perhaps somewhat more provincial participation than existed prior to the agreement, it is 
not an agreement based on the devolution o f responsibility from federal to provincial 
jurisdiction. In Nova Scotia, the federal government remains responsible for all E l Part II 
benefits and measures. The Nova Scotia agreement has a strong federal-provincial 
collaborative focus, with a significant emphasis on community development issues.
As discussed earlier, in the beginning o f  the negotiation period the province 
strongly considered devolution, but, as the details o f federal expectations emerged, the 
provincial assessment o f its ability to accept devolution grew doubtful. Consequently, 
provincial and federal representatives designed a unique agreement that involves both 
levels o f governments working together in areas o f mutual interest. The Nova Scotia 
agreement is heavily reliant on the good will o f  the partners involved. This model
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depends on the partners sharing similar perceptions about labour market issues and 
opportunities to work together. On this issue, one provincial respondent explains:
Because we have a strategic partnership agreement, the relationships 
fostered under the agreement are very important to move it along because 
it’s not predicated on legal wording. It is jointly agreed upon and, it’s 
fostered by the willingness o f  both partners at the table to do something 
that may not be within their individual mandates but which they’ve agreed 
to work on anyway. So, collaborating in this sense means that they’re 
looking at issues that may not directly affect their department. But if  
everybody works on it, then there’s an opportunity to achieve an outcome 
that everybody wants whether it’s directly within their mandates or not. 
And, that’s a very powerful thing. So personalities have a great deal o f 
play in this agreement and w e’ve been very fortunate in Nova Scotia that 
there’s been, for the most part, good relationships between the federal and 
provincial sides.
(NS-PR-L)
The province perceived it was vulnerable to unilateral federal modifications to El 
policy, and to changes in the devolution agreement that could be introduced in the future. 
Additionally, the province was cautious because o f the cut backs and the general 
unpopularity concerning El policy. In short, closer identification with El was not viewed 
as a politically sustainable solution, as the province was wary o f public criticism. 
Moreover, the province was concerned about the perceived ineffectiveness o f El policy to 
adequately address the barriers that impacted Nova Scotians’ employability. Therefore, 
while the option o f devolution was turned down, the province chose instead to assert its 
interests by supporting and eventually signing a strategic framework agreement.
In sum, the Nova Scotia position on devolution was influenced by the province’s 
perceptions o f  its (a) reliance on the federal government (b) capacity limitations (c) 
vulnerability to incur fiscal and political costs associated with devolution, given the 
shortcomings o f  El policy and the possibility o f further El reform that would exacerbate
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these shortcomings, and (d) its perceived need to incorporate social development 
priorities into a labour market agreement with the federal government.
Conclusion
According to the political interest argument o f this thesis, governmental perceptions, and 
eventual positions on devolution, are shaped by the motivation to preserve and to increase 
political power and autonomy. Positions on devolution are influenced by the drive to 
demonstrate governments’ relevance to citizens by searching for, and staking out, new 
jurisdiction and associated responsibilities. Furthermore, governments vie for power and 
compete for the loyalty o f the electorate. In comparison, the public interest argument 
views governments as primarily concerned about the well-being o f  citizens. Therefore, 
decisions about devolution are primarily influenced by governments’ perceptions about 
how devolution would serve or thwart public interests.
In the very early days following the announcement o f  the federal proposal, Nova 
Scotia was motivated to accept the greater powers and authority that came with 
devolution. Yet, a more sober consideration evolved as the province evaluated the 
perceived benefits and costs associated with increased responsibility and autonomy. 
Indeed, the province faced a quandary. Nova Scotia’s reliance on the federal government 
for both fiscal and policy expertise served to support a more consistent and potentially a 
higher quality o f labour market policies and programmes than could be expected from the 
province alone. However, concomitantly, this dependency does not allow the province to 
grow its own capacity to be independent in this policy area. As suggested earlier by 
Bickerton (2001), dependency prevents the province from being ‘driven by its own 
internal dynamism ’ to build provincial fiscal and policy capacity (Bickerton, 2001: 58).
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The provincial prerogative to seek out greater autonomy and authority for labour 
market development was hampered by historical and contemporary circumstances that 
result in Nova Scotia’s relatively disadvantaged position in the Canadian federation. Any 
provincial initiative or drive to seek out significant autonomy and control over labour 
market development was muted, largely, by challenges that limited its capacity for 
growth, and its inevitable dependency on the federal government. According to the 
political argument, devolution is embraced if it is perceived as enhancing political 
objectives, such as gaining or maintaining power and autonomy. Yet, in the case o f Nova 
Scotia, the provincial weighting o f political advantages and disadvantages o f the federal 
proposal resulted in the strong position against devolution. In Nova Scotia, the avoidance 
o f  devolution was influenced by the desire to evade negative fiscal and political costs.
The provincial expectations concerning the losses associated with devolution were 
widely expressed among respondents. For example, respondents pointed to the taxing o f 
limited capacity; threats o f increased draws on resources should federal unilateralism in 
the form o f  further cuts to income benefits or Part II programmes occur; and the negative 
provincial political repercussions resulting from a closer association with El policy.
Given the provincial economic infrastructure and policy limitations, the decision to not 
accept devolution met a political imperative. For instance, the avoidance o f perceived 
immediate and potential future costs and risks could thereby increase the provincial 
government’s chances for re-election. To ensure its relevance to the electorate, the 
provincial government chose to avoid extended power and control over labour market 
policy. Choosing continued dependency on the federal government defies, or at least 
slows down, the momentum o f provincial independence and growth, yet this decision was 
strategic in ensuring the continued existence o f that particular elected provincial 
government.
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The provincial response was a pragmatic one. Political realities as outlined above 
discouraged the provincial political will to sign a devolution agreement. Noteworthy is 
the fact that, although Nova Scotia was not prepared to take on El Part II responsibilities, 
it wanted to work with the federal government on strategic issues that would enhance 
labour market development for the province. Importantly, there was the perception that 
the province knew what was best for Nova Scotia. The province was eager to pursue an 
agreement that protected them from perceived risks associated with increased control and 
responsibility, yet offered them the opportunity to effectively participate in labour market 
policy under El Part II.
The public interest argument contends that governmental positions on devolution 
are influenced by perceptions about whether it will improve or worsen policy outcomes 
for citizens. For instance, the public interest argument asserts that governments will seek 
out devolution if  it is perceived as increasing the effectiveness and efficiency o f  the 
policy under consideration. Decisions pertaining to devolution were not only driven by 
the perspective that devolution would result in severe capacity and political costs, but the 
provincial position was also influenced by the desire to increase the effectiveness o f 
labour market policy for Nova Scotians.
Two points are most pertinent. First, from the provincial perspective, El Part II 
benefits and measures proposed for devolution had limited ability to improve the 
employability outcomes for Nova Scotians. This perceived lack o f effectiveness o f  the 
policy is most apparent in the limitations imposed by the accountability framework.
Again, priority service to El clients was o f concern considering the reality that many 
Nova Scotians would be ineligible to receive El services. Therefore, given Nova Scotia’s 
circumstances, the province justified its avoidance o f devolution, in part, based on the fact
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that the policy proposed for devolution was not effective. Whether or not the policy was 
devolved, it remains that from the perspective o f the province, it was ineffective policy 
that would not promote the best outcomes for the citizens o f  Nova Scotia.
Secondly, however ineffective the policy, in comparison to what the province 
could achieve on its own, Nova Scotia perceived that better policy outcomes could be 
achieved for citizens if  devolution was avoided. Moreover, labour market policy 
outcomes could be enhanced if  the federal government maintained its responsibility over 
labour market policy, and if  the provincial government provided input through a strategic 
partnership. The province held that continued federal involvement would ensure an 
overall superior policy than could be expected if  labour market policy was devolved to 
the province. However, the province asserted that the federal policy could benefit 
citizens further if  provincial involvement in policy development was increased. The 
province was very strong in its position that labour market policy must address systemic 
issues that have disadvantaged and challenged the province’s ability to become more 
independent from the federal government.
Additionally, in the realm o f public interest arguments, and as discussed in 
Chapter 2, devolution is often touted as the best way to realise local sensitivity to policy 
issues (Schwanen, 1996; Noel, 1999). Yet, in Nova Scotia, the province chose 
partnership with the federal government to realise local issues. In the Nova Scotia labour 
market negotiations the local context was very significant. For instance, the province was 
quite sensitive to the interaction among literacy and education levels, and unemployment 
in the province. Importantly, the province asserted its priority to enhance community 
capacity building to help the province increase its self-sufficiency. In other words,
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strategic labour market policy was conceived as a means to achieve more effective policy 
outcomes for Nova Scotians.
Both political interests and public interests influenced the provincial position on 
devolution. The argument favouring political interest influences on provincial decisions 
about devolution is not straightforward or uncomplicated in the case o f Nova Scotia. 
Nova Scotia’s inability to achieve effective and provincially determined policy outcomes 
for citizens independently is complicated by the concept o f dependency. Nova Scotia’s 
response to the federal proposal was conditioned by its disadvantages and associated 
dependency, even though the province wanted greater control and impact over labour 
market policy. Yet, the provincial capacity was insufficient, and the political risks o f 
devolution were too high.
To realise both political survival and effective policy ends for citizens, Nova 
Scotia refused devolution and chose a diplomatic and pragmatic strategy to impact labour 
market policy in the province. While the province could not accept devolution, it could 
demonstrate to the public its ability to forge new potentially empowering relations with 
the federal government by way o f the strategic partnership agreement. Although the 
province did not receive any official transfer o f authority, the strategic partnership was 
considered to be a step forward in provincial participation in labour market policy.
It must be stressed, however, that the province was faced with poor choices from 
the beginning. The province could accept devolution, but only at the risk o f  perceived 
negative fiscal and political repercussions. Or, Nova Scotia could choose to avoid 
devolution, and pursue a slow incremental approach in attempt to develop policy as an 
unequal partner with very limited capacity. This dilemma faced by Nova Scotia points to
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the challenges posed by its dependency and lack o f access to the means required to build 
its independence and autonomy. Consequently, the Nova Scotia case study illustrates the 
failure o f Canadian federalism to facilitate the equitable redistribution o f resources across 
all provinces. This subject is taken up in the next chapter. Also explored in Chapter 8 is 
the relationship between political and public interest influences on federal and provincial 
governmental positions on devolution.
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Chapter 8
Analysing Political and Public Interest Influences Among Three 
Governments
Introduction
This chapter will analyse the evidence presented in the thesis to determine the extent to 
which governmental positions on devolution are influenced by political and public 
interests. Evidence from the three case studies will be compared and contrasted to shed 
light on the strength o f the hypotheses explored in this thesis. Beginning with the 
‘political’, and then moving to the ‘public’ interest argument, the positions taken on 
devolution by the federal, Alberta, and Nova Scotia governments will be examined.
This examination will assist in answering the questions set out in Chapter 1. To 
recapitulate, this thesis seeks to understand whether governmental positions on devolution 
are influenced primarily by political or public interests. Further, this thesis examines how 
federal and provincial positions on devolution compare with each other. Also, this thesis 
explores the reasons why provincial governments accept or challenge the forms in which 
devolution is advocated by the federal government.
Influence o f political interests
To review, the political interest argument maintains that governments are motivated 
primarily to seek power. Hence, governments are self-interested and they strive to 
protect, and to extend their political reach. Governmental behaviour is often seen as a
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response to maximise electoral loyalty. Further, different levels o f government compete 
for power as evidenced by the competition between national and provincial interests.
This competition is affected largely by regional diversity, and differential economic and 
power distribution across the federal system.
All three governments studied in this thesis are motivated by the desire to 
increase, or at least maintain, their political scope, and they all behave in ways that serve 
to consolidate their electoral support. Provincial-national competition is illustrated by the 
discord between the Alberta and federal governments’ perceptions on jurisdiction prior to 
the proposal. Further, these two governments disagree about how the devolution 
agreement affects jurisdictional authority in labour market development. As reviewed 
earlier, Nova Scotia has long argued that national priorities have served to disadvantage 
provincial interests. Thus, competition between national and provincial interests are 
demonstrated by Nova Scotia’s relative disadvantaged position in the Canadian federal 
state, and by its inability to accept devolution because o f related capacity limitations, and 
the stringent federal requirements attached to the proposal.
Federal government o f Canada
The decade between the mid- 1980s to mid- 1990s are characterised as turbulent years in 
the Canadian federation. Failed attempts at constitutional renewal and the Quebec 
referendum on sovereignty brought into question the stability and unity o f  the nation. 
Faced with a federal election in 1997 and criticism o f status quo federalism, the Liberal 
government was under pressure to respond to the needs o f Quebec and the rest o f  Canada. 
It was necessary for the federal government to demonstrate to the electorate that it could 
recover from the unity crisis, and that it could succeed in keeping the country together,
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despite the failed Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, and the close loss o f a ‘yes’ 
vote for Quebec sovereignty.
That the federal government’s decision to make the proposal for devolution was 
influenced mainly by pressures to appease Quebec is strongly supported by most o f  the 
respondents in this study. Further, the political interest argument is given some weight 
because o f the suggestion among Alberta respondents that the federal government wanted 
to sign with that province first to avoid looking as if  the proposal was in response to 
demands coming from Quebec.
The lack o f common knowledge among officials about the details o f the proposal, 
and the fact that a clear policy framework to guide the negotiations was not in place from 
the beginning, suggests that the proposal was initiated from a very high political level. It 
was suggested that the devolution proposal was not a well thought out policy decision, 
because its initiation was not preceded by widespread consultation with civil servants.
Most o f  the respondents also support other political explanations such as demands 
for greater devolution from some provincial governments. These demands are related to 
long-standing constitutional and jurisdictional debates over labour market policy.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the federal proposal for devolution was initiated by 
pressures on the federal government to respond to divergent provincial demands that 
challenge status quo federalism. The Liberal federal government was attempting to 
demonstrate that federalism, under its mandate and leadership, could respond to these 
divergent expectations.
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Alberta government
Political interests are also evident in Alberta’s position on devolution. The evidence as 
reviewed in Chapter 6 supports the thesis that political interests stemming from the 
province’s jurisdictional perspective on labour market policy influenced Alberta’s 
priorities and decisions on the federal proposal. The Alberta government was resistant 
towards federal intervention in active labour market policy development. For the 
province, the authority over labour market training has always fallen under the provincial 
realm. Alberta defends this position based on the view that labour market training is an 
extension o f the province’s exclusive jurisdiction over education.
This strong jurisdictional position is supported by Alberta’s solid fiscal capacity to 
sustain a well-developed physical and policy infrastructure to incorporate the added 
authority and responsibility that would accompany devolution. Therefore, the option o f 
co-management was not desirable from the provincial perspective. Yet, there is the 
suggestion that because o f the fear o f a loss o f federal visibility, the federal position was 
at least to some extent favourable o f this option.
The provincial government reacted strongly against what was perceived as 
unjustified federal intrusion, and constraints upon how the province approached the 
design and delivery o f devolved labour market policies. This provincial drive to protect 
jurisdictional interests and expand its political scope over this policy area, vied with the 
federal stipulations in the accountability framework, and the federal concern over the loss 
o f its visibility to the electorate.
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Nova Scotia government
Nova Scotia and Alberta’s divergent experiences o f federalism are reflected in the 
noticeably different views on devolution as expressed by these two provinces during the 
bilateral negotiations. Nova Scotia respondents stressed that their strong reliance on the 
federal government regarding labour market development, served to colour their overall 
approach to these negotiations. A lack o f  provincial capacity underlies this dependence 
on federal institutions and resources.
The province’s inability to significantly invest in provincial labour market 
programmes, led to a deficiency in physical and human resources, and a dearth o f  policy 
expertise. Consequently, the province did not feel it was able to accept the federal 
conditions o f the proposal, such as the requirement to hire about 100 federal employees 
who were to accompany the devolved responsibilities.
The province was extremely concerned that devolution would result in 
considerable political and fiscal costs for the Nova Scotia government. The effectiveness 
o f El Part II benefits and measures proposed for devolution was questioned. The concern 
was that these policies had limited ability to improve the employability o f Nova Scotians.
This, coupled with the fact that the province feared that federal unilateral changes 
to El legislation, or to the labour market agreement, would increase both fiscal costs and 
result in lesser electoral support, was o f serious concern. The risks associated with 
devolution were too high, and therefore, an alternate model was created and adopted.
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In sum, Nova Scotia’s policy and fiscal limitations prohibited the province from 
meeting the federal requirements o f a devolution agreement. Competition between 
federal and provincial interests are illustrated by the fact that Nova Scotia’s dependency 
and capacity limitations were set against the federal conditions related to staff transfer, 
and expectations o f  federal savings as outlined in the accountability framework.
Influence o f  public interests
In summary, the public interest argument holds that governments are motivated primarily 
to expand or maintain the welfare o f citizens. Therefore, decisions about the devolution 
o f labour market policy are influenced by governments’ prioritisation o f public interests. 
As reviewed earlier, various definitions o f the public interest infer that there are different 
approaches to meeting such goals.
For instance, to fulfil public interest objectives, governments attempt to balance 
divergent special public interests. Also, governments are guided to meet common 
interests among societal members. Lastly, public interests can be judged according to 
some type o f  standard, such as equality and human dignity.
Federal government o f Canada
Evaluation o f the evidence for public interest influences must take into consideration the 
fact that the official proposal supported the notion that a transfer o f labour market 
authority and responsibility would improve policy outcomes for Canadians. Greater 
provincial involvement and control over local labour market policies would encourage 
effective policy outcomes. Yet, the extent o f public interest influences on the federal
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proposal for devolution is questionable. Besides stating its motivation to make 
programme improvements, the proposal prioritises federal government interests over 
public interests, because devolution is conditional to federal savings in the unemployment 
insurance fund.
Potentially, the proposal can be interpreted as a means to balance divergent 
interests among provinces. It could be seen as an attempt to offer something to Quebec, 
while also responding to demands o f wealthy provinces for greater decentralisation. Yet, 
not all provinces in Canada made such demands. In fact, as observed in Nova Scotia’s 
case, devolution was not viewed as an acceptable alternative. As reviewed earlier, some 
commentators hold that devolution can actually exacerbate the disadvantages experienced 
by poorer provinces, by degrading national standards and by discouraging redistribution 
(Armitage, 1996; Gibbins, 1997b).
It is suggested that the federal devolution proposal was mainly an attempt to 
appease Quebec and to make amends for the federal government’s inadequate response to 
the unity crisis prior to the sovereignty referendum. Further, it is argued that the fact that 
wealthy provinces were also pushing for devolution helped to dissuade attention away 
from the presumption that the proposal was primarily in response to problems associated 
with Quebec.
Respondents offer very little support for the view that the devolution proposal was 
influenced by the federal government’s desire to improve labour market policies and 
programmes for Canadians. Support for the notion that the federal government was 
motivated to reduce overlap and duplication between federal and provincial labour market
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policies, and thus increase efficiencies, is far less than the support for ‘political interest’ 
explanations.
Alberta government
From the Alberta perspective, devolution would promote more effective and efficient 
policies than could be expected from former arrangements, where both levels o f 
government were involved in labour market development policy. Alberta’s position was 
based on the perception that the provincial government is closer to citizens and the 
community, and therefore, the province is more knowledgeable about local labour market 
needs than the federal government. Accordingly, it is preferable for the province to 
respond to issues and challenges that are unique to the Alberta labour market.
• While strong support exists for the finding that Alberta was very much influenced 
by political interests pertaining to jurisdiction, public interests did, in part, influence that 
province’s position on devolution. Yet, the public interest was not always such a priority 
for the province. For example, and as discussed earlier, the province originally requested 
the devolution o f El Part I (the income benefit). However, the province shifted its 
position on this matter, partly because citizens responded negatively to recent reforms 
regarding this policy. It was suggested that the Alberta government was pleased that they 
were able to avoid problems related to Part I. Further, unlike Nova Scotia, in Alberta, the 
dispute concerning the federal accountability framework was founded less on principles 
o f  public interest, than on principles o f jurisdiction. Alberta’s frustration with close 
federal monitoring and restraints placed upon this policy was more o f an insult to their 
jurisdictional interests than to the interests o f citizens.
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N ova Scotia government
For Nova Scotia, the accountability framework and the benefits and measures proposed 
for devolution under El Part II had limited ability to improve the employability outcomes 
for citizens o f  that province. Also, even though the effectiveness o f these policies was 
questioned, Nova Scotia perceived that better policy outcomes could be achieved for 
citizens if  devolution was avoided.
Provincial capacity limitations impeded the development and implementation o f 
an effective provincial labour market strategy. Thus, in comparison to what the province 
could achieve on its own, labour market policy outcomes could be improved under 
continued federal jurisdiction and provincial involvement by means o f a strategic 
partnership.
Federal and provincial positions on devolution
As reviewed earlier, both federal and provincial levels o f  governments sought to maintain 
or increase their political power. Both levels o f government acted to consolidate their 
electoral support. For instance, the federal government’s proposal can be seen as an 
attempt to regain Quebec votes that might have been lost as a result o f hard feelings over 
the referendum. In addition, based on its strong jurisdictional position, Alberta pushed 
for devolution and the concurrent extension o f autonomy and power. Nova Scotia’s 
position was influenced by perceived political costs, including electoral losses that could 
potentially accompany devolution. Consequently, federal and provincial positions on 
devolution were driven by similar political imperatives.
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Also, both levels o f government were affected by public interests, but to a lesser 
degree in the cases o f the federal and Alberta governments. The evidence as presented in 
this thesis offers little support for the view that the federal government was influenced 
primarily by public interests. Public interest influences on Alberta and Nova Scotia’s 
positions on devolution will be compared later in this chapter.
Circumstances that are unique to federal and provincial governments may also be 
relevant to this discussion. It is suggested that the federal government had the advantage 
o f  designing the devolution proposal to benefit itself, as demonstrated by the 
accountability framework. Although it is a contentious issue, this advantage stems from 
its official jurisdictional authority over unemployment insurance policies under both Part 
I and Part II o f  the El Act.
Compared to the federal government, provinces had to build their positions on 
devolution based on the initial proposal. As agreements were negotiated bilaterally, 
provinces did not have the advantage o f knowing how negotiations were progressing 
across the country. This brings to mind Alberta’s rationale for arguing for the inclusion 
o f  an equality clause that would allow them to improve the agreement should subsequent 
LMDAs offer a province a particular advantage.
While friction between federal and provincial levels o f government is evident in 
both provinces, there are notable differences. As evidenced by these case studies, the 
competing interests o f nation-building and province-building are more overt in Alberta 
than they are in Nova Scotia. In Alberta, disagreement over jurisdiction was vigorously 
and openly debated by federal and provincial teams that were relatively equal in terms o f 
policy expertise and self-confidence in their positions. Yet, in Nova Scotia, the
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competition between nation-building and province-building was more covert than 
witnessed in Alberta. For instance, this competition between national and provincial 
interests was illustrated by the temporary provincial disinterest towards engaging in 
federal-provincial dialogue about the federal proposal. Also, the federal capacity and 
experience in designing and implementing labour market policies stands in stark 
comparison to the dearth o f provincial expertise in this area. Consequently, even though 
more collaborative efforts are observed in Nova Scotia as compared to Alberta, provincial 
dependency facilitates this federal-provincial co-operation.
In sum, both levels o f government were influenced primarily by political interests 
and to a lesser degree, by public interests. Further, federal jurisdiction over the El Act 
allowed the proposal to be designed to extend political benefits to the federal government. 
In contrast, provinces were on the receiving end, as they had to develop their responses to 
the proposal within the restrictions o f the federal accountability framework. Moreover, it 
is argued that compared to Alberta, the dynamics o f federal-provincial competition are 
more covert in Nova Scotia. The next section o f this chapter will compare and contrast 
the evidence for political and public interest influences on provincial positions on 
devolution, as represented by Alberta and Nova Scotia.
Comparison o f  provincial governments’ positions
As described earlier, this thesis strives to understand why provincial governments either 
encourage or avoid devolution. Both Alberta and Nova Scotia were offered the same 
proposal for devolution, yet their responses differed significantly from each another. 
Comparing the two provincial stances on devolution should shed light on the similarities 
and differences that influenced these divergent provincial responses.
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Public interests are expressed in similar and in different ways in the two 
provinces. For both provinces public interests were, in part, about issues related to 
effectiveness and efficiencies. For Alberta, policy effectiveness could be achieved 
through provincial control. Again, the province held that because o f its superior 
understanding o f  local issues, it could make more effective decisions than those made by 
the federal government. Also, from the Alberta perspective, efficiencies would be gained 
if  labour market development responsibilities fell under the jurisdiction o f  only one 
government. Hence, the removal o f federal activity in labour market policy would 
succeed in reducing overlap and duplication o f provincial and federal policies and 
programmes.
In contrast to Alberta, the issues in Nova Scotia related to efficiencies had to do 
with concerns over the lack o f  resources available to develop an adequate provincial 
labour market strategy. In addition, Nova Scotia’s concerns about ‘effectiveness’ were 
reserved for the perceived limitations o f federal policies under both Part I and Part II o f 
the E l Act. Therefore, in contrast to Alberta, both political and public interest influences 
on Nova Scotia’s position interact with that province’s comparatively disadvantaged 
circumstances. The consequences o f regional impediments, and related dependency 
issues, challenge an uncomplicated distinction o f political and public interests in the case 
o f Nova Scotia.
Comparing the two provinces, it appears that public interest influences are more 
significant in Nova Scotia than they are in Alberta. In Alberta, political interests are quite 
evident as the jurisdictional dynamic emerges as an overarching theme. This strong 
position on jurisdiction is reminiscent o f the historical contentious relations between the 
federal and provincial levels o f  government. As in the case with energy policy, the
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province o f Alberta has no qualms that it is justified in its jurisdictional position on labour 
market policy.
This considerably bold and single-minded confidence regarding jurisdiction is 
severely lacking in the case o f Nova Scotia. Rather, in Nova Scotia, the position on 
jurisdiction is affected by the lack o f provincial capacity to initiate and sustain provincial 
activity in labour market development. Therefore, the devolution proposal induced a 
fearful provincial response in the anticipation that the federal government might abdicate 
its jurisdictional responsibility for labour market development. Compared to Alberta, it is 
possible that public interest influences are greater in Nova Scotia simply because public 
needs are more significant, and the capacity to respond to these interests is far less. Thus, 
when compared to Alberta, Nova Scotia’s greater sensitivity to public interests is 
understandable.
Although differences are apparent, these two provinces also have some similar 
experiences o f federalism and ensuing provincial-federal relations. Both provinces 
represent regional experiences that differ from the centre o f Canada, namely Quebec and 
Ontario. As reviewed earlier, both provinces have pointed to the historical tendency o f 
the federal government to favour political interests at the centre o f Canada. Further, the 
long-standing perspective o f both Alberta and Nova Scotia is that these advantages 
provided to central Canada have resulted in their relative economic and social
thdisadvantages as experienced in the early 20 century.
Further, as the 20th century progressed, federal objectives to build the nation have 
had costs for both provinces. Nation-building has been pitted against province-building 
as observed in the failure o f regional development strategies to revitalise Nova Scotia,
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and in the national objectives that served to challenge Alberta’s claims to jurisdiction 
over energy policy.
Yet, differences between the two provinces are quite significant for the findings in 
this thesis. Nova Scotia’s lack o f ability to fund its own labour market programmes 
stands in marked contrast with Alberta’s capacity to initiate and maintain these 
programmes. What cannot be avoided is the fact that despite its lack o f fiscal and policy 
ability in this policy area, Nova Scotia wanted to play a more significant role in these 
activities than they had in the past.
Nova Scotia was very vocal in its insistence that it had insights into the problems 
and barriers to improve the employability o f Nova Scotia citizens. There was strong 
support for the notion that the design and establishment o f a labour market approach for 
Nova Scotia had to respond to provincial social and economic realities through social 
development activities. This distinct provincial sensitivity about exactly how Nova 
Scotia’s problems should be tackled indicates that the province may have avoided 
devolution largely because o f its lack o f fiscal and policy capacity. It is possible that if 
they had had the advantage o f  greater capacity, Nova Scotia may have accepted the 
devolution proposal.
As reviewed earlier, Cairns (1988) suggests that as provinces build their capacity, 
they work towards maintaining and extending their political reach. This can be seen in 
the case o f Alberta. However, as mentioned earlier, even prior to its increase in wealth, 
the province identified itself as being unfairly disadvantaged by the federal system. For 
instance, Alberta felt that central Canada was built-up to the detriment o f western growth
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and prosperity. Yet, Alberta’s ability to respond more forcefully to perceived nation- 
building at the expense o f province-building became stronger beginning in the 1970s.
Also, as reviewed earlier, Cameron (1995) points to significant shifts in Alberta’s 
approach to intergovernmental politics. In the 1980s, Alberta asserted a political agenda 
to affect changes at a national level in order to achieve greater provincial rights. Yet, 
A lberta’s strategy shifted in the 1990s to pressuring the federal government to attend to 
perceived problems in the federation through promoting devolution. To broaden its 
power and political reach, Alberta pushed for greater autonomy through devolution. 
During the 1990s, Alberta strongly asserted its view on jurisdiction at intergovernmental 
forums.
As reviewed earlier, Savoie (1986) asserts that provinces like Nova Scotia face a 
quandary when an opportunity for devolution arises. I f  Nova Scotia perceives that its 
disadvantages are caused largely by federal policies that favour nation-building, they 
might prefer to promote devolution to gain control over the authorities and 
responsibilities necessary to make decisions that benefit their own economic interests.
Yet, in the case study investigated in this thesis, Nova Scotia lacked the necessary 
economic and policy capacity to design and implement labour market policies to extend 
political and public interests. As discussed, the province chose to refuse devolution 
because it could not maintain or improve these policies on its own. To safeguard political 
and public interests, the province refused devolution and chose to maintain status quo 
federal jurisdiction over provincial labour market development.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, the evidence presented in the thesis was analysed to evaluate the extent to 
which governmental positions on devolution are influenced by political and public 
interests. The analysis o f  the evidence from the three case studies concluded that both 
political and public interests influenced the devolution proposal. Yet, support for public 
interest influences was less than such support for political interest explanations.
In comparing these influences among federal and provincial governments, it was 
suggested that political interests dominate in all three cases but that public interests are 
more apparent in the case o f Nova Scotia. In comparison to Alberta, the saliency o f 
political and public interest influences on Nova Scotia’s position result from that 
province’s relatively disadvantaged status in the Canadian federal system.
In conclusion, the evidence o f this research does not support the proposition that 
devolution is a viable choice for all provinces. Devolution may be considered beneficial 
for fiscally independent provinces that desire greater control over policy and 
correspondingly less control for the federal government. However, provinces may not be 
able to readily benefit from devolution if  they are financially disadvantaged and reliant 
upon federal assistance. Provinces that lack fiscal resources and both administrative and 
policy infrastructure, may perceive fewer benefits in devolution. Nevertheless, the 
evidence does support the notion that federal-provincial agreements can create 
opportunity for provinces that lack capacity to participate more fully in labour market 
development through collaborative arrangements, while avoiding many o f the burdens 
and risks associated with devolution.
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The evidence supports the view that because o f the lack o f capacity that results in 
the inability o f some provinces to independently fulfil policy roles and responsibilities, 
the significance o f the federal government’s involvement in labour market training should 
not be discounted. To be clear, federal involvement must ensure a measure o f equity 
among provincial policies and programmes. It is recognised that federal decisions have 
resulted in decreased provincial capacity to meet citizens’ needs. For example, the 
federal decision to replace the Canada Assistance Programme with the Canadian Health 
and Social Transfer in 1996 imposed severe cut backs to programme funding that resulted 
in particularly harsh conditions in poorer provinces such as Nova Scotia (MacDonald, 
1998).
Because devolution was not a viable solution from the Nova Scotia perspective, 
this research questions the proposition that devolution should be held up as the only 
choice when responding to challenges to federalism and to demands from provinces for 
greater responsibility over policy. It is suggested that it is necessary to closely examine 
the reasons why some provinces desire devolution while others do not.
The next and final chapter will present an overview o f the thesis and will examine 
the relevance o f the main findings for different interpretations o f ‘provincial rights’. In 
addition, to place the findings o f  this thesis in comparative context, chapter 9 will briefly 
discuss the recent devolution that has occurred in the United Kingdom.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion: Devolution in Canada and Divergent Perspectives of Provincial 
Rights
Introduction
This chapter will address the purpose and plan o f the study undertaken by reviewing the 
significance o f each chapter presented in this thesis. Further, this chapter will discuss the 
implications o f the findings o f this thesis for the concept o f ‘provincial rights’. Also, 
commented upon in this concluding chapter, is the relevance o f this study’s findings for 
federal and provincial roles and responsibilities concerning matters o f national 
importance. Lastly, this chapter will offer a brief comparative o f the United Kingdom ’s 
recent experiences with devolution and Canadian devolution, as illustrated by the cases 
examined in this thesis. A comparative understanding o f the impact o f devolutionary 
processes on governance will help to examine the relevance o f the findings in this thesis 
for devolution in other jurisdictions.
Overview o f  the thesis
The earlier chapters examined theoretical concepts and historical information, while the 
latter chapters dealt more specifically with matters related to the case studies investigated 
in this thesis. The chapters presented early in this thesis highlighted the significance o f 
historical contexts pertaining to the establishment o f the Canadian federal system, and the 
ongoing development o f federal-provincial relations. The latter chapters examined the 
influences o f decisions made about the case study o f devolution by the federal, Alberta,
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and Nova Scotia governments, respectively. It was argued in the case study chapters that 
governm ents’ decisions on devolution occur within a historical context and are founded 
on patterns o f  cultural and political experiences.
Chapter 1 introduced the subject o f this thesis and reviewed the central research 
questions to be investigated. It was established that this thesis was pursuing an 
examination o f  the influences on decisions made about the devolution o f  labour market 
policies by federal and provincial governments in Canada in the mid- 1990s. This thesis 
sought to understand whether or not federal and provincial positions on devolution were 
driven by similar motivations and priorities.
Further, this research sought knowledge about the reasons why different 
provincial governments would either encourage or avoid devolution. It was noted that 
the research was going to investigate the extent to which federal and provincial 
governments’ positions on the devolution o f policy were influenced by political interests 
and to what extent were they influenced by public interests.
In Chapter 2, the theoretical concepts related to the political interest and public 
interest arguments were examined. This chapter explained that the political interest 
argument holds that governments are influenced primarily by the drive to seek and 
maintain power as they make decisions about the devolution o f policy. Moreover, 
governments are motivated by self-preservation as they seek out electoral support, and 
compete with each other to sustain and extend their political reach. It was argued that 
competition among governments is affected by regional diversity, and unequal power and 
economic distribution among provincial jurisdictions.
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Further, it was explained that the public interest argument supports the notion that 
governments make decisions about devolution based on the best interests o f citizens, 
though it was recognised at the outset that defining ‘best interests’ or ‘the public interest’ 
is highly problematic. It was stated that public interests are viewed as attempts to balance 
divergent special public interests, and to meet citizens’ universal interests, and are judged 
according to particular standards. As decentralisation and devolution are largely affected 
by the characteristics o f federalism, the chapter offered a historical overview, and 
examined some o f the principles that influence the contemporary debate about the 
Canadian federal system.
Prior to reviewing the case study o f  devolution investigated in this thesis, Chapter 
3 examined the concept o f decentralisation. To facilitate examination o f the case study, 
Chapter 3 examined definitions pertaining to decentralisation and devolution. The extent 
o f  decentralisation in Canada in comparison with other federal systems was examined. 
Based on this assessment it was argued that Canada is representative o f a relatively 
decentralised federation. Also, to increase insight about why federal and provincial 
governments might encourage or avoid devolutionary arrangements, the chapter 
examined the debate about the relative merits o f decentralisation and devolution. Various 
explanations were offered. It was suggested that divergent perspectives concerning which 
level o f  government has responsibility for national concerns, and how decentralisation 
affects policy outcomes serve to influence governments’ decisions on devolution.
Methodological considerations were examined in Chapter 4. This study utilised a 
qualitative and interpretive research focus. Twenty-four interviews were conducted with 
respondents, three o f which were elected officials who were interviewed early in the 
study to provide some introductory and background knowledge pertaining to the
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motivations o f  governments in relation to devolution. Twenty-one respondents 
interviewed in this study are civil servants who represent federal and provincial 
jurisdictions in Alberta and Nova Scotia. The civil servants who were interviewed are 
knowledgeable about the federal proposal for devolution, and most were directly involved 
in negotiating the labour market agreements for their respective provinces.
Chapter 4 discussed pertinent issues related to methodology including the case 
study approach, field research, and sampling and recruitment strategies. The instrument 
employed in this study and the procedures that were followed to collect data were 
described. Issues related to informed consent and other ethical considerations were also 
discussed. Limitations pertaining to the methodology were noted including the fact that 
only two provinces were examined, and the sample relied mainly on civil servants.
Chapter 5 examined the rationale for the federal proposal and explored the 
pressures that faced the federal government during this time period. Status quo 
federalism including the arrangements between the two levels o f government underwent 
serious criticism, and served to pressure the federal government to respond. It was 
suggested that prior to the official proposal, the federal government was strongly 
influenced by constitutional discord, the unity crisis and Quebec, and provincial demands 
for greater devolution. In fact, it was argued in this chapter that the federal devolution 
proposal was a response primarily to the unity crisis invoked by the Quebec referendum, 
and provincial calls for both jurisdictional clarification and realignment concerning a 
number o f policy files, including labour market policy.
Chapter 6 examined the political and pubic interest influences o f the province o f 
Alberta’s response to the federal proposal. It was noted that while political interests were
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strongly represented in the case study, public interests were also evident. However, it 
was suggested that the public interest argument was not strongly supported by the 
evidence. Furthermore, it may be the case that public interests were asserted in defence of 
the strong provincial position on jurisdiction. Yet, it is acknowledged that political and 
public interest influences overlap. Chapter 6 concludes that in the Alberta case study, 
though political interests appear greater, governmental positions are influenced by both 
political and policy interests.
In Chapter 7 the influences on Nova Scotia’s position on devolution were 
examined. This chapter discussed the reasons why Nova Scotia turned down the proposal 
for devolution and chose instead an agreement that maintains federal responsibility and 
leadership in provincial labour market policy. Nova Scotia’s strong position against 
devolution was influenced by the desire to avoid negative fiscal and political costs. In 
addition, Nova Scotia was also influenced by its perceived inability to improve labour 
market policy for citizens. Both political interests and public interests influenced the 
provincial position on devolution. Nova Scotia’s lack o f capacity to achieve effective and 
provincially determined policy outcomes is convoluted by the province’s dependency on 
the federal government. It was argued in Chapter 7 that Nova Scotia’s response to the 
federal proposal was determined primarily by its fiscal and social disadvantages in the 
Canadian federal state.
In Chapter 8, a comparative analysis o f the evidence was presented. This chapter 
compared and contrasted the influences on each government’s position on devolution. In 
this chapter, the evidence was analysed to evaluate the extent to which governmental 
positions on devolution are influenced by political and public interests. It was argued that 
according to the evidence from the three case studies, both political and public interests
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influenced the devolution proposal. However, the evidence tips the scales towards a 
political interest explanation much more clearly and convincingly than a public interest 
interpretation, in whatever ways the latter concept is defined. But while political 
influences on devolution proposals and policies weigh heavily in the argument, in the 
case o f  Nova Scotia this broad conclusion must be tempered by the finding that public 
interests had a clearly significant, almost equal role to play.
What this case study showed is while political and public interests might be 
separated analytically, in real cases o f policy-making they overlap. Also, the Nova Scotia 
case seems to suggest that it would be very difficult for purely political pressures and 
motivations concerning devolution plans to win out against public interests, especially in 
provinces or devolved administrations that are very dependent, economically, on the 
centre.
Provincial rights
The findings in this study suggest competing views o f provincial rights. An examination 
o f the evidence from a ‘provincial rights’ perspective reveals two very different 
provincial interpretations. The investigations o f the Alberta and Nova Scotia case studies 
as reviewed in this thesis, finds that both governments asserted positions that encourage 
and push for ‘provincial rights’. Yet, the definition o f ‘rights’ differs substantially 
between the two provinces. For Alberta, provincial rights are furthered by greater 
autonomy through devolution. Alberta’s position on devolution results, in part, from its 
view o f the appropriate federal role in labour market development policy. In the Alberta 
case study, the presence o f federal activity in this policy area is interpreted as federal 
interference in matters o f provincial jurisdiction.
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A lberta’s perception o f provincial rights contrasts with Nova Scotia, where 
‘rights’ are advanced through equitable access to resources through the redistribution o f 
wealth across provinces in the Canadian federation. For Nova Scotia, the lack o f federal 
involvement is perceived as a loss that could result in both political costs for the province, 
and could lead to less opportunity for Nova Scotians to fulfil their labour market 
development needs. Like Alberta, Nova Scotia’s interpretation is related to its view o f 
the appropriate federal role in this policy area. In the Nova Scotia case study, the federal 
government must play a significant role in labour market development in order for the 
province to achieve its expectations o f ‘provincial rights’.
As reviewed earlier, the political interest argument in this thesis suggests that 
governmental behaviour is motivated in part by self-preservation. Yet, as illustrated in 
this study, ‘self-preservation’ is interpreted and realised differently among wealthier and 
poorer provinces. Alberta’s interpretation o f rights as greater ‘autonomy’, and Nova 
Scotia’s view o f ‘equity’ as representative o f provincial rights, illustrates the difficulty in 
initiating symmetrical policies among provinces with divergent experiences o f federalism. 
The case studies in this thesis point to the challenge o f federalism to balance ‘autonom y’ 
and ‘equity’.
As noted earlier, Gibbins’ (1997b) holds that because the goal o f decentralisation 
is policy asymmetry among provinces, standards or rules to assure symmetry o f outcomes 
contradict with the rationality o f  decentralisation. With respect to provincial rights for 
equity, G ibbins’ (1997b) concerns about how decentralisation serves to undermine 
objectives o f  pan Canada equity seem relevant. The fulfilment o f provincial rights to 
autonomy may encourage asymmetrical policy outcomes that exacerbate disproportionate 
provincial levels o f economic stability and social well-being. Consequently, greater
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symmetry or ‘equity’ in policy outcome is antithetical to an asymmetrical approach to 
federalism that defends provincial autonomy.
The results o f this study that support the existence o f disparate interpretations 
from the provincial perspective o f ‘rights’ within the Canadian federal system have 
implications for the appropriate federal and provincial roles and responsibilities on 
matters o f  national concern. As discussed earlier, there is a debate over which level o f 
government should be responsible to deal with issues o f national importance. As 
mentioned earlier, it may be the case that a strict focus on provincial autonomy will evade 
attempts to ensure equitable distribution o f  wealth and policy resources. The findings o f 
this thesis provide some support for Kennett’s (1998: 15) notion that it is a ‘heroic 
assum ption’ that provinces are capable and willing to reach consensus on and develop 
national public policies.
In a similar vein, this thesis has shed doubt on the possibility o f  achieving inter­
provincial consensus on the devolution o f labour market policy and the appropriate 
accompanying role for the federal government. I f  continued federal involvement in Nova 
Scotia’s labour market policy or in the maintenance o f national standards threatens in any 
way Alberta’s perception o f its autonomy, then consensus would surely be unachievable. 
Likewise, provincial support would not be unanimous for an approach that seeks to 
extend provincial autonomy and discourage federally monitored national standards to 
protect some measure o f equity in resources and policy outcomes.
However, as also illustrated in this thesis, federal government actions do not 
always uphold and guarantee pan Canadian equity. Furthermore, the competition 
between national and provincial interests has hindered the achievement o f equitable
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redistribution o f Canada’s fiscal and policy resources across all provinces in the 
federation. As illustrated in this thesis, such political struggles tend to impede or at the 
very least dilute governmental objectives that are dedicated to realise pan Canadian public 
interests.
Comparative o f  devolution in the United Kingdom and Canada
Commentators such as Salmon (2001) note that over the last decade both Canada and the 
U.K. have experienced significant shifts in governance that test and stretch static 
interpretations and definitions o f federal and unitary states. This thesis supports Salmon’s 
(2001: 187) contention that Canada’s federal system is in a ‘fluid state’ as a result o f 
constitutional debates and deliberations about the ‘appropriate locus o f political decision 
m aking’.
As discussed earlier in this thesis, recent changes in the U.K. challenge 
interpretations o f unitary states that emphasise the supposed domination o f one central 
government reigning supreme over sub-national governments. The substantial devolution 
that has unfolded in the U.K. with the establishment o f the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh 
Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly illustrates the overgeneralisation o f  the 
inference o f ‘supreme reign’. Further, Salmon (2001: 187) holds that the U.K. is 
experiencing a transformation in governance as the devolution that has taken place in that 
country has resulted in a ‘certain “messiness” in seeking to come to definite statements 
about where constitutional and political power lies’.
Devolution in the U.K. provides the means for greater regional participation in the 
policy-making process. According to Morgan (2001), following hundreds o f years o f
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being ‘patronized and tolerated by their English neighbours’ Scotland and Wales are 
playing lead roles in defining the future o f Britain. In Canada, the devolution that led to 
the LMDAs succeeded in increasing autonomy and greater decision-making authority 
concerning labour market policy, especially among those jurisdictions that opted for full 
transfer o f responsibilities.
According to McEwen (2001: 97), though the Scottish Parliament provides the 
opportunity for the expression o f ‘Scottish distinctiveness’ in the development o f public 
policies, the convergence between the current regional executive and central 
governm ents’ perspectives on policy priorities serves to stymie regional autonomy. 
Further, while Scottish Parliament has control over distributive and regulatory power, 
W estm inster’s power over redistribution has encouraged a ‘continued dependence upon 
central government’ as illustrated by the Scottish Executive’s approach to poverty, for 
example (McEwen, 2001). Similarly, in Canada, provinces are reliant upon federal fiscal 
transfers and are vulnerable to federal fiscal restraint and the federal spending power. 
Further, as is the case in the U.K., the Canadian federal proposal for devolution illustrated 
the federal government’s intention to retain control and authority over important policy­
making decisions that have the potential to impinge upon provincial autonomy. Political 
interests o f the central governments’ in both countries are extended through control over 
the redistribution o f resources.
Moreover, devolution is affecting shifts in the conceptions o f citizenship and 
regional and national identities in both the U.K. (Morgan, 2001; McEwan, 2001) and 
Canada (Segal, 2001; Jenson, 2001). In both countries, the redefinition o f regional, 
provincial, and national identities is influenced largely by perceptions about the 
exclusivity o f identity (Salmon, 2001). The extent to which citizens distinguish and meld
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their Scottish-British and Alberta-Canadian identities, for example, will affect the relative 
strength o f  loyalty to one or the other.
Morgan (2001) suggests that devolution in the U.K. has unearthed a weakening 
British nationalism and has provoked an identity crisis among the English. This resonates 
with the Canadian unity crisis and English Canada’s determination to avoid any special 
treatm ent o f  Quebec perhaps, in part, for the fear that this would threaten long held 
beliefs among the English about what it means to be Canadian. Yet, it could be argued 
that English Canada simply refused to engage in an ‘identity dilemm a’, and chose instead 
to vilify the suggestions o f asymmetrical federalism and the recognition o f  a special status 
for the province o f Quebec. It is probably the case that Quebec’s desire for its position in 
the Canadian federation to be perceived as ‘distinct’ is much misunderstood in English 
Canada.
That devolution was the adopted federal strategy to pacify Quebec without 
insulting the integrity o f English Canadian identity is an interesting comparison with the 
U.K., where devolution, in part, appeased regional calls for greater authority and 
autonomy, yet challenged the definition o f Britishness. This does not imply that the 
concept o f  citizenship has remained unscathed in Canada. However, because this case o f 
Canadian devolution offered enhanced autonomy to all jurisdictions, the federal 
government was able to avoid the perception and ensuing repercussions o f extending 
special rights to a single jurisdiction.
Yet, as illustrated in this thesis, though the devolution o f labour market policies 
secured the perception o f ‘symmetry’ it actually resulted in ‘asymmetry’ largely because 
o f the uneven distribution o f fiscal and policy strength among jurisdictions. Divergent
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provincial expectations o f federalism and o f provincial rights to autonomy and equity are 
mirrored in the different choices about devolution. Perhaps Canadian and provincial 
identities may be inferred from these divergent and competing expectations o f  federalism 
and provincial rights.
Commentators on devolution in the U.K. also point to the implications o f 
devolution for richer and poorer sub-national administrations. Quigley (2001) argues that 
in the U.K., convergence between richer and poorer regions should be accomplished 
through planned and supported growth in regional wealth in poorer regions rather than 
through transfers from the central government. Yet, the lack o f ability among regions to 
manoeuvre monetary and fiscal policy levers could undermine such goals. Quigley 
(2001) remarks:
There could be considerable frustration if  the devolved institutions and the 
regions believe themselves to be performing effectively in the areas that 
are within their control and perceive their efforts to be frustrated or shed 
by the ineffectiveness o f national policy.
(Quigley, 2001: 168)
According to Quigley (2001), national policy must respond to the concerns faced 
by regions and encourage and strengthen regional endeavours to enhance social capital 
and regional economic development. This brings to mind Nova Scotia’s disappointed 
expectations o f the federal government in Canada. The divided sovereignty inherent in 
Canadian federalism has not resulted in national policies that have been successful in 
reinforcing the efforts o f poorer regions, such as Atlantic Canada, to strengthen their 
economies, and to enhance their autonomy and capacity to act independently o f  federal 
control. Time will tell if  devolution in the U.K. will result in more favourable economic 
conditions for poorer regions than has been achieved by Canadian federalism.
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Conclusion
This chapter presented a general survey o f this thesis. The thesis overview summarised 
the main findings and argued that the devolution o f governmental power and authority, as 
illustrated by this Canadian case study, was driven primarily, but not solely by political 
interests. Further, it was suggested that public interest influences, while subordinate in 
the case studies o f the federal and Alberta governments, were near equivalent to political 
interest influences in the case o f Nova Scotia.
The implications o f the main findings for the concept o f provincial rights were 
also examined in this chapter. As reviewed earlier, Alberta and Nova Scotia’s very 
different priorities and positions on devolution suggest a distinct divide in perceptions on 
how provincial rights are defined and realised. The findings o f the investigation 
undertaken in this thesis serve to highlight divergent perceptions o f provincial rights that 
are based on ‘autonomy’ and ‘equity’. For Alberta, devolution was accepted because it 
fostered greater provincial autonomy and control. However, in comparison with Alberta, 
Nova Scotia avoided devolution because o f concerns over perceived political and public 
interest losses.
Nova Scotia’s interpretation o f provincial rights is more strongly connected to the 
promotion o f  equity across all provinces in the federation, rather than with safeguarding 
autonomy over labour market development for individual provinces. In contrast,
Alberta’s interpretation o f these rights has more to do with greater provincial control and 
autonomy in the development o f labour market policies, rather than securing a measure o f 
equity concerning labour market opportunities among citizens in all Canadian provinces.
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Lastly, to place Canada in comparative context the chapter offered a brief 
discussion on the relevance o f the findings in this thesis for some o f the processes o f 
devolution that are unfolding in the United Kingdom. Canadian and British experiences 
with devolution exemplify the contemporary evolving nature o f governance that serves to 
challenge traditional definitions o f federal and unitary states. In both the U.K. and 
Canada, the extent to which devolution encourages regional and provincial autonomy is 
tempered by central political control over the redistribution o f  resources and by the 
relative wealth o f sub-national governments. Moreover, in both countries, devolutionary 
processes are shedding light on shifting perceptions o f national and sub-national 
identities.
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A ppendix  A
Interview Schedule for Respondents
Rationale and Context
I. Why did the federal government make the proposal for devolution? What factors 
influenced the federal proposal to devolve employment policies?
II. W hat was actually proposed for devolution?
III. W hat was the range o f  options/models made available to the provinces?
IV. From the respective provincial and federal perspectives what was to be gained and 
lost by any potential devolution? What were the costs-benefits for each level o f 
government?
V. Are you aware o f  any individuals or groups who disagreed with the choice to 
devolve employment programmes from the federal to provincial governments?
A. If  so, what were their objections and how did they rationalise their 
positions?
Process Issues Related to the Development o f the LMDA
VI. How was the proposal initiated? Who was involved in initiating the overall 
process?
VII. What were the terms o f  reference for the negotiations? For those given the 
responsibility to negotiate this agreem ent- what decisions had to be made?
VIII. Can you recommend any documentation (meeting minutes; briefs/reports etc.) that 
outlines the overall objectives o f the negotiations, including the choices and 
decisions that had to be made, and alternative scenarios to be considered?
IX. Were some issues more difficult to negotiate than others?
X. Was part I o f the El act, (The income benefits) on the table?
Federal and Provincial Attitudes. Priorities and Positions on Devolution and the LMDA
XI. W hat were the issues that were most important to the province?
A. Was the federal government yielding in these matters?
XII. Please describe the chosen model for the LMDA
XIII. Why was this model chosen over the alternate one(s)?
285
XIV. Did other options exist apart from the full transfer and co-management models?
XV. W hat were the advantages and disadvantages o f both the full transfer and co­
management models for the federal government?
XVI. W hat were the advantages and disadvantages o f both the lull transfer and co­
management models for the province?
XVII. Please comment on the level o f consensus between the federal provincial 
governments about the chosen model/structure.
XVIII. With respect to the terms o f  the agreement overall - to what degree were both 
governments satisfied with the final draft?
A. Did the province get what it wanted?
B. Did the federal government get what it wanted?
XIX. Could you comment on why some provinces may argue for models o f devolution 
that result in greater or lesser provincial authority and responsibility than others?
Lessons Learned
XX. W hat has been learned as a result o f this experience?
A. Should we promote or avoid further devolution?
XXI. Will some provinces benefit more than others within a more decentralised 
Canada?
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Appendix B 
Consent Form
Research Topic: Devolution in Canada
Researcher: Erin Gray BSW, MSW, PhD candidate (University o f Wales
Swansea) RSW (AB).
#444, 11044-82 Ave. Edmonton AB. T6G 0T2 
(780) 492-0405
Research Supervisor: Dr. Ken Blakemore, University o f Wales Swansea 
Singleton Park, Swansea, UK. SA2 8PP 
01792 295760
This consent form, a copy o f which has been given to you, is part o f the process o f 
informed consent. It should give you the basic idea o f what the research is about and 
what your participation will involve. If  you would like more detail about something 
mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take 
the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.
This research is conducted in part to fulfil PhD requirements o f the researcher’s 
programme o f study. In relation to devolution, the study explores the December 1996, 
Canada-Alberta Agreement on Labour Market Development and the April 1997, Canada- 
Nova Scotia Agreement on a Framework fo r  Strategic Partnerships.
You have been asked to contribute to the study based on your knowledge o f  the subject 
area. You have identified yourself as someone with knowledge about the December,
1996 Canada- Alberta Agreement on Labour Market Development or the April 1997, 
Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement on a Framework fo r  Strategic Partnerships.
You will be asked a series o f questions regarding the subject area and your responses will 
be tape-recorded. Your responses will be transcribed for analysis. Written and tape- 
recorded responses will be housed at Erin Gray’s address as noted above. Upon 
completion o f the study your responses may be retained for potential future data analyses.
As a participant o f the study your contributions will be identified as: a federal/provincial 
civil servant involved in &/or knowledgeable about the development and negotiations o f 
the Canada-Alberta Labour Market Development Agreement or the Canada-Nova Scotia 
Agreement on a Framework for Strategic Partnerships
Your involvement in this study is voluntary. Your signature on this form indicates that 
you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the 
study and agree to participate as a subject. You are free to withdraw from the study at 
any time. Please feel free to contact Erin Gray or Ken Blakemore at the addresses and 
phone numbers as outlined above, should you have questions concerning matters related 
to this research.
Your participation is very much appreciated.
Participant’s Signature______________________________ Date
Researcher_________________________________________ Date
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